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Self-Managed Superannuation Funds (SMSFs) play an increasingly important 
role within Australian retirement planning, with over a third of all superannuation 
savings held by SMSFs. This study adds to the relatively limited research on SMSFs 
through an examination of the investment decisions of SMSF trustees over the period 
prior to, during and after the 2008 global financial crisis. 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that SMSFs out-performed other superannuation 
providers during the 2008 global financial crisis, largely due to the high cash 
weightings within SMSFs. This study investigates whether or not there is evidence of 
an ideal investment strategy by SMSF trustees over the period 2005 to 2011, a period 
which encompasses a period of significant financial stress. The investment 
transactions of a sample of SMSFs over the period 2005 to 2011 were analysed in 
order to allow for observations to be made regarding the timing and nature of SMSF 
trustee investment decisions. The results of the analyses suggest that there is little 
evidence of an ideal investment approach adopted by SMSF trustees. SMSFs tended 
to increase market risk exposure prior to the global financial crisis, failed to take 
advantage of lower asset prices during the financial crisis and adopted a more 
defensive investment approach in the period following the financial crisis. The 
relationship between SMSF size and SMSF risk profile and trustee investment 
decision-making was also investigated, finding that smaller SMSFs tended to adopt 
the least appropriate investment approach and that only a weak relationship exists 
between SMSF risk profile and the investment approach adopted by the fund’s 
trustees. SMSFs within the sample also exhibited a number of behavioural biases and 
heuristics, including loss aversion, representativeness and cognitive dissonance. 
 
The findings of this study suggest that greater attention from policymakers 
and regulatory authorities on the investment decision-making of SMSF trustees may 
be required and that further research on the prevalence and impact of behavioural 
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The Self-Managed Superannuation sector plays an important role in the 
Australian retirement system, with nearly $500 billion of assets held within Self-
Managed Superannuation Funds (SMSFs) (Australian Taxation Office 2013). Given 
the importance of the SMSF sector within the context of the Australian retirement 
system, it is vital that policymakers, SMSF members and SMSF trustees are fully 
informed regarding the ability of SMSFs to meet member retirement needs, 
regardless of the prevailing state of the economy and financial markets. Whether or 
not SMSFs are able to fulfil the role of meeting member retirement needs depends 
largely on the investment decisions of fund trustees. Trustee investment decisions are 
of even greater importance during periods of financial stress and volatility, where 
inappropriate investment strategies and decisions can result in the erosion of member 
retirement assets. This study considers the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis 
on the SMSF sector. This study undertakes the first investigation into the investment 
trading behaviour of SMSF trustees in the period leading up to, during, and after the 
2008 financial crisis. 
 
1.2 Existing Research on the SMSF Sector 
The Australian superannuation system has been the subject of relatively 
extensive research, although the SMSF sector has received substantially less 
attention. This study adds to the growing body of research focused on the SMSF 
sector, with a particular focus on SMSF trustee investment decisions and the 
outcomes resulting from such decisions. Investor behaviour, decision-making and the 
various theories of investment management have a long history of research, however 
the SMSF sector has only attracted modest attention with regard to these avenues of 
investigation.  
The individual investment decisions of SMSF trustees are the key 
determinant of whether or not SMSFs are able to meet the primary requirement for 
SMSFs; that of meeting the retirement income needs of fund members. In this regard 
an assessment of the trading behaviour of SMSF trustees provides an approach for 
determining the likelihood of fund trustees fulfilling this requirement. This is 
particularly relevant over the period 2008 to 2009, which includes the global 
financial crisis. Research has shown that other investors traded more frequently 
during the crisis (Kallberg, Liu & Wang 2012; Tang et al. 2011), behaviour which 
may have been repeated by SMSF trustees. It has also been shown that investor 
wealth (Yamaguchi 2006) and the asset allocation decisions by investors have an 
impact on the level of investor trading activity (Mitchell et al. 2007). The extensive 
literature on the various theories of investment management and investor behaviour 
is also relevant to the SMSF sector and this study. This includes investment theories 
such as Modern Portfolio Theory, Arbitrage Pricing Theory and the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis; concepts which all offer SMSF trustees potential investment 
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strategies to adopt in the management of the fund’s assets. Behavioural finance 
theories and concepts such as Prospect Theory, loss aversion, overconfidence, 
representativeness and risk aversion are also of interest, given that the investment 
outcomes of SMSFs are simply a result of the decisions of the individual trustee(s). 
This study explores these relationships within the context of the Australian SMSF 
industry. 
 
1.3 Research Objective 
The objective of this study is to examine the trading behaviour of Australian 
SMSFs within the context of the 2008 global financial crisis. Specifically, the study 
investigates whether or not SMSF trustee investment decision-making was ideal, 
given the period of substantial investment stress which accompanied the financial 
crisis. This is done by comparing the trading behaviour of SMSF trustees during the 
crisis with their trading behaviour both prior to and following the crisis.  
 
 
To assist with this process a number of research questions were developed to 
be answered through the analysis of SMSF trustee trading behaviour over the period 
2005 to 2011. These questions are: 
 
1. Did SMSFs increase their exposure to cash and other defensive investments in the 
period leading up to the global financial crisis? 
2. Did SMSFs increase their exposure to market risk assets as stock markets 
bottomed and recovered in 2009? 
3. Have SMSFs become more conservative in their investment approach since the 
global financial crisis? 
4. Did larger or less risk-averse SMSFs behave differently as compared to smaller or 
more conservative SMSFs over the course of the global financial crisis? 
 
 To assist in answering these questions, a number of hypotheses regarding the 
trading behaviour of SMSF trustees were developed. These hypotheses are based on 
the initial assumption that SMSF trustees within the sample did not make ideal 
investment decisions prior to, during and following the financial crisis, and that there 
is no significant difference in the trading behaviour of SMSF trustees based on risk 
profile or fund size. These hypotheses are outlined in further detail in Chapter 2. 
 
1.4 Significance of the Research 
The level of assets now held within the SMSF sector accounts for over a third 
of all Australian superannuation savings (Australian Taxation Office 2013) . Over 
the period June 2000 to June 2011 the SMSF sector was the fastest growing segment 
within the superannuation system, with an increase in assets over that period of 
461% (KPMG ACFS 2011). There is little evidence to suggest any imminent 
decrease in the popularity of SMSFs among Australians, with the establishment of 
41,017 SMSFs in the 2012 financial year, the second-highest annual number of new 
SMSFs since the introduction of legislation permitting SMSFs (Australian Taxation 
Office 2013). Given the importance of the SMSF sector within the overall context of 
Australian retirement planning, it is desirable that the assets held within the sector 
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are managed as appropriately as possible. In this regard it is important that the 
relevant legislation covering the SMSF sector and the approach taken by the 
appropriate regulatory bodies act together to ensure the integrity of the SMSF sector. 
Academic and other research can play a role in assisting policy-makers to determine 
the most appropriate rules, regulations and strictures under which the SMSF sector 
must operate, yet to-date there has been comparatively little research into the SMSF 
sector. This study seeks to add to the body of literature concerning the SMSF sector, 
with a specific emphasis on the behaviour of SMSF trustees in times of financial 
stress. This complements other research which has examined the behaviour, 
performance, investment approach and activities of SMSFs (Phillips 2007, 2009, 
2011a, 2011b; Phillips, Baczynski & Teale 2009a, 2009b; Phillips, Cathcart & Teale 
2007). 
 
A distinguishing feature of this study is that it considers the trading decisions 
of SMSF trustees over a period of time, a period which includes the 2008 global 
financial crisis. While other studies have examined the investment decisions of 
SMSF trustees, these have focused on the investment exposure of SMSFs at a point 
in time. While such an approach can provide insights into the investment choices of 
SMSF trustees at that point in time, it does not allow for conclusions to be drawn 
regarding changes in SMSF trustee behaviour or decision-making over time. The 
time period covered by this study offers an opportunity to investigate SMSF trustee 
behaviour across a varied set of economic and financial circumstances. This period 
encompasses the relatively strong market returns in those years leading up to the 
financial crisis, the severe bear market of 2008-09 and the gradual recovery in those 
years following the financial crisis. This set of varied economic and market 
conditions may allow for a robust set of conclusions to be drawn regarding the 
investment trading behaviour of SMSF trustees.  
 
SMSFs have been generally viewed as having weathered the financial crisis 
better than other superannuation providers such as industry and retail superannuation 
funds. This out-performance was largely due to the comparatively larger cash 
holdings of SMSFs as compared to the other superannuation structures (Phillips, 
Baczynski & Teale 2009b). However there has been no investigation as to whether or 
not this high allocation to cash was a result of superior investment decision-making 
by SMSF trustees or simply a result of good fortune. The results of this study may 
provide an insight into the existence or otherwise of appropriate investment choices 
by SMSF trustees. 
 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
The scope of the study is restricted to the time period 2005 to 2011 and 
concerns only the investment transactions of a sample of SMSFs. The impact of the 
2008 financial crisis on the wider superannuation sector will not be discussed, nor 
will this study address matters such as the relevance of SMSF trustee demographics 
or the impact of regulatory change on the SMSF sector. 
 
The study seeks to address the primary research question of whether or not 
there is evidence that trustees of Australian SMSFs employed an ideal investment 
strategy over the period 2005 to 2011. With the benefit of hindsight, the ideal 
investment strategy have been one that resulted in decreased investment risk 
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exposure on the eve of the financial crisis and increased investment risk exposure as 
markets bottomed and subsequently recovered following the financial crisis. 
Anecdotal evidence and recent research appears to indicate that SMSFs generally 
out-performed other superannuation providers over the period encompassing the 
financial crisis (Phillips, Baczynski & Teale 2009b). The results of the study may 
clarify whether or not this outperformance was due to luck or the superior investment 
approach of SMSF trustees compared to alternative superannuation providers. 
 
The study analyses the investment decisions of SMSF trustees as a whole and 
also on the basis of SMSF size and risk profile. In this regard SMSFs within the 
sample are segmented according to the level of assets held within each fund on 1 
January 2005 (fund size) and the level of exposure of each fund to higher risk assets 
as at 1 January 2005 (risk profile). This segmentation allows for conclusions to be 
drawn regarding the impact of fund size or risk profile on the investment decisions of 
fund trustees and also whether or not trustees of larger or more aggressive funds 
behaved differently to trustees of smaller or more defensive funds.  
 
1.6 Summary of Main Findings 
The results of the analysis of the investment trading behaviour of SMSF 
trustees within the sample tends to suggest that trustees were not making ideal 
investment decisions over the period 2005 to 2011. There is little evidence that 
trustees acted to reduce market exposure prior to the onset of the financial crisis; nor 
is there evidence that trustees acted to take advantage of low asset prices as equity 
markets bottomed in early 2009 (although when segmented by size, there is evidence 
that medium-sized funds within the sample were more likely to take advantage of 
low asset prices). There is also evidence that SMSFs within the sample adopted a 
more conservative investment approach in that period following the financial crisis, 
behaviour which may not have been appropriate given the recovery in equity markets 
following the crisis. The results of the study suggest that the apparent 
outperformance by SMSFs over alternative superannuation structures during the 
financial crisis may be more a result of good fortune rather than good judgement. 
SMSFs within the sample appeared to hold high levels of cash during those years 
when market returns were positive leading up to the crisis (in 2005, 2006 and 2007) 
but there is little evidence to indicate an increase in cash holdings over that period, 
activity which would suggest that SMSF trustees were appropriately reducing their 
market exposure in the lead up to a significant bear market. SMSF trustees within the 
sample also tended to make investment decisions in a reactive manner; that is, they 
adopted a more conservative approach following the crisis, a period which saw most 
asset markets record strong growth. When considered on the basis of fund risk 
profile, the results indicate that SMSF trustee risk profiles change over time, 
seemingly in response to changes in investment conditions.  The analysis also 
provides information with regards to the ideal size of a SMSF, suggesting that 
smaller SMSFs tended to adopt the least appropriate investment strategy over the 
period 2005 to 2011. 
 
The results of the analysis also suggest the existence of a number of 
behavioural biases within the sample group. These include loss aversion and regret 
avoidance, where SMSF trustees appeared unwilling to sell assets which would have 
fallen in value during the financial crisis. SMSF trustees within the sample also 
 5   
 
exhibited other biases and heuristics such as cognitive dissonance, representativeness 
and the availability heuristic. SMSFs within the sample tended to behave as though 
they expected the prevailing set of market conditions to continue indefinitely and 
appeared to place too great a weight on recent events and the likelihood of these 
events re-occurring in the future. The findings of this study suggest that greater focus 
on the investment related aspects of a trustee’s role may be appropriate, rather than 
the existing legislative and regulatory focus on SMSF compliance and 
administration. 
 
1.7 Structure of the Study 
The study is organised as follows. The next chapter, Chapter 2, presents a 
review of the literature relevant to the SMSF sector and this study in particular. This 
review includes key concepts and theories such as investor behaviour, theories of 
investment management and the impact of the global financial crisis on investor 
trading patterns. Chapter 3 describes the data that forms the basis of this study and 
outlines the analysis of this data. The study is based on a sample of SMSFs and the 
nature of the data and the limitations of the sample data are also outlined in this 
chapter. Chapter 3 also outlines the research objective, questions and hypotheses 
which form the basis for the study. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the results of the 
analysis. Chapter 4 presents the results of the analysis of the SMSF sample as a 
whole, while Chapters 5 and 6 present the results of the analysis on the basis of fund 
segmentation according to size and risk profile respectively. Chapter 7 discusses the 
results of the analysis presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The study concludes with 
Chapter 8, which summarises the key findings, provides answers to the research 
questions identified in Chapter 3, identifies any implications resulting from the study 
and outlines areas for potential further research relating to the SMSF sector. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
The SMSF sector is an important component of Australia’s retirement 
system, yet there has been comparatively little empirical research into the ability of 
SMSFs to meet the requirements of their members and satisfy the policy objectives 
of law-makers and regulatory bodies. This study aims to add to the body of 
knowledge concerning the SMSF sector, with a specific emphasis on the investment 
decision-making of SMSF trustees. This is done within the context of the time period 
encompassing prior to, during and after the 2008 global financial crisis. Theoretical 
areas which are relevant to the study include investment strategies and decision-
making, regulatory theory, and behavioural finance. We now proceed to Chapter 2 
where the literature related to these theoretical areas and their relevancy to the SMSF 




 6   
 
 




The Australian superannuation sector is now an entrenched and vital 
component of the Australian financial system. With over $1.5 trillion of assets, the 
sector is an important source of investment capital and plays a key role in the 
retirement funding plans of a majority of retired and working Australians (Cooper 
Review 2010). With general support from all major Australian political parties, it is 
likely that the sector will only grow in scale and importance in coming years. Given 
this significant role within the Australian financial system, it is no surprise that the 
sector has attracted a significant level of academic research. On the other hand, the 
SMSF sector has attracted far less attention, a surprising situation given that over a 
third of superannuation assets are held within SMSFs (Cooper Review  2010).  
 
As is the case with much of the financial sector, SMSFs operate within a 
strict regulatory framework, largely underpinned by federal government statute. 
These include the Superannuation Guarantee Administration Act 1992 and the 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993. It is important that this regulatory 
environment is considered when assessing the nature of the SMSF sector or the 
behaviour of participants within the industry. As SMSFs are fundamentally the 
retirement savings investment vehicle for one or more fund members, the investment 
decisions of fund trustees are an important determinant of whether or not SMSFs are 
in a position to meet the needs of fund members. The behaviour and decision-making 
of SMSF trustees can therefore be assessed with reference to the body of financial 
and economic theories and models which seek to explain the investment decision-
making of investors.  
 
This chapter provides the theoretical basis for a study of the investment 
decision-making of SMSF trustees, through a review of the literature relevant to 
SMSFs and investment decision-making. This chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 2.2 outlines literature relevant to the general Australian superannuation 
system, detailing the history and purpose of superannuation. Section 2.3 details 
current research relevant to the SMSF sector in particular. This section serves to 
outline both the importance of the SMSF sector, and to illustrate the relevant paucity 
of published academic research regarding the SMSF sector. Section 2.4 highlights 
the theories of investor behaviour and decision-making that are relevant to the SMSF 
sector, while Section 2.5 considers the regulatory framework within which the SMSF 
sector operates. Section 2.6 discusses the theoretical investment strategies that may 
be utilised by SMSF trustees, and finally, Section 2.7 focuses on those studies which 
have considered investor trading purely within periods of financial stress, including 
the global financial crisis of 2007-08.  
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2.2 The Australian Superannuation System 
The Australian superannuation sector is now a permanent and important 
fixture within the Australian retirement income system. Superannuation in Australia 
can be traced as far back as the mid-19th century, although at that stage it was 
restricted to certain occupations, most notably banking and the public sector 
(Bateman 2002). A National Superannuation Scheme was debated in the years 
following World War II and was outlined and recommended in the Hancock Report 
(National Superannuation Commission of Enquiry 1976), though this was later 
rejected by the Fraser government (Carmichael & Plowman 1985). It was not until 
1992 and the implementation of the Superannuation Guarantee Administration Act 
(Cwlth) and the subsequent Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act (Cwlth) that 
superannuation became recognisable as the system we know it today (Australian 
Treasury 2001). The introduction of superannuation was intended to assist 
individuals in saving for their eventual retirement through compulsory employer 
contributions to an eligible employee’s superannuation account. 
 
2.2.1 The Superannuation Contributions Guarantee 
 The defining characteristic of the current Australian superannuation system 
is the effective requirement that employers contribute a certain percentage of an 
eligible employee’s salary, over and above their actual wage, to a specified 
superannuation fund, known as the Superannuation Guarantee Charge (SGC) 
(Morling & Subbaraman 1995). This was a significant change to the superannuation 
system, which until that point had been predominately voluntary in nature and 
covered only a small proportion of employees. The SGC effectively penalised those 
employers which did not make superannuation contributions for employees at the 
minimum prescribed rate. Commencing in 1992-93 at 4 per cent of the salary of 
eligible employees of firms with payroll in excess of $1,000,000 (and 3 per cent for 
firms with payroll below that level), the minimum contributions rate has increased to 
be 9.25 per cent as of 1 July 2013 as per the Superannuation Guarantee 
(Administration) Amendment Act (Cwlth). In 1995-96 the federal government had 
announced plans to increase the superannuation contributions rate over time, 
reaching a minimum of 15 per cent for most employees by 2002-03, however this 
pledge was not upheld by subsequent governments (Morling & Subbaraman 1995).  
Despite the failure to increase the minimum superannuation contributions rate as 
promised, the superannuation sector grew in size as the number of eligible employees 
increased over time. As the superannuation industry grew in both size and 
importance, it attracted an increasing level of attention from researchers. Not all 
conclusions drawn were complimentary to the concept of involuntary 
superannuation. Freebairn (1998) considered the impact of superannuation on the 
labour market under both a flexible and rigid wage model, concluding that the 
minimum superannuation contributions requirement acted much like a tax, with 
people on lower incomes worse off than in the absence of the minimum contributions 
requirement. A later paper by the same author assessed the long run labour market 
effects of the SGC, finding that wages and employment both fall in the presence of 
the SGC (Freebairn 2004).  
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2.2.2 Superannuation and Choice of Fund 
Other researchers have focused on the issue of choice of superannuation fund, 
which came to the fore following the passage of the Superannuation Legislation 
Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Act 1993 (Cwlth). This legislation 
was significant in the development of the superannuation industry, in that it allowed 
the majority of employees to select their own superannuation fund, rather than be 
restricted to a union or employer selected fund.  Fry, Heaney and McKeown (2007) 
suggested that few fund members would switch their superannuation following 
passage of the legislation, a view confirmed by Clare (2006) who found that 
switching rates were lower than had been expected prior to the implementation of the 
legislation. Fry et al. (2007) did however expect that the SMSF sector would be a 
beneficiary of the new freedom of employees to select their superannuation fund, 
although this change was downplayed by Clare (2006), who found that the rate of 
establishment of SMSFs actually decreased in the years immediately following the 
implementation of superannuation choice.  Choice of fund in terms of switching from 
a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan has also been the subject of 
investigation, with research showing that fund members did not necessarily act 
rationally in making the decision to switch funds and that there was a correlation 
between demographics and the choice made by the fund member (Clark-Murphy & 
Gerrans 2001, 2004; Clark-Murphy, Kristofferson & Gerrans 2002). It was found 
that younger males with lower incomes tended to find the decision to switch 
superannuation funds an easy one, while women and older age groups tended to find 
the decision comparatively more difficult. Overall the evidence is somewhat mixed 
as to whether or not the advent of superannuation choice resulted in better outcomes 
for fund members. 
 
2.2.3 Active and Passive Investment Management 
As superannuation is essentially a structure for holding and managing assets 
set aside to fund retirement, the theoretical and empirical aspects of portfolio 
management theory and practice play an important role in the ability of 
superannuation to meet the retirement income needs of fund members (Phillips 
2007). The question of active versus passive investment management has been of 
considerable interest to researchers, not only in the context of superannuation but 
also with regards to the management of all tradeable investments (active investment 
management involves making deliberate investment decisions so as to outperform an 
identified benchmark, while passive management does not try to outperform the 
benchmark (Evanson Asset Management 2011)). The literature reports extensive 
investigations into the relative merits of active and passive investment strategies, 
with arguments made both in favour of active management (Cremers & Petajisto 
2009; Grauer, Hakansson & Shen 1990) and passive management styles (Barber & 
Odean 2000; French 2008; Malkiel 2003b). A related debate concerns the relative 
importance of asset allocation as compared to asset selection. It has been argued that 
asset allocation is the primary determinant of returns, with asset selection playing a 
secondary role (Ibbotson & Kaplan 2000), an argument that has been viewed as 
providing support to advocates of passive investment management. 
 
This path of investigation has also been applied to the investment 
performance of Australian superannuation funds. Early work by Drew and Stanford 
(2001) showed that fund trustees could earn higher risk-adjusted returns with a 
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passive rather than active asset selection strategy. Later work reinforced the notion 
that a passive investment management style was in the fund members’ best interests 
(Drew, Stanford & Taranenko 2001). The relationship between past and future 
performance has also been considered. Researchers found that there was no 
indication that past performance was a useful predictor of future returns (Drew, 
Stanford & Taranenko 2001; Drew, Stanford & Veeraraghavan 2002).  
 
2.3 The Self-Managed Superannuation Sector 
As a sub-sector of the Australian superannuation industry, SMSFs have not 
attracted the same level of research attention as that focused on the retail and 
industry superannuation funds. As the level of assets invested through SMSFs has 
grown however, so has the interest of researchers, although it was not until 2004 that 
the first paper specifically focused on the SMSF sector was published. In this initial 
paper Valentine (2004) largely concentrated on the regulation of SMSFs, 
recommending that the investment strategies of SMSF be more closely regulated, a 
stance somewhat at odds with the raison d’etre of SMSFs.  
 
Phillips (2007) published a more detailed consideration of SMSFs, analysing 
the microstructure of a sample of 41 SMSFs. Although the small SMSF sample size 
was acknowledged, the analysis still provided the first detailed published 
investigation of the contents of SMSFs and of the biases and investment choices of 
SMSF trustees. Of particular interest was the observation that SMSFs adopted a ‘buy 
and hold’ methodology, which is a variant of a passive investment strategy. This 
hints that, despite the ‘self-managed’ moniker of SMSFs, few trustees may actually 
practice active management of their SMSF assets. 
 
2.3.1 The Investment Performance of SMSFs 
The investment performance of SMSFs is important, as the introduction of 
SMSFs essentially allowed for the transfer of investment decision-making 
responsibility away from professional investment managers in industry and retail 
superannuation funds and into the hands of the trustees of each SMSF. As SMSF 
trustees are not required to meet any educational qualification requirements or 
possess any minimum level of investment expertise, it may be reasonable to assume 
that the investment performance of SMSFs would lag their larger counterparts.  The 
first investigation of the investment performance of SMSFs was undertaken by 
Phillips et al. (2007). Based on sample of 40 SMSFs, the authors found that SMSFs 
not only suffered from a lack of diversification, but also underperformed the broader 
market index on a risk-adjusted basis. Later research considered the performance of 
SMSFs specifically over the period 2007-08 (Phillips, Baczynski & Teale 2009b). In 
this instance it was found that SMSF investment performance over the period 
compared favourably with retail superannuation funds, although the risk-adjusted 
equity component of SMSFs underperformed the broader market index. It was 
suggested that the high cash levels of SMSFs may have insulated SMSFs from the 
steep equity market falls during 2007-08 to a certain extent, although the question of 
whether or not this was a deliberate strategy by SMSF trustees leading into the bear 
market (being a market fall in excess of 20%) was not addressed. If SMSF trustees 
deliberately increased cash levels leading up to the GFC, this would potentially 
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indicate the existence of a well-timed investment strategy by SMSF trustees to 
reduce market exposure immediately prior to a significant bear market. However, if 
SMSF trustees have consistently over-weighted cash regardless of the economic 
environment and stock market returns, this may indicate that the relatively 
favourable investment performance of SMSFs through 2007-08 was largely due to 
luck. 
 
This issue forms the rationale for a number of the questions addressed 
through this thesis. Firstly, with the benefit of hindsight, were SMSF trustees making 
ideal investment decisions leading up to the 2008 financial crisis? For example, it 
would have been ideal for SMSF trustees to be reducing their equities exposure and 
increasing their exposure to defensive assets (cash and fixed-interest investments) in 
the period prior to the stock market falls in 2008-09. This leads to a second question 
to be answered by the dissertation: do SMSF trustee investment decisions over the 
period under investigation show evidence of an ideal and consistent investment 
strategy? For example, once the Australian stock market ‘bottomed’ in 2009, it 
would have been ideal at that time for SMSF trustees to increase their market 
exposure and reduce their level of defensive assets, thereby benefiting from the 
recovery in equity markets in 2009-10. 
 
Given the size of the SMSF sector, where SMSF trustees are now responsible 
for the management of over a third of total Australian retirement savings, the issue of 
whether or not SMSF trustees are making appropriate investment decisions is worthy 
of further consideration. Poor investment decision-making by SMSF trustees 
potentially poses a threat to the efficient operation of Australian capital markets, 
given the level of assets now controlled by SMSF trustees (Phillips, Baczynski & 
Teale 2009b). It is easy to envisage competing superannuation providers such as 
retail and industry funds making claims that the largely unregulated investment 
decision-making process of SMSF trustees poses a risk to member’s retirement 
savings, thereby requiring a greater level of regulatory scrutiny and perhaps the 
eventual erosion of the advantages which initially attracted SMSF members to the 
sector in the first place. 
 
2.3.2 SMSF Risk and Returns 
While the investment performance of SMSFs is important, this must be 
assessed within the context of the level of investment risk adopted by SMSF trustees. 
The ability of SMSFs to generate returns in excess of the equity risk premium has 
been considered, with results showing, inter-alia, that SMSF returns were below the 
riskless rate of interest (Phillips, Baczynski & Teale 2009a).  This raises important 
questions about the rationale for the existence of SMSFs and the ability of SMSF 
trustees to adequately manage their assets. The risk/return trade-off and its relevance 
within the SMSF sector has also attracted the attention of researchers. Phillips (2009) 
considered whether larger SMSFs would have a higher allocation to risky assets than 
smaller funds, finding that the size of the fund was irrelevant in determining SMSF 
allocations to risky assets (this conclusion has a bearing on this study, which 
considers whether or not larger SMSFs exhibited a different pattern of investment 
trading behaviour as compared to smaller funds. Chapter 5 presents the results of the 
analysis of SMSF trustee trading behaviour on the basis of fund size). The high cash 
allocations of SMSFs were again noted, tying in with findings from earlier research 
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(Phillips, Baczynski & Teale 2009b). Phillips (2011a) determined the relative risk 
coefficient of the average SMSF trustee, finding that SMSF trustees were too risk 
averse, to the point where SMSF trustees would be unable to grow or maintain their 
share of economic wealth. This raises further questions about the ability of SMSF 
trustees to appropriately manage SMSF assets. A question which has not yet been 
considered is the extent to which SMSF trustees receive and follow investment 
advice. It may be that SMSF trustees who pay for expert advice regarding their 
investment decisions achieve superior results compared to those trustees who opt not 
to receive such advice, or it may be that the perceived fee savings of a ‘do-it-
yourself’ superannuation fund more than outweigh any benefit offered by expert 
investment advice. This question is as yet unanswered by the existing literature 
regarding SMSFs, however it is beyond the scope of this study and potentially 
presents an avenue for further research. 
 
2.4 Investor Behaviour 
The investment outcomes of SMSFs are a direct consequence of decisions 
made by either the trustees or their investment advisors. Behavioural finance, which 
seeks to provide explanations and reasons as to why market participants make the 
decisions they do (Sewell 2007), can therefore be utilised as a tool for assessing the 
decisions of SMSF trustees. 
 
2.4.1 Prospect Theory 
One of the earliest contributions to behavioural finance (which is considered 
a sub-section of behavioural economics) was Prospect Theory, outlined by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory showed how individuals evaluate 
potential gains and losses from a range of alternatives with varying degrees of 
probability. Most importantly they found that individuals tend to discount outcomes 
subject to uncertainty in comparison to outcomes of which there is no uncertainty 
(Sewell 2007). Through empirical evidence Kahneman and Tversky were able to 
show that individuals, far from showing the indifference expected of rational agents, 
exhibited loss aversion in that a loss was felt more keenly than a gain of equal 
magnitude. Further refinement of Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky 
resulted in the development of Cumulative Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky 
1992). Cumulative Prospect Theory differed from the original Prospect Theory in 
that it allowed for the weighting of the cumulative probability function, rather than 
the individual probabilities as under the original Prospect Theory. According to 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992), the value of a prospect can be determined as: 
 




for ߨᵢ =  ߨᵢ˖ if i ≥ 0 and ߨᵢ =  ߨᵢି if i ≤ 0 
 
Therefore the value of a prospect V, is a function of the decision weight (πᵢ) 
and the value of each of the prospect's potential outcomes (ݔᵢ). See Barberis (2013) 
and Edwards (1996) for a review of Prospect Theory and the application of the 
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theory in mainstream economics. Building on the work by Kahneman and Tversky, 
further research showed that loss aversion was also dynamic: losses were felt more 
keenly if they were preceded by other losses, but less keenly if preceded by other 
gains, otherwise known as the ‘house-money’ effect (Barberis & Huang 2001; Thaler 
& Johnson 1990). Loss aversion is closely related to the disposition effect, which 
refers to the tendency for investors to sell their winners and hold on to their losers, 
first outlined by Shefrin and Statman (1985) and later covered by Odean (1998). 
 
2.4.2 Mental Accounting and Other Cognitive Biases 
A further extension of Kahneman and Tversky’s work was outlined by Thaler 
(1980), who introduced the notion of ‘mental accounting’, which describes the 
process whereby households and individuals exhibit multiple attitudes to risk. This 
entails compartmentalising financial assets such that assets set aside for different 
purposes are treated differently with respect to risk. Other common behavioural 
biases of investors which have been identified include regret avoidance (Bell 1982), 
‘naïve’ diversification (Benartzi & Thaler 2001), overconfidence (which manifests 
itself in over-trading) (Barber & Odean 2000; Glaser & Weber 2007) and herding 
(Hong, Kubik & Stein 2005). 
 
An important aspect of behavioural finance is the role of heuristics in 
decision-making, which describes the use of ‘rules of thumb’ by investors. Faced 
with complex decisions in uncertain environments, investors simplify the decision-
making process according to rules of thumb (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). One of 
the more common heuristics is the representative heuristic, which describes the 
tendency of people to rely on the categorisation of events as typical or representative 
of that type of event (Kahneman & Tversky 1972). Another important heuristic is the 
availability heuristic, whereby investors rely on the ease of recalling a specific 
incident as an indication of the probability of such an incident repeating itself 
(Frieder 2004). The availability heuristic is closely related to the concept of recency 
bias, whereby investors place greater emphasis on recent events in framing their 
expectations of future events. For a comprehensive review of the literature associated 
with behavioural economics, including discussions regarding concepts such as 
overconfidence, the endowment effect, framing and choice confusion, see 
DellaVigna (2009). 
 
2.4.3 Risk Aversion 
As the investment transactions of SMSFs are a function of the decisions of 
SMSF trustees, the concept of risk aversion plays an important role in shaping the 
decision-making process of SMSF trustees. With respect to investor behaviour, risk 
aversion describes an individual’s preference for a lower return with a relatively 
known probability as compared to a higher return with an uncertain probability. 
Seminal work by Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) established the existence of both 
relative and absolute risk aversion. Relative risk aversion describes an investor’s 
willingness to accept risk based on a percentage of wealth, while absolute risk 
aversion describes the amount of wealth an investor is willing to expose to risk as 
wealth changes. While some have argued otherwise, it is generally accepted that 
investors exhibit constant relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion 
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(Chiappori & Paiella 2011; Kihlstrom, Romer & Williams 1981), behaviour which 
would be expected to be replicated by SMSF trustees. 
 
Given that SMSFs are commonly managed by trustees without the assistance 
of professional advice, it is possible that the investment decisions of trustees exhibit 
a number of the cognitive biases explained by behavioural finance (and indeed this is 
possibly the case even where trustees have sought professional advice). As yet 
SMSFs have not been comprehensively examined within the framework of 
behavioural finance, with the exception of work by Phillips (2007) and Phillips et al. 
(2007). This suggests an avenue for further research concerning SMSFs. This study 
addresses a number of the concepts of behavioural finance within the context of 
SMSFs, however a full analysis of the relationship between SMSF trustee investment 
decisions and behavioural finance is beyond the scope of the study. 
 
2.5 Regulation 
The regulatory regime which applies to any specific industry or sector plays 
an important role in setting out the structural framework within which the relevant 
industry participants must operate. There are a number of different regulatory 
regimes which can be implemented by policymakers, the selection of which depends 
on the aims of policymakers and the relevant industry and regulatory authority. 
 
2.5.1 Rules, Risk and Principles-Based Regulation 
In terms of the regulatory regime which applies to financial services in 
general, the regulatory system chosen by policymakers tends to be a varying mix of 
principles, risk or rules-based regulation (Black, Hopper & Band 2007; Black 2008; 
Peterson & Fensling 2011). Principles-based regulation relies less on detailed or 
prescriptive rules and more on broad or high-level guidance or principles which are 
intended to be followed by participants (Black, Hopper & Band 2007). Principles-
based regulation has been viewed as allowing industry flexibility while encouraging 
innovation and competition, however the global financial crisis of 2008 has led to 
questions regarding the effectiveness of such regulation, given that much of the 
financial sector in developed economies was subject to principles-based regulation 
(Black 2008).  
 
Risk-based regulation focuses on prioritising the activities of regulators and 
making the most efficient use of available resources according to evidence-based 
assessments of risk. Regulators focus attention on those areas where the risk of a 
negative event is highest, according to a pre-determined measure of the event’s 
likelihood and its severity (Peterson & Fensling 2011). Criticism of risk-based 
regulation has focused on the requirement for accurate measurement of risks, and the 
difficulty in validating whether or not the regulation was effective in regulating 
behaviour (Danielsson 2003; Peterson & Fensling 2011).  
 
Rules-based regulation is generally viewed as the direct opposite to a 
principles-based regulatory system. Rules-based regulatory systems are implemented 
on the basis that principles-based systems may lead to situations where good faith 
judgments lead to differing outcomes for identical events or circumstance. In 
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contrast, rules-based regulation is seen as being less ‘grey’, with greater clarity over 
allowable or forbidden actions (Benston, Bromwich & Wagenhofer 2006). One of 
the reasons commonly cited for favouring rules-based regulatory systems over 
principles-based systems is the increasingly litigious nature of modern economies. 
The downside of rules-based regulations however, is the propensity for it to lead to a 
‘tick-the-box’ approach to compliance, where risks are perhaps not fully understood 
or investigated (Anand 2009). 
 
The Australian SMSF sector, in line with much of the Australian financial 
sector, is subject to a mixed regulatory regime encompassing both rules and 
principles-based regulation (Bateman 2003). The usage of principles-based 
regulation within the SMSF sector has tended to focus largely on the investment 
selection processes of SMSFs, which is attractive to superannuants who seek 
flexibility in managing their retirement assets. Conversely however, the degree of 
flexibility allowed by principles-based regulation may also be responsible for some 
of the reported failings and abuses of SMSFs. While components of the SMSF sector 
regulatory regime exhibit a principles-based approach, a proportion of the legislation 
adopts a rules-based approach. This includes rules governing trustee eligibility, the 
lodgement of SMSF accounts and documents, the treatment of in-house assets and 
procedural requirements for receiving and paying member contributions and 
withdrawals, as outlined in the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 
(Cwlth). 
 
In general the rules-based components of superannuation legislation tend to 
focus more on the procedural aspects of SMSFs, while the investment related aspects 
of SMSFs are subject to principles-based regulation. This distinction between the 
two regulatory approaches is both a reason for the apparent popularity of SMSFs, yet 
also explains some of the instances of abuse and mismanagement of SMSFs which 
can occur. An important question that as yet remains unanswered, is the extent to 
which changes to the financial services regulatory regime, as a consequence of the 
2008 global financial crisis, have impacted (or will impact) the SMSF sector. The 
predominate regulatory changes to the financial service sector since the crisis are 
encapsulated in the Future of Financial Advice bill (Corporations Amendment 
(Future of Financial Advice) Act 2012) and the reforms which form part of the 
federal government’s Stronger Super program (Australian Treasury 2012). Given the 
short time frame that has elapsed since the implementation of these reforms, the 
precise impact on the SMSF sector is as yet unclear. This again suggests an avenue 
of further research related to the SMSF sector, although this too is beyond the scope 
of this study. 
 
2.6 Investment Strategies and Theories 
A SMSF is essentially a portfolio of investment assets which must be 
managed by fund trustees for the benefit of members. Although the size of SMSFs 
may differ from investment portfolios managed by institutions on behalf of their 
clients or members, the basic approach of maximising returns while minimising risk 
remains the same. In that regard, the different theories and approaches of portfolio 
management are highly relevant to the SMSF sector, as they offer trustees a number 
of alternative methodologies to follow in the management of SMSF assets.  
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2.6.1 Modern Portfolio Theory 
One of the most well-known portfolio management theories available to 
SMSF trustees is Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), which focuses on the use of 
diversification as a tool for maximising portfolio returns for a given level of risk. 
MPT is based on the principle that the level of risk of a portfolio can be lowered by 
taking into account the correlations between the assets which make up the portfolio 
(Markowitz 1952). Expected portfolio return for a given level of portfolio risk can be 
maximised by careful selection of the weightings of each available asset. 
Alternatively, the level of portfolio risk can be minimised for a given level of 
expected portfolio return. A number of extensions to MPT have been developed, 
however the classical calculation of the expected return of a portfolio can be 
expressed as: 
ߤ =  ܧ[ܴ]  = ෍ ߤ݅ݔ݅݊
݅=1  








ݔ௜ ≥ 0, ݅ = 1, 2, … , ݊ 
 
According to MPT, the set of all possible portfolio combinations (ߪଶ, ߤ) is 
the attainable set. An investor is then able to select that combination which provides 
his or her desired risk/return outcome, as long as reasonable values for ߤ௜ and ߪ௜,௝ can 
be obtained (Markowitz 1952). MPT has been subject to criticism that a number of 
the definitions and assumptions underpinning the theory are invalid (Vincent 2011; 
Resnik 2010). In particular, MPT’s definition of risk, which focuses on the volatility 
of both the investments and the portfolio, has been criticised as being unrealistic 
(Vincent 2011). MPT treats all volatility as undesirable, whereas volatility which 
results in increasing asset values would be welcomed by SMSF trustees. MPT has 
also been criticised for its reliance on historical data, which may not necessarily be 
an indication of the future behaviour of particular investments or asset classes 
(Vincent 2011). Resnik (2010) argued that MPT failed investors during the global 
financial crisis of 2008, where diversification based on the principles of MPT still 
resulted in significant losses to investors across most asset classes.  
 
Despite the criticism of MPT, the theory continues to have a role in 
investment management, being extended to include aspects of behavioural finance 
(Curtis 2004; Davies & de Servigny 2012) and as the foundation for further 
development of theories of risk and return. For a review of MPT see Elton and 
Gruber (1997). While MPT does suffer from some limitations, it does offer SMSF 
trustees a framework for the management of their fund assets, although previous 
research has shown that the typical SMSF portfolio is most likely not optimised in 
terms of mean-variance analysis (Phillips, Cathcart & Teale 2007). Despite concerns 
regarding the assumptions underpinning MPT, further extensions to Markowitz’s 
work have been published since 1952, most notably Sharpe’s Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM), which focused on the risk of an investment relative to the overall 
market (Sharpe 1964). The CAPM itself has been criticised, relying as it does on its 
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close relationship to MPT and with considerable empirical evidence of the real-world 
failure of the CAPM (Bornholt 2013; Brown & Walter 2013; Dempsey 2013; Roll 
1977; Fama & French 1992, 1993). In any event it is unlikely that many SMSF 
trustees would be familiar with the CAPM and therefore be in a position to apply the 
principles of the CAPM in their investment approach.  
 
2.6.2 Arbitrage Pricing Theory and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
An alternative investment theory which SMSF trustees may choose to adopt 
is Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), which involves determining the expected return 
of an asset using a linear equation which takes into account a number of different 
macro-economic factors, ranging from interest rates and currency levels to changes 
in inflation (Roll & Ross 1984; Ross 1976). Similar to MPT, APT is based on the 
premise that an asset’s covariance with other assets is more important than the 
volatility of the asset itself – how the price of the asset moves in relation to other 
assets matters more for portfolio construction than the magnitude of the asset’s own 
price movements (Shanken 1982). Taking into account asset covariance and a 
number of macro-economic factors, investors are able to use APT to construct 
portfolios with the highest expected rate of return. A criticism regarding APT 
concerns the choice of macro-economic factors - different researchers have proposed 
the use of differing factors; this introduces an element of subjectivity into the 
application of APT (Roll & Ross 1984). As yet there is no evidence that a significant 
proportion of SMSFs utilise APT as a framework for the management of fund assets, 
possibly due to a lack of awareness of its existence or the difficulty in applying the 
theory in real world situations. 
 
A potentially more useful investment theory, in terms of the approach 
adopted by SMSF trustees, is the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The EMH is 
based on the premise that current stock market prices reflect all information relating 
to the specific stock, which implies that it is not possible to achieve investment 
returns in excess of the market return on a risk-adjusted basis (Fama 1970). Fama 
outlined three variations of the EMH: weak - where current stock prices reflect past 
publicly-available information; semi-strong - where current stock prices reflect both 
current and past publicly known information; and strong - where prices reflect all 
public and private current and past information. Later work by Fama (1991) 
reviewed the literature associated with the EMH and made slight changes to the 
categorisation of the variations of the EMH, although the key principles of the EMH 
were retained. A more recent review of capital market efficiency by Valentine  
(2010) noted some of the well-known anomalies of the EMH, notably the Weekend 
Effect and the Monday Effect. Despite some doubts as to the empirical validity of the 
EMH, it holds appeal for those investors who believe that selecting individual 
investments or following investment theories such as MPT or APT will not lead to an 
outcome which is consistently superior, on a risk-adjusted basis, to holding the 
market portfolio. Such investors usually construct their investment approach around 
the use of low-cost exchange-traded index funds which aim to replicate a specific 
index (Malkiel 2005). Supporters of the EMH are also more likely to advocate the 
implementation of a ‘buy and hold’ investment strategy (Malkiel 2003a). Adoption 
of the EMH as an investment methodology offers SMSF investors a relatively 
straightforward approach to managing fund assets, and one which may also appeal to 
the ‘do-it-yourself’ nature of many SMSF trustees.  
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 Whether or not SMSF trustees have adopted the EMH as a core investment 
theory may be evident through an analysis of the investment transactions of SMSF 
trustees. By analysing the investment decisions of SMSF trustees over a given time 
period, it should be apparent whether trustees adopted a ‘buy and hold’ investment 
strategy as advocated by the EMH, or pursued a more active investment approach. 
Evidence of a tendency of SMSFs to follow ‘buy and hold’ strategies would confirm 
earlier findings by Phillips (2007), who also noted that a ‘buy and hold’ strategy, in 
conjunction with infrequent trading, has been shown to outperform more active 
investment management approaches. 
 
2.7 The 2008 Global Financial Crisis and Trading Activity 
Of relevance to this study is existing research which focuses on the trading 
behaviour of both individuals and institutions during financial crises, including the 
2008 financial crisis. With respect to institutional trading decisions during the 2008 
financial crisis, it has been found that institutional investors faced a significant 
increase in trading costs during the financial crisis, while liquidity decreased more 
sharply for smaller, more volatile stocks (Anand et al. 2011). The authors also found 
that institutions adjusted their trading toward more liquid stocks at the expense of 
less liquid stocks, possibly explaining the change in liquidity experienced by smaller, 
more volatile stocks. Researchers have also considered the role of equity funds 
(managed funds) in exaggerating the effects of the financial crisis, where it was 
found that funds with exposure to financial stocks during the crisis were subject to 
large investor redemptions, forcing those funds into asset fire-sales and thus 
propagating the effects of the crisis (Hau & Lai 2012). Similar research found that 
hedge funds were even more likely than equity funds to sell off their holdings during 
the crisis, thereby potentially amplifying the effects of the crisis (Ben-David, 
Franzoni & Moussawi 2011). 
 
2.7.1 The Trading Patterns of Individual Investors 
While the trading behaviour of institutional investors during the financial 
crisis is of some relevance, SMSF trustees more closely resemble the typical retail or 
individual investor, as compared to institutional investors, being as they are 
essentially ‘do-it-yourself’ funds. Tang et al. (2011) carried out a similar 
investigation to that of this study, focusing on the trading patterns of 401(k) plan 
participants in the United States during the 2008 financial crisis. 401(k) plans bear 
many similarities to SMSFs, particularly with regards to allowing a substantial level 
of individual control over the investment of available funds. The authors considered 
the frequency of trading by 401(k) plan participants, finding that trading increased 
during the financial crisis. It was also found that participants exhibited a flight to 
safety as the crisis deepened, although this change was not significant enough to be 
viewed as panic trading by investors. The demographics of plan participants was also 
taken into account, showing that novice traders were more likely to trade than traders 
with greater experience and that female and lower-wealth participants were over-
represented in the novice trader category. In a similar vein, a more recent study 
found that during the 2008 financial crisis Chinese investors increased their trading 
frequency (Kallberg, Liu & Wang 2012). The authors also found that the financial 
crisis tended to amplify the disposition effect; that is, during the crisis Chinese 
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investors were more likely to sell their winners and hang on to their losers. It was 
also shown that investors tended to reduce the level of risk within their portfolios 
during the crisis. The authors concluded that the investor behaviour was consistent 
with two behavioural finance concepts; the disposition effect and loss aversion.  
 
2.7.2 Trading Patterns, Investor Wealth and Asset Allocations 
It is reasonable to expect that investor wealth has some bearing on the 
investment trading decisions of individual investors. Individuals with a greater level 
of wealth (particularly investable wealth) may be either more sophisticated in terms 
of investment awareness or experience than less well-off investors, or more likely to 
take greater investment risks. The issue of investor wealth and trading activity was 
considered by Yamaguchi (2006), who found that wealthier individual investors were 
likely to trade more frequently than their counterparts with less wealth, although it is 
not clear that this increased level of trading necessarily resulted in a greater level of 
exposure to investment risk. It is possible that this finding may be replicated with 
respect to SMSFs, with larger funds (taken as an indication of greater wealth) 
potentially making a greater number of investment transactions than smaller funds. It 
is not obvious however that larger SMSFs would be more active traders under all 
market conditions – for example, would larger SMSFs make a greater number of 
trades in both rising and falling markets? These questions form the basis of one of 
the hypotheses to be addressed by this study, where the relationship between SMSF 
size and trading behaviour will be investigated under the premise that larger SMSFs 
exhibit more frequent trading activity than smaller SMSFs.  
 
The relationship between 401(k) plan trading patterns and the asset allocation 
of each plan was explored by Mitchell et al. (2007), who found that investors who 
held index funds or lifecycle funds within their 401(k) plans were less likely to trade. 
The same study also found that investors holding international funds were also less 
likely to trade. This potential relationship between existing asset allocations and the 
level of trading activity forms the basis of one of the hypotheses to be addressed by 
this study, which is based on the premise that SMSFs with a higher allocation to 
equities are likely to trade more frequently. For example, it is possible that a higher 
allocation to equities may be an indication of a more sophisticated investment 
approach by a SMSF trustee, which would be likely to lead to more frequent trading 
activity. On the other hand, a less sophisticated investment strategy might be 
evidenced through a higher allocation to defensive assets, with a corresponding 
decrease in the expected level of trading activity.  
 
2.7.3 The Financial Crisis and Changes in Investor Risk Appetites 
One of the advantages of analysing investor behaviour over the period 2005 
to 2011 is that it allows us to determine the impact of a period of acute financial 
stress on the risk appetites of investors. Standard investor risk profiling, as used by 
financial advisers, is based on the premise that an individual’s risk profile is 
relatively stable, although it is likely to change over time as an individual grows 
older and approaches retirement. This approach ignores the potential impact on risk 
appetite of both rising and falling investment markets. Hoffman et al. (2011) 
considered the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the risk tolerance and risk 
perception of investors, assessing how changes in tolerance and perception 
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subsequently affect both investment performance and risk taking by investors. In 
general it was found that there was a significant increase in the level of investor 
trading activity, as also reported by Tang et al. (2011) and Kallberg at al. (2012). The 
authors concluded that the more successful investors during the crisis traded less 
during the period and also took on less risk and that this outperformance was linked 
to the investor’s lower risk tolerance and higher return expectations. However, it was 
also found that after the crisis the successful investors became more risk tolerant, 
were more likely to trade and therefore no longer outperformed relative to previously 
less-successful investors. It was hypothesised that perhaps the investors had become 
over-confident in their abilities and subsequently altered their investment strategy to 
their detriment, a behavioural bias previously outlined by Barber and Odean (2000). 
 
The question of the level of risk taken by investors during the financial crisis, 
as outlined by Hoffman et al. (2011), has relevance to one of the questions to be 
answered by this study. That is, have SMSF trustee investment decisions become 
more conservative since the financial crisis? If the financial crisis had no lasting 
impact on the risk tolerance of SMSF trustees, an analysis on SMSF trustee 
investment decisions since stock markets bottomed in early 2009 should show an 
increase in market exposure by SMSFs as markets recovered. Whether or not this 
occurred will be evident through an analysis of SMSF trustee investment decisions 
over the period March 2009 to the end of 2011. This analysis forms the basis of 
testing one of the study’s assumptions, which is that SMSFs have become more 
conservative in their investment decision-making since the financial crisis.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a review of the existing literature relevant to this 
study, focusing on the Australian superannuation system and the Self-Managed 
Superannuation sector in particular. Areas of literature which are relevant to this 
study include investor behaviour, regulation and investment strategies and theories. 
Key investment theories such as the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, Modern Portfolio 
Theory, the Capital Asset Pricing Model and newer concepts involving behavioural 
finance all have an impact, however minor, on the SMSF sector. The review has also 
identified a number of further areas for research which are not covered by this study, 
but present questions to be potentially addressed through further work. These include 
questions regarding the usefulness or otherwise of investment advice in relation to 
SMSFs; the prevalence of well-known investor biases amongst SMSF trustees and 
the impact of recent financial services sector reforms on the SMSF sector.  
 
Given the size and scope of the SMSF sector, it would be expected that the 
sector had attracted a concomitant level of attention from researchers. A review of 
the literature focusing on the SMSF sector reveals this not to be the case. It may be 
that the heterogeneous nature of the sector is a partial cause of this phenomenon, 
given that there are over four hundred thousand individual SMSFs with no 
centralised or standardised reporting or record-keeping obligations, outside of annual 
taxation returns (Cooper Review 2010). This lack of centralised access to the 
investment transaction decisions of SMSF trustees potentially acts as a barrier to 
detailed analysis of the operation of SMSFs and the decision-making of SMSF 
trustees. The SMSF sector should, however, present a fertile field for academic 
research, given the relevancy of many topical investment theories and strategies to 
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the SMSF sector. This study seeks to add to the relatively small body of literature 
concerning the SMSF sector, presenting as it does an analysis of the investment 
trading decisions of SMSF trustees over the period 2005 to 2011. The next chapter, 
Chapter 3, outlines the research questions and hypotheses to be addressed by the 
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The previous chapter outlined a number of the key theories of portfolio 
management theory and investor trading behaviour. The state of the Australian 
superannuation system, and more specifically the Self-Managed Superannuation 
sector, and the impact of the various theories of portfolio management on 
superannuation were also discussed. Despite the growing importance of SMSFs in 
Australian retirement planning, there has been relatively little attention paid to the 
investment decisions of SMSF trustees, who collectively are responsible for the 
management of over $416 billion of assets (Australian Taxation Office 2012). This 
chapter outlines the research methodology adopted in this study of the investing and 
trading behaviour of SMSF trustees. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify and outline the research questions 
and hypotheses to be addressed by the study and to describe the data used for the 
analysis component of the study. Steps taken during the analysis of the data are also 
explained and any limitations which may apply to the data or to the analysis are 
outlined. Finally any ethical issues which are relevant to the study are considered. 
The chapter begins with an outline of the research objective and questions, which are 
an outcome of the theoretical discussions outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
3.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research objective of this study is to examine the trading behaviour of 
Australian Self-Managed Superannuation Funds within the context of the 2008 
global financial crisis. In consideration of the research objective, the research 
question may therefore be summarised as follows:  
 
Is there evidence that Australian Self-Managed Superannuation Funds employed 
ideal investment strategies leading up to, during and after the 2008 global financial 
crisis? 
 
In the context of the study, ‘ideal investment strategies’ are defined as the 
implementation of investment strategies which resulted in an increased allocation to 
cash and other defensive assets as markets rose prior to the financial crisis and an 
increasing exposure to assets with a higher level of market risk during the period 
immediately prior to March 2009 when stock markets bottomed. It is likely that such 
a strategy of prudently reducing exposure to market risk assets as stock markets 
peaked and then increasing market risk exposure as stock markets neared their lows 
in early 2009 would have resulted in superior risk-adjusted investment returns. 
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Following on from the primary research question, a number of secondary 
research questions were developed. These questions focused on specific areas of 
investigation of the study, as follows: 
 
1. Did SMSFs increase their exposure to cash and other defensive investments in the 
period leading up to the global financial crisis? 
 
2. Did SMSFs increase their exposure to market risk assets as stock markets 
bottomed and recovered in 2009? 
 
3. Have SMSFs become more conservative in their investment approach since the 
global financial crisis? 
 
4. Did larger or less risk-averse SMSFs behave differently as compared to smaller or 
more conservative SMSFs over the course of the global financial crisis? 
 
A number of hypotheses were developed in order to address the identified 
research questions. The null hypothesis was used in testing these hypotheses. That is, 
the hypotheses to be investigated are based on the expectation that SMSFs did not 
employ the ideal investment strategies leading up to, during and after the financial 
crisis, and that there was no difference in trading behaviour based on fund size or 
risk profile. The hypotheses are: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  There was no significant difference in the cash allocations of SMSFs 
between the years leading up to the global financial crisis. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  There was no significant difference in the exposure to riskier assets by 
SMSFs between the years leading up to the global financial crisis and 
as stock markets bottomed in 2009. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  There was no significant difference in the exposure to riskier assets by 
SMSFs between the periods prior to and following the global financial 
crisis. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  There are no significant differences between the trading behaviour of 
large SMSFs and small SMSFs during the period 2005 to 2011. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  There are no significant differences between the trading behaviour of 
risk-seeking and risk-averse SMSFs during the period 2005 to 2011. 
 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 focus on the specific actions taken by SMSF trustees 
prior to, during and after the global financial crisis. Hypotheses 4 and 5 examine 
more general behaviours of SMSFs, in particular whether or not specific 
characteristics of SMSFs such as size or asset allocation are relevant with regards to 
the trading behaviour of SMSFs over the time period 2005 to 2011. 
 
3.3 Research Design 
The question of research philosophy plays an important role in the research 
design and in the approach taken in data collection. In terms of the paradigm adopted 
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by this study, it most closely falls within a functionalist paradigm, which is problem 
oriented in approach (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009). The study adopts a 
quantitative approach to an investigation of the various attributes of SMSFs; seeking 
out rational explanations for SMSF trustee decisions and behaviour and identifying 
potential opportunities for policymakers to improve the ability of the SMSF sector to 
meet fund member needs. 
 
The study primarily follows a deductive approach, although some aspects of 
the study may also be seen as inductive in nature. A substantial component of the 
study meets a number of the characteristics which define the deductive approach 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009). Firstly, causal relationships between variables 
are identified; for example, was an over-weight cash position in SMSFs brought 
about by deliberate actions by trustees or was it simply a reflection of an 
unsophisticated investment strategy? Secondly, the researcher is independent of what 
is being observed. That is, the research is based on the analysis of existing historical 
SMSF investment data, ensuring researcher independence. Thirdly, concepts will be 
operationalised. In this regard SMSF asset weightings, investment decisions and 
other concepts are defined such that they can be measured quantitatively. Finally, 
generalisations will be made. That is, findings and conclusions are based on an 
analysis of a sample of SMSFs, allowing for generalisations of the wider SMSF 
sector. Some components of the study however, will be more suited to an inductive 
approach, as outlined by Egan (2002). For example, in assessing the impact of the 
2008 financial crisis on the asset allocation decisions of SMSFs, the research begins 
with observations regarding the change in asset allocations, progresses to the 
detection of specific patterns in SMSF allocation decisions, formulates one or more 
tentative hypotheses which can be explored and culminates in drawing general 
conclusions or hypotheses regarding the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on SMSF 
asset allocation decisions.  
 
In regards to the type of research undertaken, this study is most closely 
identified as being explanatory research, where causal relationships between a 
number of the different variables under consideration are explored (Saunders, Lewis 
& Thornhill 2009). The research strategy is primarily one of archival research, based 
on the historical data of a sample of SMSFs, utilising quantitative analysis 
techniques. An important feature of this study is that it is longitudinal in nature. 
Previous research into the SMSF sector has largely been cross-sectional in nature, 
focusing on the sector at a point in time, be it the current regulatory regime or current 
SMSF microstructure or industry macrostructure. In comparison, this study outlines 
changes in the composition of a sample of SMSFs and the changing investment 
decisions of the funds over a period of time. This will allow for a discussion of the 
various factors which influence individual SMSFs and the industry as a whole under 
differing market and economic conditions. 
 
3.4 SMSF Sample Data 
The study is based on the quantitative analysis of a sample of Australian 
SMSFs. The sample consists of two primary data sets: the investment transactions of 
a number of SMSFs over the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2011, and the 
asset allocation of the same SMSFs as at the end of each quarter over the same time 
period. One of the advantages of using the SMSF sample data is that it is primary 
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data and is thus not susceptible to some of the disadvantages of using secondary data, 
such as reliability, validity and measurement bias (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 
2009). The discrepancies that can arise when using multiple secondary data sources 
were also outlined by Deininger and Squire (1996) and Atkinson and Brandolini 
(2001). The accuracy of the primary data which forms the SMSF sample data is 
important, however it can be expected that such data is accurate, being that it forms 
the basis of SMSF tax reporting obligations. 
 
The SMSF sample data was provided by a number of financial services firms 
involved in the administration and management of SMSFs, with around 180 
individual SMSFs initially included in the sample. The financial services firms were 
based in Queensland and New South Wales. A number of other organisations and 
institutions were approached regarding participation in the study, however time and 
resources constraints and perceived privacy concerns were cited as reasons for 
precluding their participation in the study. Due to the inability of other organisations 
to participate, the sample cannot be said to be random. The sample data will likely 
have a bias to the geographical location of the participating financial services firms, 
in addition to a socio-economic bias to the typical type of client serviced by each 
firm.  Due to the nature of the subject matter, a truly random representative sample 
would not be possible without access to the investment transaction and asset 
allocation data relating to all SMSFs over the period 2005 to 2011. Such access 
would not be possible due to the nature of the SMSF industry, specifically the 
absence of a centralised data repository. This issue is discussed in further detail 
below. 
 
The sample is drawn from a wider population of approximately 278,244 
SMSFs as at June 2004 (Australian Taxation Office 2009). While the size of the 
proposed sample is relatively small when compared to the size of the general 
population of SMSFs, the sample will be large enough to draw generalisations as to 
the characteristics and nature of the general population of SMSFs. Taking into 
account the size of the general population of SMSFs, the number of funds needed to 
provide a more representative sample can be calculated using the formula published 
by the American National Education Association (Krejcie & Morgan 1970). This 
formula can be used where the population size is known, as is the case with the 
SMSF sector in 2004-05. The formula is outlined below: 
 
s = X2NP(1 − P) ÷ d2(N − 1) + X2P(1 − P)   
 
Where: 
s = required sample size 
X2 = the table value of chi-square for 1 degree of freedom at the desired confidence 
level 
N = the population size 
P = the population proportion (assumed to be .50) 
d = the degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (.05) 
 
Based on a population size of 278,244 SMSFs in 2004 and a chi-square value 
of 3.841 (representing a 95% confidence level), the ideal sample size can be 
calculated as 384 SMSFs. This is a larger sample size than that used in this study. 
While a larger sample would be preferable, working with an overly large sample of 
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SMSFs would be impractical as SMSF data is held across multiple information 
technology systems across multiple organisations, without consistent or mandated 
record-keeping systems, making data aggregation for many funds unfeasible given 
the time and resource constraints of the study. The only current source of aggregated 
data regarding SMSFs is the information reported to the Australian Taxation Office 
by SMSF trustees on an annual basis as part of their annual taxation obligations. 
However, this information would not include transaction data and access to the data 
is restricted. Furthermore, each individual SMSF may potentially generate hundreds 
of individual transactions per year and each transaction must be tracked and taken 
into account in analysing asset allocation or selection. An analysis of a large sample 
of SMSFs in this manner would likely require a time commitment beyond the scope 
of this study. As a result of these factors the study makes use of convenience 
sampling, which entails selection of the most easily available data, in this case the 
data provided by those firms which agreed to participate in the study. Such an 
approach involves less time, cost and resources than other sampling techniques, 
however it is likely that the data resulting from such a sample will be less robust than 
that provided by other approaches such as surveys or random sampling techniques 
(Marshall 1996). 
 
3.4.1 The SMSF Sample in Detail 
The initial SMSF sample contained the details of 180 SMSFs which had been 
in existence over the period 2005 to 2011. The data was made available in spread 
sheet format, with each SMSF assigned a unique fund identifier. The data relevant to 
each fund was contained within 29 individual spread sheets. Sheet 1 contained a list 
of all the investment transactions for a specific fund from 1 January 2005 to 31 
December 2011. Sheets 2 to 29 contained quarterly ‘snapshots’ of the contents of 
each fund as at the end of each quarter beginning 1 January 2005. This included the 
contents of each fund as at 1 January 2005, which marked the starting asset 
allocations for each fund. The funds differed in size, with the smallest fund holding 
assets worth $8,217 as at 1 January 2005, while the largest fund at the same time 
held total assets of $2,124,200. The data was held on a number of commercially 
available portfolio administration software packages which allowed for the recording 
of investment transactions and bank account movements within each fund. The 
investment transactions and quarterly contents of each fund from 2005 to 2011 was 
the only data made available for the study.  
 
The fund data was anonymous and did not disclose any fund-specific data 
beyond the investment transactions and allocations. Data regarding each fund which 
was not made available included the name of the fund; its domicile; any demographic 
details regarding the fund trustees or members; the fund’s investment strategy; the 
risk profile of the fund trustees and the age of the fund or the extent to which the 
fund’s investment decisions were the result of third-party advice. The issue of the 
scope or use of third-party advice by the sample SMSFs is particularly relevant given 
the primary focus of the study into the investment decisions of SMSFs.  The financial 
services firms which provided the data indicated that financial advice was provided 
to fund trustees where requested, however in all cases the fund trustees were at 
liberty to accept or reject any such advice, and all final investment decisions rested 
solely with the fund trustees. 
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While it is reasonable to conclude that some of the investment decisions 
made by fund trustees and subsequently included in the study were the result of 
advice provided by third-parties such as stockbrokers or financial advisors, this does 
not necessarily render any such data unusable with respect to the study. SMSF 
trustees likely base their investment decisions on information provided by a number 
of different sources, be they professional advisers or brokers, newsletters and the 
internet or other forms of media. The investment transactions of each SMSF are 
ultimately the sole responsibility of the fund trustees, regardless of how these 
investment decisions are reached by the fund trustees. As the study seeks to assess 
the investment decisions of fund trustees over time, the source or sources of such 
decisions do not detract from any conclusions drawn from the analysis. 
 
3.4.1.1 Sample transaction data in detail 
The SMSF transaction data was initially drawn from 180 individual SMSFs. 
Of this dataset a number funds were excluded as they were either opened or closed 
during the period under investigation, therefore failing to meet a key criterion for 
inclusion in the study. This left 93 SMSFs which had existed for the full period from 
1 January 2005 to 31 December 2011. The total number of investment transactions 
carried out by these SMSFs amounted to 24,651 transactions; however a number of 
these transactions were conducted prior to 1 January 2005 or after the period 31 
December 2011. After these transactions were excluded, the total number of SMSF 
transactions amounted to 22,570 and comprised of nine distinct transaction types. 
The nine different types of transactions carried out by the sample SMSFs included 
asset sales and purchases, investment conversions, capital returns and interest 
reinvestment. The total number of each transaction type is shown in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 List of investment transaction types in SMSF sample data 
Transaction type Number of transactions 
Call for payment                                           135  
Capital return                                        8,250  
Conversion purchase                                           758  
Conversion sale                                           638  
Dormant sale                                             33  
Purchase                                        7,754  
Purchase (DRP)                                           872  
Restructure of units                                             70  
Sale                                        4,060  
Total transactions                                     22,570  
 
Of the total investment transactions contained within the SMSF sample data, 
the most frequent transaction type was an investment purchase. ‘Call for payment’ 
was a specific transaction type where the SMSF trustee had purchased an investment 
where a subsequent payment at a later date was required to effect full ownership. A 
‘capital return’ describes a transaction where a payment to an investor includes a 
capital component, thus reducing the investment purchase price by the amount of the 
capital return. ‘Conversion purchase’ and ‘conversion sale’ related to the acquisition 
or sale of investments due to corporate activity. For example, a share issue 
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consolidation would result in the ‘conversion sale’ of the original investment and the 
‘conversion purchase’ of the new number of securities in the holding undergoing the 
share consolidation. A ‘dormant sale’ was the effective sale of a holding where it was 
deemed that the securities held no economic value, usually in the case of bankruptcy 
of a listed company. ‘Purchase (DRP)’ signified the acquisition of an investment 
through a dividend reinvestment process. ‘Restructure of units’ described the process 
where additional units where issued to security-holders, usually through the use of 
bonus share issues or similar. 
 
Of the nine investment transaction types, capital returns, conversion 
purchases and conversion sales were excluded from further analysis as these 
transaction types only affected the cost base or the number of units held by the 
SMSF. Dormant sales were also excluded, as this type of transaction was not a 
willing sale of an investment by the SMSF trustee, but merely reflected the 
bankruptcy and eventual delisting of an investment. Any transaction types identified 
as restructuring of units were also excluded, as this transaction also simply resulted 
in a change to the number of units held in a specific investment by the SMSF. Any 
investment transactions which resulted in cash being transferred or utilised to invest 
in other cash investments were also excluded from the analysis. For example, the 
transfer of cash from an at-call savings account to a higher-yielding bank account 
would be excluded from the analysis. The reason for this distinction is that the study 
investigates whether SMSF trustees were making aggressive or defensive investment 
choices at the appropriate time and transferring cash from one account to another is 
essentially a shift from one defensive asset to another and would not have any 
bearing on the overall risk profile of the portfolio. Once the excluded transactions 
were removed from the SMSF sample data, 10,459 eligible transactions were 
included in the analysis. This is shown in Table 3.2. Of the 10,459 eligible 
investment transactions, 3,485, or 33.32% of the transactions involved the sale of an 
investment, with 6,974 or 66.68% of the transactions involving the purchase of an 
investment. 
 
Table 3.2 Eligible SMSF investment transactions within the sample data 
Transaction type Action Number of transactions 
Call for payment Purchase 111 
Purchase Purchase 6121 
Purchase (DRP) Purchase 742 
Sale Sale 3485 
Total transactions                                 10,459  
 
The 10,459 investment transactions covered 484 discrete investments. These 
included cash, listed equities, listed corporate bonds and hybrid securities, managed 
funds and instalment warrants. Each investment type was designated as either 
‘aggressive’ or ‘defensive’ in nature. For example, listed equities are aggressive 
investments, in that purchasing equities with cash leads to a relative increase in risk; 
while selling equities for cash would lead to a corresponding relative reduction in 
risk. Corporate bonds however are classified as defensive investments, as investing 
in bonds is seen as a reduction in the risk of capital loss. In the context of the study 
risk is defined as the risk of loss of the invested capital. In this regard, listed equities 
present a greater risk of loss than cash or corporate bonds for example. While this 
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distinction ignores other types of risk, such as credit risk, interest rate risk, price 
volatility or liquidity risk, such a definition of risk is sufficient for the purposes of 
the study. Classifying each investment as either aggressive or defensive makes it 
possible to track the flow of money into or out of each investment type, thereby 
illustrating the investment decision-making outcomes of SMSF trustees. The 
breakdown between transactions involving defensive or aggressive assets is 
summarised in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3 Summary of eligible transaction types 
Transaction type Number of transactions 
Aggressive (AGG) transactions                                            7,248  
Defensive (DEF) transactions                                            3,211  
Total                                          10,459  
Transaction type Dollar value ($) 
Total dollar value of AGG transactions                            71,251,315.01  
Total dollar value of DEF transactions                            84,856,891.46  
Total                156,108,206.47  
 
As shown in Table 3.3, transactions involving aggressive investments 
outweighed those involving defensive assets by a substantial margin. Note that this 
does not mean that SMSFs were taking on risk in the same proportions, as it is the 
direction of the transaction which is important. In terms of the dollar value of the 
transactions, more funds were allocated to defensive transactions, though again it is 
the direction of the flow funds which matters, not simply the overall total.  
 
3.4.1.2 Sample fund contents data in detail 
The data relating to the contents of each SMSF consisted of a list of the 
investments held by each fund at quarterly intervals over the period 1 January 2005 
to 31 December 2011. As with the investment transaction data, the quarterly 
investment holdings of 93 SMSFs were included in the analysis. The first quarterly 
period was 31 March 2005 and the final quarterly period was 31 December 2011, 
covering 28 end-of-period listings of each SMSF. Across the sample of SMSF 
holdings there were 509 individual assets, ranging from cash to listed equities and 
direct residential and commercial property. This differs from the 484 investments 
identified in the SMSF transaction data as the funds already held existing assets at 
the start of the time period under investigation. To facilitate the analysis each 
individual asset was classified into one of five primary asset classes. The number of 
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Table 3.4 Asset classes within quarterly SMSF contents data 
Asset class Number of investments 
Equity 256 






As shown in Table 3.4, the most common asset type held within the SMSF 
sample was equities, with fixed interest investments being slightly less popular. 
Property investments made up less than 8% of the total number of assets and 
comprised both listed and unlisted property assets. Five different assets were 
identified which qualified as cash – this included savings accounts, cash management 
accounts and online-only accounts. The ‘Other’ asset class was an investment in a 
gold exchange traded fund. Within the SMSF sample, total assets at the end of the 
first quarter in 2005 (31 March 2005) amounted to $41,703,856. Total assets peaked 
in the third quarter of 2007 (30 September 2007) at $73,350,860 while the lowest 
level of total assets was also 31 March 2005. The level of assets within the sample at 
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Table 3.5 Total SMSF sample assets at the end of each quarter 
Quarter-ending   Total assets within SMSF sample ($)  
31 Mar 2005       41,703,856  
30 Jun 2005       44,450,479  
30 Sep 2005       49,027,276  
31 Dec 2005       50,869,819  
31 Mar 2006       52,985,569  
30 Jun 2006       53,855,852  
30 Sep 2006       56,592,984  
31 Dec 2006       61,561,394  
31 Mar 2007       63,277,827  
30 Jun 2007       71,436,868  
30 Sep 2007       73,350,860  
31 Dec 2007       70,000,081  
31 Mar 2008       63,058,152  
30 Jun 2008       61,477,946  
30 Sep 2008       60,665,541  
31 Dec 2008       54,112,071  
31 Mar 2009       54,131,895  
30 Jun 2009       56,824,644  
30 Sep 2009       63,869,604  
31 Dec 2009       66,582,567  
31 Mar 2010       66,183,786  
30 Jun 2010       62,723,400  
30 Sep 2010       65,124,607  
31 Dec 2010       66,186,359  
31 Mar 2011       66,597,415  
30 Jun 2011       65,708,981  
30 Sep 2011       62,322,550  
31 Dec 2011       63,586,536  
 
While the change in the level of assets within the SMSF sample can be 
expected to reflect changes in market values and the values of other investments held 
within the sample, superannuation contributions and withdrawals by fund members 
would also have had an impact on the level of assets at the end of each quarter. These 
withdrawals and contributions are included in the data in Table 3.5, however it is 
likely that any such transactions within the SMSF sample would comprise only a 
relatively minor portion of any change in the total assets within the sample and 
would be outweighed by market movements and investment transactions over each 
quarter. The quarterly totals for the primary asset classes of cash, equities, property 
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Table 3.6 Quarterly totals of individual asset classes within the SMSF data 
Year Qtr. Cash ($) Equity ($) Property ($) Fixed interest ($) 
2005 1     2,715,852    22,484,898     3,593,243          12,903,848  
2005 2     3,609,860    24,146,284     3,786,362          12,921,790  
2005 3     4,865,129    27,861,653     3,222,359          13,089,078  
2005 4     4,762,731    29,005,510     3,214,201          13,852,374  
2006 1     3,757,538    31,162,563     3,506,699          14,597,876  
2006 2     3,810,518    31,463,149     3,632,134          14,951,222  
2006 3     4,843,981    33,039,041     3,953,076          14,778,689  
2006 4     4,293,704    36,415,850     4,219,400          16,601,520  
2007 1     4,191,428    38,287,462     4,473,095          16,335,796  
2007 2     7,543,999    40,516,786     6,156,959          17,228,865  
2007 3     5,368,785    42,486,631     6,303,783          19,209,981  
2007 4     4,031,295    41,077,277     6,923,053          18,039,718  
2008 1     3,598,319    35,634,869     6,778,590          17,066,003  
2008 2     5,287,808    34,015,918     6,690,105          15,468,301  
2008 3     5,023,424    33,053,427     6,738,809          15,852,506  
2008 4     8,120,194    28,531,326     6,039,243          11,423,121  
2009 1     7,930,474    29,020,846     5,771,084          11,318,666  
2009 2     7,248,608    31,010,663     5,748,724          12,722,762  
2009 3     6,340,170    37,315,647     5,754,968          14,200,017  
2009 4     5,675,402    39,851,356     5,963,831          15,058,161  
2010 1     5,162,936    39,959,366     5,940,869          14,985,556  
2010 2     5,084,886    36,499,163     6,238,102          14,790,525  
2010 3     6,211,889    37,966,869     6,293,173          14,541,972  
2010 4     6,108,977    39,167,564     6,425,400          14,387,288  
2011 1     6,966,016    38,029,889     6,543,060          14,942,571  
2011 2     6,515,401    38,746,663     5,465,330          14,358,119  
2011 3     5,758,776    35,335,693     5,484,227          15,150,333  
2011 4     5,683,028    36,470,072     5,427,975          15,978,223  
 
Information regarding the contents of each SMSF at quarterly intervals makes 
it possible to identify and track changes in the asset allocations of the funds within 
the sample. While this provides similar information to the SMSF transaction data, the 
fund contents data presents a more complete picture of the exposure of funds within 
the sample at specific points in time. On the other hand the SMSF investment 
transaction data allows us to investigate the decision-making of SMSF trustees over a 
specific time period, which subsequently has an impact on the contents of the funds 
within the sample at specific points in time. Taken together the two data sources 
present a complete picture of the trading behaviour of SMSF trustees over the time 
period under consideration, and how this trading behaviour was both related to and 
impacted on the asset allocations of funds within the SMSF sample. 
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3.5 Preparation of the Data 
The first step in the preparation of the SMSF sample data was to remove any 
data which related to SMSFs that had not been in existence for the full period from 1 
January 2005 to 31 December 2011. Following this, the various investments and 
transaction types were identified as being either ‘aggressive’ or ‘defensive’, as 
outlined in section 3.4.1.2. Cash, fixed-interest and property investments were 
classified as defensive investments, with equity investments classified as aggressive 
investments (and any associated transactions). In order to allow for analysis of the 
data a number of variables were identified. These variables form the basis of the 
statistical analysis component of the study and relate to the number and type of 
transactions carried out by SMSFs in the sample. The variables were defined as per 
Table 3.7. 
 
Table 3.7 Definition of variables used in the analysis 
Variable Definition 
COUNT The number of investment transactions in a given time 
period 
COUNT_AGGBUYS The number of times an ‘aggressive’ investment 
purchase was made in a given time period 
COUNT_AGGSALES The number of times an ‘aggressive’ investment was 
sold in a given time period 
VALUE_AGGBUYS The dollar value of ‘aggressive’ investments purchased 
in a given time period 
VALUE_AGGSALES The dollar value of ‘aggressive’ investments sold in a 
given time period 
COUNT_DEFBUYS The number of times a ‘defensive’ investment 
purchase was made in a given time period 
COUNT_DEFSALES The number of times a ‘defensive’ investment was 
sold in a given time period 
VALUE_DEFBUYS The dollar value of ‘defensive’ investments purchased 
in a given time period 
VALUE_DEFSALES The dollar value of ‘defensive’ investments sold in a 
given time period 
NET_FLOWDEF The dollar value of shares sold in a given time period, 
less the dollar value of shares purchased in a given 
time period. In effect NETFLOW_DEF = 
VALUE_AGGSALES – VALUE_AGGBUYS 
TRADE_VALUE The total dollar value of all investment types 
purchased or sold in a given time period 
 
With the exception of NETFLOW_DEF, the variables are numerical 
measures of the number or dollar value of different investment transactions carried 
out by the fund trustees over a specified time period. NETFLOW_DEF differs in that 
it allows us to determine the net flow of funds into defensive assets for a given time 
period.  By subtracting the dollar value of shares purchased from the dollar value of 
shares sold for a given period of time, we are able to determine whether or not that 
time period represented a shift into defensive or aggressive assets. If 
NETFLOW_DEF is a positive value, then on an overall basis money was moved 
from aggressive assets to defensive assets for that given time period and vice versa 
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when NETFLOW_DEF is a negative value. For the purposes of the study it is 
assumed that a share sale represents a shift into defensive assets, while a share 
purchase represents a shift into risky assets. By observing the changes in the net flow 
into defensive assets it is possible to conclude whether or not SMSFs were increasing 
defensive exposure in the period leading up to the financial crisis; the investment 
response of SMSF trustees during the actual financial crisis; and whether or not there 
was any change in trustee investment decisions after the financial crisis.  
 
The variables listed in Table 3.7 were calculated according to four different 
criteria. This was done firstly on a monthly basis over the period January 2005 to 
December 2011. For each month the number and dollar value of aggressive and 
defensive investment transactions was determined and allocated to each variable 
accordingly. The period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2011 was also split into 
three distinct periods in order to allow for an analysis of transactions prior to, during 
and after the global financial crisis. Period 1 was from 1 January 2005 to 30 June 
2008 and is considered to represent that period of time prior to the financial crisis. 
Period 2 covers from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 and represents the time period 
during the financial crisis, while Period 3 runs from 1 July 2009 to 31 December 
2011 and represents the period after the financial crisis. The variables were also 
calculated according to fund size and asset allocation. With regards to fund size, each 
fund in the sample was grouped as being small (less than $350,000 in assets), 
average (more than $350,000 in assets but less than $750,000 in assets) or large 
(greater than $750,000 in assets) as at 1 January 2005. This grouping is based on 
information provided by the Australian Taxation Office which showed that the 
average SMSF size in 2005 was $560,519 (Australian Taxation Office 2009). Any 
fund in the sample which was within a range of $200,000 more or less than the actual 
average fund size of $560,519 was included in the ‘average’ group. The average size 
of the 24 funds within this group was $501,690, which closely matched the actual 
reported average fund size. One hundred and ten funds were included in this data as 
any comparative analysis would be done on an annual basis which meant that funds 
which opened or closed during the course of the year could still be included. The 
grouping of funds within the sample by size is shown in Table 3.8. 
 
Table 3.8 Sample funds grouped according to size as at 1 Jan 2005 
Group   No. of funds   Average Size ($)   Total assets ($) 
 Large           17  1,174,910  19,973,474  
 Average           24  501,690  12,040,555  
 Small           69  144,904  9,998,378  
 Total         110          1,821,504       42,012,407  
 
The funds within the sample were also grouped according to their asset 
allocation. For the purposes of grouping funds by asset allocation, three categories of 
funds were identified. These were ‘aggressive’ (where equities comprised greater 
than 60% of assets), ‘moderate’ (where equities comprised less than 60% of assets 
but greater than 50%) and ‘defensive’ (where equities comprised less than 50% of 
assets). These groupings were based on the asset allocations of each SMSF within 
the sample as at 1 January 2005. This categorisation system was designed to ensure 
sufficient fund representation in all risk profile groups.  
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It is worth noting that no definitive risk categorisation system exists, with 
various fund managers, superannuation funds and research organisations each having 
their own set of categorisation criteria. For example, research company Morningstar 
classifies defensive funds as holding less than 50% equities; moderate funds as 
holding 50% to 70% in equities and aggressive funds as holding 70% to 90% in 
equities (Morningstar 2014). This quite closely matches the categorisation system 
utilised in this study. On this basis the risk profile categorisation system developed 
for the study is considered to be sufficient for the purposes of categorising SMSFs 
based on their tolerance for risk.   
 
As the initial asset allocation of each fund was used to determine its risk 
profile, only SMSFs which were in existence at 1 January 2005 were included in the 
grouping, which numbered 93 funds. Details of the grouping of the funds by asset 
allocation are shown in Table 3.9. 
 
 
Table 3.9 Sample funds grouped according to asset allocation as at 1 Jan 2005 
Group 
Percentage of 
assets in equities 
Average equities 
allocation (%) 





funds > 60% 74.93 
                      
447,578  33 
Moderate 
funds  ≤  60%  ≥ 50% 55.27 
                      
465,408  30 
Defensive 
funds < 50% 34.79 
                      
454,720  30 
Total       93 
 
 
The variables outlined in Table 3.7 were not amended in order to account for 
the impact of inflation or market movements (i.e. changes in the values of market-
linked investments due to stock market falls or rises). This decision was made for 
two reasons. Firstly, to strip out the impact of both inflation and market movements 
for each asset held within every fund within the sample would require accurately 
determining the effect of inflation and market movements on each asset, a very 
difficult and time-consuming task, and one beyond the time and resource constraints 
imposed on the project. Secondly, the inclusion of variables which are based on the 
frequency of investment transactions, as opposed to the dollar value of transactions, 
to a certain extent removes the impact of inflation and market movements. 
 
Using SAS 9.2 for Windows statistical software, the variables were tested for 
significant differences between each year from 2005 to 2011 and between the three 
defined time periods which cover the periods prior to, during and after the financial 
crisis. Firstly ANOVA was performed for each variable and based on the results of 
that analysis tests for significant differences within each variable were conducted 
using Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) test. Fisher’s LSD test is known to 
minimise Type II errors, but with a corresponding potential increase in the number of 
Type I errors (Williams & Abdi 2010). Fisher’s LSD test can be considered to be less 
conservative than other statistical approaches, however the accuracy of the test is 
considered sufficient for the purposes of the study. The tests of significance allow the 
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study to address the five hypotheses which form the basis of the study as outlined in 
section 3.2. The results of the analysis of the data are presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 
6. 
 
3.6 Ethical Considerations 
The ethical considerations of research cover a range of issues which must be 
taken into account in all stages of the research process. These stages include the 
planning, execution and reporting of the research (Spata 2003). As part of this 
process responsibility falls on the researcher to ensure that the outcomes from the 
research are not intentionally misleading; that the welfare of any participants in the 
research process is protected; that any relevant local, state or federal laws are 
complied with; that data used in the research is correctly reported and that any 
relevant institutions have given their approval for the research to proceed. 
 
One of the key ethical issues in research is that of consent (Fouka & 
Mantzorou 2011). As this study entails the use of anonymous data, informed consent 
of the trustees or members included in the study was not required. That is, the SMSF 
sample data was provided in electronic format with no means to identify the 
geographical location or names and contact details of the SMSF trustees and 
members. In addition, no other demographic information relating to the SMSFs was 
included within the data made available for the study, such as the age of the members 
and trustees, their marital status, their employment status or any other identifying 
information. As issues such as consent, privacy and confidentiality were not relevant 
to the study, key ethical considerations for the study focused on ensuring the accurate 
presentation of the data and results of the research. 
 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter described and discussed the research methodology used in this 
study and outlined the research question and hypotheses to be addressed by the 
study. The SMSF sample data was described and the key features of the data were 
summarised. While the sample size is acknowledged as being smaller than the ideal 
sample size based on work by Krejcie and Morgan (1970), the nature of the SMSF 
industry means that working with a larger sample size was not feasible. Any 
conclusions drawn by the study will therefore need to be made with regard to 
limitations of the sample size. A number of variables relating to the investment 
actions of SMSF trustees were also defined. These variables form the basis of the 
quantitative analysis component of the study and provide the ability to quantitatively 
measure changes in the trading behaviour of SMSFs within the sample over the 
identified time period. This gives rise to an important characteristic of the study, 
which is the longitudinal nature of the study. Key ethical considerations relating to 
the study were also discussed, although the nature of the study means that key 
concerns focus largely on the accurate presentation and analysis of the data.  
 
The next chapter, Chapter 4, presents the results of the analysis of the SMSF 
sample data across the period 2005 to 2011. 
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CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS: TRADING BEHAVIOUR 2005 TO 2011 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the research methodology adopted by this 
study and the research questions and hypotheses to be addressed through this study. 
The chapter also described the data which forms the analysis component of this 
study. This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the data, focusing on the 
trading behaviour of SMSFs over the period 2005 to 2011, which addresses the 
question of whether or not SMSF trustees changed their investing behaviour over the 
period prior to, during and after the global financial crisis. The results of the analysis 
of SMSF transaction data on the basis of fund size and risk profile over the same 
period are presented in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. Chapter 7 discusses the results 
of the analysis with regards to addressing the research questions outlined in Chapter 
3. 
 
The variables analysed in this portion of the study cover the frequency and 
value of SMSF trading activities, the actions of SMSF trustees to increase or 
decrease aggressive or defensive investment exposure respectively, and the net flow 
of funds into defensive assets for SMSFs within the sample. The intention is to 
present a complete picture of SMSF trading activity over the period 2005 to 2011, 
both on an annual basis and on a ‘per period’ basis. Generally only those cases where 
statistically significant differences in SMSF trading behaviour were found will be 
discussed within the text, although the full table of results for each variable are 
presented for sake of completeness. 
 
4.2 SMSF Trustee Trading Behaviour from 2005 to 2011 
In order to determine whether or not SMSF trustees made ideal investment 
decisions over the period 2005 to 2011, analysis of variance was used to determine 
whether the type of trading behaviour exhibited a statistically significant difference 
from one period to the next. This was done initially on an annual basis, and then by 
reference to the three identified time periods, being prior to, during and after the 
global financial crisis.  
 
4.2.1 Statistical Differences in SMSF Trading Behaviour on an Annual 
Basis 
To address the research question of whether or not SMSF trustees were 
making the correct investment decisions over the period 2005 to 2011, the trading 
behaviour of SMSF trustees was assessed for each year from 2005 to 2011. This was 
done within the context of the variables which were defined in Table 3.7. Each 
variable was calculated on a monthly basis and the mean of each variable for each 
year is presented in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Monthly means of variables for each year from 2005 to 2011 
Variable 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
COUNT 143  145  152  113  114  107  98  
COUNT_AGGBUYS 75  78  69  47  64  46  32  
COUNT_AGGSALES 32  31  45  18  11  27  29  
VALUE_AGGBUYS $465,902  $712,755  $798,580  $376,309  $427,381  $408,052  $416,652  
VALUE_AGGSALES $331,148  $391,179  $514,924  $204,385  $119,808  $303,855  $466,682  
COUNT_DEFBUYS 28  25  25  25  27  20  19  
COUNT_DEFSALES 8  10  13  23  12  15  18  
VALUE_DEFBUYS $491,860  $473,669  $655,666  $409,529  $403,905  $653,847  $882,533  
VALUE_DEFSALES $176,336  $242,898  $365,694  $503,756  $309,094  $709,273  $793,349  
NET_FLOWDEF -$134,754  -$321,576  -$283,656  -$171,924  -$307,573  -$104,197  $50,030  
TRADE_VALUE $1,465,245  $1,820,500  $2,334,864  $1,493,978  $1,260,188  $2,075,026  $2,559,216  
 
The data shows the changes in the level of trading activity by SMSFs across 
the period, with the number of average monthly trades by SMSFs (COUNT) falling 
from 143 in 2005 to just 98 in 2011. Changes in COUNT_AGGBUYS, which 
represents the average number of times per month that money was committed to an 
‘aggressive’ investment, provides information relating to research question 2. This 
considers whether SMSFs have become more conservative in their investment 
approach since the global financial crisis. SMSFs within the sample were investing 
money in aggressive investments on average 78 times per month prior to the 
financial crisis (in 2006), but by 2011 this level of aggressive trading behaviour had 
fallen to an average of just 32 such trades per month. This is matched by falls in the 
number of transactions involving the sale of shares (COUNT_AGGSALES) which 
declined from a high of 45 in 2007, to low of 11 in 2009. Differences can also be 
observed in the value of share sales and purchases across the period. That is, the 
average monthly dollar value of shares purchased (VALUE_AGGBUYS) fell from 
$465,902 in 2005 to $376,309 in 2008, before recovering somewhat to $416,652 in 
2011. Correspondingly, the average monthly dollar value of share sales 
(VALUE_AGGSALES) rose from 2005 ($331,148) to 2011 ($466,682).  
 
The average number of times per month that SMSFs were buying defensive 
investments (COUNT_DEFBUYS) also fell across the period, with the highest 
number of transactions occurring in 2005 (28) and falling to 19 in 2011. On the other 
hand, COUNT_DEFSALES, which represents the average number of times that 
SMSFs sold defensive investments, experienced an increase in occurrence over the 
period, from 8 such transactions per month in 2005 to 18 transactions per month in 
2011. Related to the changes in the number and dollar value of defensive investment 
transactions, NET_FLOWDEF, which tracks the net amount of money invested in 
defensive assets, was negative for all years from 2005 to 2010 and only turned 
positive in 2011 ($50,030). The data also indicates that the overall average monthly 
trade value has increased from the periods prior to the financial crisis, with the 
exception of 2008 and 2009, where overall average monthly trade value fell sharply, 
with a low of $1,260,188 in average monthly trades in 2009. 
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4.2.1.1 Analysis of the variable COUNT on an annual basis 
While Table 4.1 does illustrate changes in the trading behaviour of SMSFs 
over the period 2005 to 2011, it does not identify whether or not any such changes, if 
present, were statistically significant. A multivariate analysis of variance test was 
required to identify those changes in behaviour which were statistically different. 
The variables in Table 4.1 were tested for significant differences across each year 
using Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) test, based on a significance level 
of 0.05. The results of the tests with regards to the average number of investment 
transactions are shown in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of investment 
transactions (COUNT) from 2005 to 2011 (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter are not 
significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 152 2007 
B A 145 2006 
B A 143 2005 
B A 114 2009 
B A 113 2008 
B A 107 2010 
B   98 2011 
 
The only significant difference in the number of trades carried out during the 
period 2005 to 2011 was between 2007 and 2011, with monthly averages of 152 and 
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4.2.1.2 Analysis of the variable COUNT_AGGBUYS on an annual basis 
Table 4.3 shows the results for the monthly average number of aggressive 
investment purchases made between the years 2005 to 2011. 
 
Table 4.3 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of aggressive purchase 
transactions (COUNT_AGGBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 78 2006 
B A 75 2005 
B A 69 2007 
B A 64 2009 
B C 47 2008 
B C 46 2010 
  C 32 2011 
 
The results show that significant differences existed in the number of 
aggressive purchase transactions. The year 2006 (78) saw a significantly greater 
number of such transactions as compared to 2008 (47), 2010 (46) and 2011 (32). The 
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4.2.1.3 Analysis of the variable COUNT_AGGSALES on an annual basis 
Table 4.4 shows the results of the analysis of the monthly average number of 
aggressive sales transactions (COUNT_AGGSALES). 
 
Table 4.4 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of aggressive sales 
transactions (COUNT_AGGSALES) from 2005 to 2011 (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter are 
not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A   45 2007 
B A   32 2005 
B A   31 2006 
B A C 29 2011 
B A C 27 2010 
B   C 18 2008 
    C 11 2009 
 
The level of sales of aggressive investments showed significant differences 
between 2007 and 2009, 2007 and 2008, and 2005/06 and 2009 with the number of 
such transactions being significantly higher in the earlier years of 2005 (32), 2006 
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4.2.1.4 Analysis of the variable VALUE_AGGBUYS on an annual basis 
The results of the analysis of the variable VALUE_AGGBUYS, which relates 
to the monthly average dollar value of purchases of aggressive investments, are 
shown in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of aggressive 
purchase transactions (VALUE_AGGBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $798,580 2007 
B A $712,755 2006 
B A $465,902 2005 
B   $427,381 2009 
B   $416,652 2011 
B   $408,052 2010 
B   $376,309 2008 
 
The only significant difference in the average monthly dollar value of 
aggressive purchase transactions was between 2007 ($798,580) and the years from 
2008 to 2011 (ranging from $376,309 to $427,381), with the value in 2007 being 
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4.2.1.5 Analysis of the variable VALUE_AGGSALES on an annual basis 
In contrast to the level of aggressive investment purchases, significant differences in 
the monthly average dollar value of aggressive investment sales are outlined in Table 
4.6. 
 
Table 4.6 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of aggressive sales 
transactions (VALUE_AGGSALES) from 2005 to 2011 (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter are 
not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A   $514,924 2007 
  A   $466,682 2011 
B A   $391,179 2006 
B A C $331,148 2005 
B A C $303,855 2010 
B   C $204,385 2008 
    C $119,808 2009 
 
The monthly average dollar value of aggressive sales transactions in 2009 
($119,808) was significantly lower than the same transaction types in 2006 
($391,179), 2007 ($514,924) and 2011 ($466,682). The year 2008 ($304,385) also 
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4.2.1.6 Analysis of the variable COUNT_DEFBUYS on an annual basis 
The monthly average number of defensive investment purchase transactions 
is shown in Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of defensive purchase 
transactions (COUNT_DEFBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 28 2005 
A 27 2009 
A 25 2006 
A 25 2007 
A 25 2008 
A 20 2010 
A 19 2011 
 
There were no statistically significant differences in the monthly average 
number of defensive investment purchases. While the years following the crisis 
(2010 and 2011) did see a lower level of such transactions, this decline was not 
significant at a significance level of 0.05.  
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4.2.1.7 Analysis of the variable COUNT_DEFSALES on an annual basis 
The results of the same analysis with regards to the monthly average number 
of defensive sales transaction is shown in Table 4.8. 
 
Table 4.8 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of defensive sales 
transactions (COUNT_DEFSALES) from 2005 to 2011 (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 23 2008 
B A 18 2011 
B A 15 2010 
B A 13 2007 
B A 12 2009 
B   10 2006 
B   8 2005 
 
Significant differences in the monthly average number of defensive sales 
transactions only existed between the year 2008 (23) and 2005 and 2006 (8 and 10 
respectively), with a significantly larger number of such transactions occurring in 
2008.  
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4.2.1.8 Analysis of the variable VALUE_DEFBUYS on an annual basis 
With regards to the monthly average dollar value of defensive investment 
purchases, the results of the analysis are detailed in Table 4.9. 
 
Table 4.9 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of defensive 
purchase transactions (VALUE_DEFBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $882,533 2011 
B A $655,666 2007 
B A $653,847 2010 
B   $491,860 2005 
B   $473,669 2006 
B   $409,529 2008 
B   $403,905 2009 
 
The only significant difference in the monthly average dollar value of 
defensive purchase transactions was between 2011 ($882,533) and the years 2005 
($491,860), 2006 ($473,669), 2008 ($409,529) and 2009 ($403,905), with 2011 
recording a significantly greater monthly average dollar value of defensive purchase 
transactions. 
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4.2.1.9 Analysis of the variable VALUE_DEFSALES on an annual basis 
The statistical analysis with regards to the average monthly dollar value of 
defensive sales transactions is shown in Table 4.10. 
 
Table 4.10 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of defensive sales 
transactions (VALUE_DEFSALES) from 2005 to 2011 (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $793,349 2011 
  A $709,273 2010 
B A $503,756 2008 
B C $365,694 2007 
B C $309,094 2009 
B C $242,898 2006 
  C $176,336 2005 
 
The results of the analysis indicate that significant differences exist with 
regards to transactions involving the sale of defensive investments in the years 
following the crisis (2011 ($793,349) and 2010 ($709,273)) as compared to the years 
prior to and during the crisis (2005 ($176,336), 2006 ($242,898), 2009 ($309,094) 
and 2007 ($365,694)) which were significantly lower. The year 2008 ($503,756) was 
also significantly greater than 2005. 
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4.2.1.10 Analysis of the variable NET_FLOWDEF on an annual basis 
Results of the analysis of the variable NET_FLOWDEF, which indicates the 
net flow of funds into defensive assets, are outlined in Table 4.11. 
 
Table 4.11 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average net flow of money into 
defensive assets (NET_FLOWDEF) from 2005 to 2011 (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $50,030 2011 
B A -$104,197 2010 
B A -$134,754 2005 
B A -$171,924 2008 
B A -$283,656 2007 
B   -$307,573 2009 
B   -$321,576 2006 
 
There was a significantly higher monthly average net flow of funds into 
defensive assets in 2011 ($50,030), as compared to both 2006 (-$321,576) and 2009   
(-$307,573). The year 2010 (-$104,197) also saw a high monthly average net flow of 
funds into defensive assets, but this was not significantly different to the level of 
such transactions in other years over the period 2005 to 2011.  
  
 48   
 
4.2.1.11 Analysis of the variable TRADE_VALUE on an annual basis 
Table 4.12 outlines the results of the comparison in the monthly average total 
trade value of all investment transactions. 
 
Table 4.12 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average total trade value of all 
investment transactions (TRADE_VALUE) from 2005 to 2011 (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter are 
not significantly different. 
Grouping   Mean Year 
  A   $2,559,216 2011 
  A   $2,334,864 2007 
B A   $2,075,026 2010 
B A C $1,820,500 2006 
B   C $1,493,978 2008 
B   C $1,465,245 2005 
    C $1,260,188 2009 
 
Significant differences were found in the monthly average total trade value 
between 2009 and 2007, 2010 and 2011, with the latter three years all exhibiting a 
significantly greater number of monthly average total trade values than 2009. The 
years 2007 and 2011 were also significantly greater than 2005 and 2008. 
 
4.2.2 Statistical Differences in SMSF Trading Behaviour on a Per-Period 
Basis 
The tests for significant differences between the variables covered in Tables 
4.2 through 4.12 were based on the monthly averages of SMSF investment 
transactions on an annual basis. The next stage of the study was based on the 
monthly averages on a ‘per period’ basis. Three distinct time periods were identified: 
 
Period 1: 1 January 2005 to 30 June 2008 
Period 2: 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 
Period 3: 1 July 2009 to 31 December 2011 
 
The periods were defined in this manner so as to differentiate between the 
time period prior to the onset of the global financial crisis (Period 1), the period 
during the crisis (Period 2) and the period following the crisis (Period 3). Table 4.13 
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Table 4.13 Monthly means of variables for each period from 2005 to 2011 
Variable Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
COUNT 145 108 102 
COUNT_AGGBUYS 72 53 43 
COUNT_AGGSALES 35 14 23 
VALUE_AGGBUYS $634,890 $313,958 $427,823 
VALUE_AGGSALES $397,355 $125,247 $326,396 
COUNT_DEFBUYS 27 25 20 
COUNT_DEFSALES 12 17 16 
VALUE_DEFBUYS $530,129 $383,423 $692,854 
VALUE_DEFSALES $281,422 $454,592 $664,332 
NET_FLOWDEF -$237,534 -$188,711 -$101,427 
TRADE_VALUE $1,843,796 $1,277,220 $2,111,404 
 
The monthly average number of all transactions by SMSFs (COUNT) within 
the sample declined from Period 1 (145) to Periods 2 (108) and 3 (102). This is 
consistent with results from Table 4.1, which also show a decline in the overall level 
of trading activity by SMSFs from year to year. COUNT_AGGBUYS, which 
represents the monthly average of aggressive investment purchases, also declined 
from 72 such transactions in Period 1, to 53 and 43 transactions in Periods 1 and 2 
respectively. The level of sales of aggressive investments, COUNT_AGGSALES, 
fell from Period 1 (35) to Period 2 (14), but then increased in Period 3. With regards 
to the dollar value of trades, the monthly average dollar value of aggressive 
investment purchases (VALUE_AGGBUYS) was highest in Period 1 ($634,890), 
falling to $313,958 in Period 2, before increasing to $427,823 in Period 3. The same 
relationship applies with regards to the monthly average dollar value of aggressive 
investment sales (VALUE_AGGSALES); a high of $397,355 in Period 1, falling to 
$125,247 in Period 2, and subsequently increasing to $326,396 in Period 3.  
 
The monthly average dollar value and number of defensive transactions show 
slightly different patterns as compared to the aggressive transactions. 
COUNT_DEFBUYS, which represents the average monthly number of defensive 
investment purchases, decreased slightly from Period 1 (27) to Period 2 (25), 
followed by a larger decline in Period 3 (20). When considering the average monthly 
dollar value of defensive investment sales (COUNT_DEFSALES) however, this 
increased from 12 such transactions in Period 1, to 17 and 16 transactions in Periods 
2 and 3 respectively. The average monthly dollar value of defensive investment 
purchases, VALUE_DEFBUYS, which indicates the extent to which SMSF trustees 
were committing funds to defensive investments, fell from $530,129 in Period 1 to 
$383,423 in Period 2, before increasing to $692,854 in Period 3. The average 
monthly dollar value of defensive investment sales increased across the three time 
periods, from $281,422 in Period 1, to $454,592 in Period 2, and to $664,332 in 
Period 3. NET_FLOWDEF, which measures the level of net flow of funds into 
defensive investments, remained negative in each period, however the flow of funds 
into defensive investments did increase between periods. Period 1 showed 
NET_FLOWDEF of -$237,534, increasing to -$188,711 in Period 2, and increasing 
again to -$101,427 in Period 3. NET_TRADEVALUE, which shows the total 
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average monthly dollar value of all transaction per period, fell from Period 1 
($1,843,796) to Period 2 ($1,277,220), but increased in Period 3 ($2,111,404). 
 
4.2.2.1 Analysis of the variable COUNT on a per-period basis 
As with the variables on an annual basis, the variables in Table 4.13 were 
analysed to determine whether or not any differences between the time periods (if 
they existed) were statistically significant. Table 4.14 shows the results for the 
variable COUNT over the three time periods. 
 
Table 4.14 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of investment 
transactions (COUNT) between Periods 1, 2 and 3 (p = 0.05) 
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level 
are indicated by ***. 
  Difference   
Period Between   
Comparison Means   
1 – 2 37   
1 – 3 43 *** 
2 – 1 -37   
2 – 3 6   
3 – 1 -43 *** 
3 – 2 -6   
 
A statistically significant difference in the average number of monthly 
transactions between Periods 1 and 3 was found, with a higher average number of 
monthly transactions in Period 1 (145) compared to Period 3 (102).  
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4.2.2.2 Analysis of the variable COUNT_AGGBUYS on a per-period 
basis 
Table 4.15 outlines the results of the analysis of the monthly average number 
of aggressive purchase transactions (COUNT_AGGBUYS). 
 
Table 4.15 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of aggressive purchase 
transactions (COUNT_AGGBUYS) between Periods 1, 2 and 3 (p = 0.05) 
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level 
are indicated by ***. 
  Difference 
  Period Between 
Comparison Means 
1 - 2 19   
1 - 3 29 *** 
2 - 1 -19   
2 - 3 10   
3 - 1 -29 *** 
3 - 2 -10   
 
A statistically significant difference was found in the average monthly 
number of aggressive purchase transactions between Period 1 (72) and Period 3 (43), 
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4.2.2.3 Analysis of the variable COUNT_AGGSALES on a per-period 
basis 
Table 4.16 shows the results of the analysis of the monthly average number 
of aggressive sales transactions between the three time periods 
(COUNT_AGGSALES). 
 
Table 4.16 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of aggressive sales 
transactions (COUNT_AGGSALES) between Periods 1, 2 and 3 (p = 0.05) 
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level 
are indicated by ***. 
  Difference 
  Period Between 
Comparison Means 
1 - 3 12 *** 
1 - 2 20 *** 
3 - 1 -12 *** 
3 - 2 9   
2 - 1 -20 *** 
2 - 3 -9   
 
Statistically significant differences were found in the monthly average 
number of aggressive sales transactions between both Period 1 and Period 2, and 
Period 2 and Period 3 (with a difference between the means of 12 and 20 
respectively, indicating a significantly greater number of such transactions in Period 
1). There was no significant difference in the monthly average number of sales 
transactions between Period 2 and Period 3.  
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4.2.2.4 Analysis of the variable VALUE_AGGBUYS on a per-period basis 
Table 4.17 shows the results of the analysis of the monthly average dollar 
value of aggressive purchase transactions (VALUE_AGGBUYS). 
 
Table 4.17 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of aggressive 
purchase transactions (VALUE_AGGBUYS) between Periods 1, 2 and 3 (p = 0.05) 
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level 
are indicated by ***. 
  Difference 
  Period Between 
Comparison Means 
1 - 3 $207,067 *** 
1 - 2 $320,932 *** 
3 - 1 -$207,067 *** 
3 - 2 $113,865   
2 - 1 -$320,932 *** 
2 - 3 -$113,865   
 
The monthly average dollar value of aggressive purchase transactions showed 
significant differences between Period 1 and both Period 2 and 3. Period 1 recorded a 
significantly higher level of such transactions per month; $207,067 greater on 
average than Period 3 and $320,932 greater on average than Period 2.   
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4.2.2.5 Analysis of the variable VALUE_AGGSALES on a per-period 
basis 
The results of the analysis with regards to the monthly average dollar value of 
aggressive sales transactions are shown in Table 4.18. 
 
Table 4.18 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of aggressive sales 
transactions (VALUE_AGGSALES) between Periods 1, 2 and 3 (p = 0.05) 
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level 
are indicated by ***. 
  Difference 
  Period Between 
Comparison Means 
1 - 3 $70,960   
1 - 2 $272,108 *** 
3 - 1 -$70,960   
3 - 2 $201,148   
2 - 1 -$272,108 *** 
2 - 3 -$201,148   
 
An indication of the extent to which SMSF trustees were reducing their 
exposure to riskier assets is the monthly average dollar value of aggressive sales 
transactions. The analysis of the variable VALUE_AGGSALES over the period 2005 
to 2011 showed a significant difference in the level of such transactions between 
Period 1 (pre-crisis) and Period 2 (during the crisis). Period 1 exhibited a 
significantly higher monthly average dollar value of aggressive sales transactions as 
compared to Period 2, with a difference between means of $272,108. No other 
significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of such transactions were 
found.  
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4.2.2.6 Analysis of the variable COUNT_DEFBUYS on a per-period basis 
Table 4.19 shows the analysis of the monthly average number of defensive 
purchase transactions (COUNT_DEFBUYS). 
 
Table 4.19 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of defensive purchase 
transactions (COUNT_DEFBUYS) between Periods 1, 2 and 3 (p = 0.05) 
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level 
are indicated by ***. 
  Difference 
  Period Between 
Comparison Means 
1 - 2 2   
1 - 3 7   
2 - 1 -2   
2 - 3 4   
3 - 1 -7   
3 - 2 -4   
 
The monthly average number of defensive purchase transactions reflects the 
extent to which SMSF trustees were increasing their holdings of defensive 
investments. No significant differences were detected in the number of defensive 
purchase transactions between the three time periods.  
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4.2.2.7 Analysis of the variable COUNT_DEFSALES on a per-period 
basis 
Table 4.20 shows the analysis of the monthly average number of defensive 
sales transactions. 
 
Table 4.20 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of defensive sales 
transactions (COUNT_DEFSALES) between Periods 1, 2 and 3 (p = 0.05) 
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level 
are indicated by ***. 
  Difference 
  Period Between 
Comparison Means 
2 - 3 1   
2 - 1 4   
3 - 2 -1   
3 - 1 4   
1 - 2 -4   
1 - 3 -4   
 
Similar to the monthly average number of defensive purchase transactions, no 
statistically significant differences were detected in the monthly average number of 
defensive sales transactions between the three time periods.  
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4.2.2.8 Analysis of the variable VALUE_DEFBUYS on a per-period basis 
Table 4.21 shows the analysis of the monthly average dollar value of 
defensive purchase transactions between the three time periods. 
 
Table 4.21 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of defensive 
purchase transactions (VALUE_DEFBUYS) between Periods 1, 2 and 3 (p = 0.05) 
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level 
are indicated by ***. 
  Difference 
  Period Between 
Comparison Means 
3 - 1 $162,725    
3 - 2 $309,431  *** 
1 - 3 -$162,725    
1 - 2 $146,706    
2 - 3 -$309,431  *** 
2 - 1 -$146,706    
 
Period 3 exhibited a statistically significantly higher monthly average dollar 
of defensive purchase transactions as compared to Period 2, with a difference of 
$309,431 between the mean values for each period.  
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4.2.2.9 Analysis of the variable VALUE_DEFSALES on a per-period 
basis 
Table 4.22 outlines the results of the analysis with regards to the monthly 
average dollar value of defensive sales transactions between the three time periods. 
 
Table 4.22 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of defensive sales 
transactions (VALUE_DEFSALES) between Periods 1, 2 and 3 (p = 0.05) 
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level 
are indicated by ***. 
  Difference 
  Period Between 
Comparison Means 
3 - 2 $209,739    
3 - 1 $382,909  *** 
2 - 3 -$209,739    
2 - 1 $173,170    
1 - 3 -$382,909  *** 
1 - 2 -$173,170    
 
A statistically significant difference was found in the monthly average dollar 
value of defensive sales transactions between Period 1 and Period 3, with Period 3 
exhibiting mean monthly dollar values of defensive sales transactions $382,909 
greater than Period 1.  
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4.2.2.10 Analysis of the variable NET_FLOWDEF on a per-period basis 
Results of the analysis of the variable NET_FLOWDEF, which indicates the 
net flow of funds into defensive assets, are outlined in Table 4.23. 
 
Table 4.23 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average net flow of money into 
defensive assets (NET_FLOWDEF) between Periods 1, 2 and 3 (p = 0.05) 
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level 
are indicated by ***. 
  Difference 
  Period Between 
Comparison Means 
3 - 2 $87,284    
3 - 1 $136,107    
2 - 3 -$87,284    
2 - 1 $48,824    
1 - 3 -$136,107    
1 - 2 -$48,824    
 
Unlike the results of the analysis of NET_FLOWDEF on a yearly basis 
(Table 4.11), which showed a number of statistically significant differences in 
NET_FLOWDEF between the years from 2005 to 2011, no statistically significant 
differences were found between the three defined periods prior to, during and after 
the global financial crisis.  
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4.2.2.11 Analysis of the variable TRADE_VALUE on a per-period basis 
The results of the analysis of the monthly average total trade value between 
the three defined time periods are shown in Table 4.24. 
 
Table 4.24 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average total trade value of all 
investment transactions (TRADE_VALUE) between Periods 1, 2 and 3 (p = 0.05) 
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level 
are indicated by ***. 
  Difference 
  Period Between 
Comparison Means 
3 - 1 $267,607    
3 - 2 $834,184  *** 
1 - 3 -$267,607    
1 - 2 $566,576    
2 - 3 -$834,184  *** 
2 - 1 -$566,576    
 
Period 3 exhibited a significantly greater monthly average total trade value 
than Period 2, with $834,184 greater monthly average trade values than Period 2. 
This is consistent with the results in Table 4.12 which showed that 2009 (which 
forms part of Period 2) had a significantly lower monthly average total trade value 
than the other years from 2005 to 2011. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the results of the analysis of SMSFs within the sample 
on both an annual basis and on a ‘per period’ basis. The analysis on an annual basis 
allows for a more ‘granular’ view of SMSF trading activity over the period 2005 to 
2011, while the ‘per period’ analysis makes greater allowance for generalisations 
regarding the trading behaviour of SMSFs prior to, during and following the 2008 
financial crisis.  
 
When considering SMSF trading behaviour on an annual basis, trading 
frequency decreased considerably over the period 2005 to 2011, while that period 
following the financial crisis (Period 3) saw significantly fewer average monthly 
trades than that period leading up to the financial crisis (Period 1). These findings 
appear to indicate that the financial crisis had a significant negative impact on SMSF 
trustee willingness to trade. In contrast however, the dollar value of average monthly 
trades by SMSF trustees did not exhibit the same pattern. Those years following the 
crisis generally saw greater monthly average trade values as compared to prior to or 
during the crisis, while Period 3, which followed the crisis, also exhibited greater 
monthly average trade value when compared to both prior to and during the crisis. 
SMSF trustees may have traded less following the crisis, but the dollar values they 
were willing to commit to each trade was larger in the period following the financial 
crisis. Investment transactions which increased SMSF exposure to riskier assets are 
those transactions which involved the purchase of aggressive investments or the sale 
of defensive investments. The results indicate that SMSFs were, in general, 
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increasing their exposure to riskier assets immediately prior to the financial crisis. 
Conversely, those transactions which involve increasing exposure to defensive assets 
tend to indicate that SMSF trustees were more likely to increase defensive asset 
exposure in the period following the financial crisis. The variable which measures 
the net flow of funds into defensive assets, NET_FLOWDEF, appears to confirm this 
result, with a greater net flow of funds into defensive assets in 2010, 2011 and Period 
3 (although it must be noted that the result for NET_FLOWDEF in Period 3 was not 
significantly greater than in Periods 1 and 2). 
 
The results of the analysis provide an insight into SMSF trustees’ appetite for 
risk. It has been shown that an individual’s risk appetite is not fixed, but can vary 
over  time (Gai & Vause 2005). In particular, it has been found that risk appetite 
tends to be stable during economic and market periods of relative calm, but can 
fluctuate considerably in response to external shocks. The action taken by SMSF 
trustees to increase their exposure to defensive investments in that period 
immediately following the 2008 crisis supports this conclusion. Interestingly 
however, at the peak of the 2008 financial crisis, during a period of significant falls 
on equity markets, there is little evidence that SMSF trustees acted to reduce their 
market risk exposure. It was only after the crisis had peaked that there was evidence 
of a change in the risk appetite of SMSF trustees. This suggests that SMSF trustees 
may have been frozen in inaction during the worst of the crisis; concerned about 
severe investment losses but too fearful to make significant changes to their market 
risk exposure. It was only after the apparent passage of the worst of the crisis that 
trustees evidenced a significant change in their appetite for risk, increasing their 
exposure to defensive assets long after such a course of action would have been 
proven to be prudent. This may indicate the existence of the availability heuristic, 
where SMSF trustees overestimated the likelihood of another financial crisis, with 
the memory of the 2008 crisis fresh in their minds. This is similar to work by Frieder 
(2004), who found evidence of the availability heuristic in US investors. The results 
also point to the potential for cognitive dissonance within SMSF trustees during the 
crisis, which describes a mental tension which exists when an individual holds two 
beliefs which are psychologically incompatible (Olsen 2008). SMSF trustees may 
have believed that equity markets would continue to provide positive investment 
returns, even as markets fell sharply over 2008 and early 2009. SMSF trustees may 
have been unwilling to reduce their investment risk exposure even during a 
significant bear market, believing that equity markets could not fall further, even in 
the face of evidence to the contrary. This behaviour by SMSF trustees also suggests 
the presence of loss aversion in trustee trading behaviour. SMSF trustees may have 
been unwilling to sell higher risk investments as markets fell, for fear of realising 
significant losses on these market linked investments. This type of behaviour closely 
matches the description of loss aversion as outlined by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979). 
 
The lack of action by SMSF trustees to reduce their exposure to higher risk 
investments in the period leading up to the financial crisis is also a potential 
indication of representative bias by SMSF trustees. That is, on the eve of the 2008 
financial crisis SMSF trustees acted in a manner which suggests that they expected 
the rise in equity markets prior to the crisis to continue in that manner indefinitely. 
Were this not the case, SMSF trustees would have been expected to undertake a 
significant level of transactions involving the sale of higher risk investments, without 
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a corresponding number of transactions involving the purchase of higher risk 
investments. There is no evidence of this in the results of the analysis. It therefore 
appears that SMSF trustees considered the probability of a significant fall in the 
market to be low, given the lengthy period of positive investment returns in that 
period leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, behaviour consistent with 
representativeness as outlined by Kahneman and Tversky (1972). 
 
This chapter presented the results of the analysis of the trading behaviour of 
SMSFs within the sample for each year from 2005 to 2011 and across the three 
identified time periods over the same length of time. The results appear to indicate 
that SMSF trustees were not appropriately positioning their portfolios with a more 
defensive stance on the eve of the crisis, and that the financial crisis has had an 
impact on the willingness of SMSF trustees to increase market risk exposure. There 
is also evidence of the existence of a number of behavioural biases of SMSF trustees, 
including representativeness, loss aversion and the availability heuristic. This section 
of the study focused on the overall level of activity of funds within the sample. 
Chapters 5 and 6 which follow present the same analysis of the variables outlined in 
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CHAPTER 5  
RESULTS: TRADING BEHAVIOUR AND FUND SIZE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the results of the analysis of SMSF 
investment transactions over the period 2005 to 2011. This was done on both an 
annual basis and by reference to the three time periods prior to, during and after the 
global financial crisis. This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the trading 
behaviour of SMSFs on the basis of fund size. This analysis seeks to address the 
question of whether or not funds of different sizes exhibited the same trading 
behaviour over the period 2005 to 2011. 
 
The reasoning behind segmenting SMSFs within the sample based on fund 
size is to allow for conclusions to be drawn regarding the relevance of fund size as a 
predictor of trustee behaviour. For example, do trustees of larger funds exhibit 
different patterns of trading behaviour as compared to smaller funds? Are trustees of 
larger (or smaller) funds more likely to adopt an aggressive (or defensive) approach? 
As larger funds may be a proxy for overall trustee wealth and potentially investor 
sophistication, do such funds exhibit a more sophisticated investment approach than 
trustees of smaller funds? These are the types of questions which may be addressed 
through an analysis of trustee trading behaviour on the basis of fund size. In order to 
allow for a fair comparison, the trading behaviour of each fund size category was 
compared with the same funds over the period prior to, during and following the 
crisis. A direct comparison between funds of different sizes would not be useful as it 
would reasonably be expected, for example, that larger funds would have a higher 
dollar value investment turnover than smaller funds. Therefore the trading behaviour 
of funds within each identified fund size category are compared across the time 
period with one another, rather than being compared across size categories. 
 
5.2 Statistical Differences in SMSF Trading Behaviour Based 
on Fund Size 
The SMSFs within the sample data were segmented into three groups based 
on their size as 1 January 2005 and were tested for significant differences in each of 
the variables as defined in Table 3.7. The mean values for each of the variables for 
funds in group 1 are shown in Table 5.1. Group 1 funds are those funds with less 
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Table 5.1 Monthly means of variables for group 1 funds (small funds) for each year from 2005 
to 2011 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
COUNT 30  34  39  31  33  33  24  
COUNT_AGGBUYS 14  17  19  12  18  15  8  
COUNT_AGGSALES 9  8  11  5  3  7  6  
VALUE_AGGBUYS $86,189  $184,407  $260,106  $136,358  $119,012  $134,894  $104,415  
VALUE_AGGSALES $151,248  $149,899  $192,301  $93,164  $55,879  $121,032  $122,980  
COUNT_DEFBUYS 5  6  6  8  9  7  5  
COUNT_DEFSALES 2  3  3  6  4  5  5  
VALUE_DEFBUYS $132,889  $149,927  $184,271  $148,172  $171,433  $378,067  $330,129  
VALUE_DEFSALES $63,103  $104,353  $120,670  $177,438  $147,962  $383,818  $337,993  
NET_FLOWDEF $65,059  -$34,508  -$67,805  -$43,193  -$63,133  -$13,861  $18,565  
TRADE_VALUE $433,429  $588,585  $757,348  $555,132  $494,286  $1,017,811  $895,517  
 
The data shows the frequency of trading activity by small funds was 
relatively consistent over the period 2005 to 2011. Those variables which measure 
the frequency of each type of trading activity, such as COUNT, 
COUNT_AGGBUYS, COUNT_AGGSALES, COUNT_DEFBUYS and 
COUNT_DEFSALES, show only minor deviation across the time period under 
consideration. Differences in the dollar value of each type of trading activity are 
more pronounced however, with VALUE_AGGBUYS peaking at an average of 
$260,106 per month in 2007, before falling both during and after the onset of the 
financial crisis. A similar change is apparent with regards to VALUE_AGGSALES, 
which fell from a monthly average of $192,301 of such trades in 2007 to $55,879 in 
2009. NET_FLOWDEF, which measures the net flow of funds into defensive assets 
was negative for the majority of the years preceding the financial crisis, as well as 
during the financial crisis. In 2010 and 2011 however, there was a pronounced 
increase in the net flow of funds into defensive assets, with 2010 exhibiting a 
monthly mean value of just -$13,861 before NET_FLOWDEF turned positive in 
2011 with a monthly mean of $18,565. This is consistent with the data in Table 4.1 in 
Chapter 4 which showed a similar change across all funds within the SMSF sample. 
 
Table 5.2 shows the monthly means for each of the variables of group 2 
funds, which are those funds with greater than $350,000 but less than $750,000 in 
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Table 5.2 Monthly means of variables for group 2 funds (medium funds) for each year from 
2005 to 2011 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
COUNT 37  30  31  21  25  16  19  
COUNT_AGGBUYS 17  15  11  8  14  7  5  
COUNT_AGGSALES 12  7  11  2  2  2  6  
VALUE_AGGBUYS $66,446  $131,289  $94,327  $44,065  $132,317  $43,677  $43,000  
VALUE_AGGSALES $113,945  $67,999  $89,544  $19,657  $13,560  $39,546  $115,156  
COUNT_DEFBUYS 7  5  5  5  6  4  4  
COUNT_DEFSALES 2  2  3  6  4  3  4  
VALUE_DEFBUYS $145,416  $93,546  $151,067  $95,104  $126,891  $66,140  $100,773  
VALUE_DEFSALES $53,371  $51,398  $119,880  $121,814  $101,309  $71,414  $107,179  
NET_FLOWDEF $47,499  -$63,290  -$4,783  -$24,408  -$118,758  -$4,131  $72,157  
TRADE_VALUE $379,178  $344,231  $454,818  $280,640  $374,077  $220,777  $366,109  
 
Unlike small funds, medium sized funds within the sample exhibit different 
trading activity patterns over the period 2005 to 2011, with those variables which 
measure trading frequency (COUNT, COUNT_AGGBUYS, COUNT_AGGSALES, 
COUNT_DEFBUYS and COUNT_DEFSALES) varying noticeably in the periods 
before, during and after the financial crisis. For example, the variable COUNT, 
which measures the average monthly number of investment trades for funds within 
the sample group, was above 30 in each of the years preceding the crisis, before 
falling to an average of 21 in 2008 and reaching a low of 16 in 2010. In addition to 
variations in the frequency of trades, the dollar value of trading activity also varied 
over the period 2005 to 2011. VALUE_AGGBUYS, which measures the dollar value 
of trades that are associated with the purchase of ‘aggressive’ investments, fell from 
$94,327 in 2007 to $44,065 in 2008 as the financial crisis developed, although the 
variable did record an increase to $132,217 in 2009. NET_FLOWDEF, which 
measures the net flow of funds into defensive assets, was negative in the years prior 
to the financial crisis, although it did increase from -$63,290 in 2006 to -$4,783 in 
2007, which was immediately prior to the financial crisis.  
 
The third sub-set of funds within the sample, large funds, were those funds 
which held total assets of greater than $750,000 as at 1 January 2005. As with both 
‘small’ and ‘medium’ funds, the transaction variables for these funds were calculated 
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Table 5.3 Monthly means of variables for group 3 funds (large funds) for each year from 2005 to 
2011 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
COUNT 52  57  56  43  36  41  41  
COUNT_AGGBUYS 29  31  24  17  20  17  16  
COUNT_AGGSALES 10  12  18  9  5  14  12  
VALUE_AGGBUYS $141,592  $227,723  $231,930  $134,304  $113,991  $163,270  $192,006  
VALUE_AGGSALES $58,696  $85,033  $123,725  $68,323  $34,333  $108,661  $145,788  
COUNT_DEFBUYS 10  9  9  9  8  6  8  
COUNT_DEFSALES 4  3  5  9  3  4  6  
VALUE_DEFBUYS $131,937  $132,927  $180,566  $101,843  $68,173  $109,640  $125,445  
VALUE_DEFSALES $57,157  $52,647  $94,426  $127,213  $43,712  $100,052  $121,833  
NET_FLOWDEF -$82,897  -$142,690  -$108,205  -$65,981  -$79,658  -$54,610  -$46,218  
TRADE_VALUE $389,382  $498,329  $630,646  $431,683  $260,208  $481,623  $585,071  
 
As with medium-sized funds, large funds within the sample also exhibited 
differences in the level of transaction activity over the period 2005 to 2011. The 
average monthly number of trades (COUNT) peaked two years before the onset of 
the financial crisis, with an average of 57 trades per month in 2006. In 2009 the level 
of activity dropped to an average of just 36 transactions per month, a 37% reduction 
in trading activity. COUNT_AGGBUYS and VALUE_AGGBUYS, which measure 
the level of aggressive investment transactions for each period, also peaked prior to 
the crisis and declined in the years during and following the crisis. 
COUNT_AGGBUYS, which measures the monthly number of aggressive 
transactions, peaked the year before the onset of the crisis, with an average of 31 
such transactions in 2006, as compared to an average of just 17 such transactions in 
2006. NET_FLOWDEF, which measures the net flow of investment funds, remained 
negative throughout the period 2005 to 2011, although it did increase from -$142,690 
in 2006 to -$46,218 in 2011. 
 
While the nominal values of each transaction variable outlined in Tables 5.1, 
5.2 and 5.3 are informative, the data as presented does not indicate whether or not 
any of the changes, if present, were statistically significant or could be explained by 
normal variations in the data. Therefore the next step was to test the variables in 
Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 for significant differences across each year using Fisher’s 
Least Significant Difference (LSD) test, based on a significance level of 0.05. The 
results of the tests are grouped based on each variable being tested. This begins with 
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5.2.1 Analysis of the Variable COUNT Based on Fund Size 
Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 present the results of the analysis of the variable 
COUNT for each of the three different fund size groupings, being small, medium and 
large funds respectively. 
 
Table 5.4 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of investment 
transactions (COUNT) from 2005 to 2011 for group 1 funds (small funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 39 2007 
B A 34 2006 
B A 33 2009 
B A 33 2010 
B A 31 2008 
B A 30 2005 
B   24 2011 
 
For smaller SMSFs within the sample, there was a statistically significant 
greater difference in the average number of monthly transactions between the years 
2007 and 2011, with respective monthly mean trades of 39 and 24.   
 
Table 5.5 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of investment 
transactions (COUNT) from 2005 to 2011 for group 2 funds (medium funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter are 
not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A   37 2005 
B A   31 2007 
B A   30 2006 
B A C 25 2009 
B   C 21 2008 
B   C 19 2011 
    C 16 2010 
 
Similar to smaller funds, medium-sized funds within the sample show 
significant differences in the level of trading activity across the period prior to, 
during and after the financial crisis. 2005 saw a significantly greater level of trading 
activity, with a monthly average of 37 transactions, as compared to 2008 (21), 2010 
(16) and 2011 (19). The years 2006 (30) and 2007 (31) were also significantly 
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Table 5.6 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of investment 
transactions (COUNT) from 2005 to 2011 for group 3 funds (large funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 57 2006 
A 56 2007 
A 52 2005 
A 43 2008 
A 41 2011 
A 41 2010 
A 36 2009 
 
Unlike small funds and medium-sized funds, large SMSFs within the sample 
showed no significant differences in the overall level of trading activity across the 
period 2005 to 2011.  
 
5.2.2 Analysis of the Variable COUNT_AGGBUYS Based on Fund Size 
Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 outline whether the three different fund size groups 
showed evidence of significant changes in the monthly average number of aggressive 
investment purchase transactions (COUNT_AGGBUYS), which illustrates trustees 
acting to increase the level of market risk associated with the fund’s investments.  
 
Table 5.7 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of aggressive purchase 
transactions (COUNT_AGGBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group 1 funds (small funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 19 2007 
  A 18 2009 
  A 17 2006 
B A 15 2010 
B A 14 2005 
B A 12 2008 
B   8 2011 
 
The results in Table 5.7 show that significant differences in the monthly 
average number of aggressive purchase transactions existed between 2011 and the 
years 2006, 2007 and 2009, with 2011 having a significantly lower average of only 8 
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Table 5.8 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of aggressive purchase 
transactions (COUNT_AGGBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group 2 funds (medium funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter are 
not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A   17 2005 
  A   15 2006 
B A   14 2009 
B A C 11 2007 
B D C 8 2008 
  D C 7 2010 
  D   5 2011 
 
A number of significant differences in the monthly average aggressive 
investment purchase transactions were evident with regards to medium sized funds. 
The years following the crisis showed a number of differences, where 2011 and 2010 
had a significantly lower number of aggressive investment purchase transactions than 
2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009. The year 2008 also saw a statistically significant lower 
number of such transactions as compared to 2005 and 2006. 
 
Table 5.9 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of aggressive purchase 
transactions (COUNT_AGGBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group 3 funds (large funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 31 2006 
B A 29 2005 
B A 24 2007 
B A 20 2009 
B   17 2008 
B   17 2010 
B   16 2011 
 
For large SMSFs within the sample, a significant difference in the monthly 
average number of aggressive purchase transactions was found between 2006 and the 
years 2008, 2010 and 2011. The year 2006 registered a monthly average of 31 such 
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5.2.3 Analysis of the Variable COUNT_AGGSALES Based on Fund Size 
Tables 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 show the results of the analysis of the monthly 
average number of aggressive investment sales transactions (COUNT_AGGSALES) 
for small, medium and large funds respectively. 
 
Table 5.10 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of aggressive sales 
transactions (COUNT_AGGSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group 1 funds (small funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter are 
not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A   11 2007 
B A   9 2005 
B A C 8 2006 
B A C 7 2010 
B A C 6 2011 
B   C 5 2008 
    C 3 2009 
 
Table 5.10 shows that there were a significantly higher number of aggressive 
sales transactions in 2007 as compared to 2008 and 2009, with respective monthly 
means of 11, 5 and 3. The year 2005 (9) also saw a significantly higher number of 
such transactions as compared to 2009 (3).  
 
Table 5.11 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of aggressive sales 
transactions (COUNT_AGGSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group 2 funds (medium funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 12 2005 
  A 11 2007 
B A 7 2006 
B A 6 2011 
B   2 2010 
B   2 2008 
B   2 2009 
 
The results for medium-sized funds closely match those for small funds, with 
an increased level of aggressive sales transactions in the years preceding the financial 
crisis. The years 2005 (12) and 2007 (11) saw a significantly greater number of 
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Table 5.12 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of aggressive sales 
transactions (COUNT_AGGSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group 3 funds (large funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 18 2007 
B A 14 2010 
B A 12 2006 
B A 12 2011 
B A 10 2005 
B A 9 2008 
B   5 2009 
 
Large funds within the sample showed a significantly greater difference in the 
monthly average number of aggressive sales transactions between 2007 and 2009, 
with 2007 averaging 18 such trades per month, compared to just 5 in 2009.  
 
5.2.4 Analysis of the Variable VALUE_AGGBUYS Based on Fund Size 
Tables 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15 show the results of the analysis of the variable 
VALUE_AGGBUYS for the three different fund size groupings, which gives an 
indication of the variation of the magnitude of aggressive investment purchase 
decisions by SMSF trustees. 
 
 
Table 5.13 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of aggressive 
purchase transactions (VALUE_AGGBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group 1 funds (small funds) 
(p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $260,106 2007 
B A $184,407 2006 
B   $136,358 2008 
B   $134,894 2010 
B   $119,012 2009 
B   $104,415 2011 
B   $86,189 2005 
 
Significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of aggressive 
purchase transactions of small funds were found between the years 2007 ($260,106) 
and the years 2005 ($86,189), 2008 ($136,358), 2009 ($119,012), 2010 ($134,894) 
and 2011 ($104,415), with 2007 recording a significantly higher value than the 
corresponding years. 
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Table 5.14 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of aggressive 
purchase transactions (VALUE_AGGBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group 2 funds (medium 
funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $132,317 2009 
  A $131,289 2006 
B A $94,327 2007 
B   $66,446 2005 
B   $44,065 2008 
B   $43,677 2010 
B   $43,000 2011 
 
The results for medium funds found that 2009 and 2006 exhibited a 
significantly greater level of investment transactions involving the purchase of 
aggressive investments as compared to 2005, 2008, 2010 and 2011. The monthly 
means for 2009 ($132,317) and 2006 ($131,289) were significantly in excess of the 
means for the other years, which ranged from $66,446 in 2005 to $43,000 in 2011.  
 
Table 5.15 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of aggressive 
purchase transactions (VALUE_AGGBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group 3 funds (large funds) 
(p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly 
different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A $231,930 2007 
A $227,723 2006 
A $192,006 2011 
A $163,270 2010 
A $141,592 2005 
A $134,304 2008 
A $113,991 2009 
 
As shown in Table 5.15, there were no significant differences for large funds 
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5.2.5 Analysis of the Variable VALUE_AGGSALES Based On Fund Size 
In contrast to the average monthly dollar value of aggressive purchase 
transactions, VALUE_AGGSALES measures the monthly average dollar value of 
monthly aggressive sale transactions. These are investment transactions where SMSF 
trustees sold those investments categorised as ‘aggressive’. The results of the 
analysis for the 3 different fund sizes are shown in Tables 5.16, 5.17 and 5.18. 
 
Table 5.16 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of aggressive sales 
transactions (VALUE_AGGSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group 1 funds (small funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $192,301 2007 
B A $151,248 2005 
B A $149,899 2006 
B A $122,980 2011 
B A $121,032 2010 
B A $93,164 2008 
B   $55,879 2009 
 
The results of the analysis for significant differences for the variable 
VALUE_AGGSALES showed a significantly greater difference existed between the 
years 2007 and 2009, with monthly means of $192,301 and $55,879 respectively.  
 
Table 5.17 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of aggressive sales 
transactions (VALUE_AGGSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group 2 funds (medium funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $115,156 2011 
  A $113,945 2005 
B A $89,544 2007 
B A $67,999 2006 
B A $39,546 2010 
B   $19,657 2008 
B   $13,560 2009 
 
For medium-sized funds within the sample, there was a significantly greater 
difference in the level of aggressive investment sales transactions between the years 
2011 and 2005 with 2008 and 2009, with respective monthly averages of $115,156, 
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Table 5.18 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of aggressive sales 
transactions (VALUE_AGGSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group 3 funds (large funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $145,788 2011 
  A $123,725 2007 
B A $108,661 2010 
B A $85,033 2006 
B A $68,323 2008 
B A $58,696 2005 
B   $34,333 2009 
 
Large funds showed significant differences in the level of aggressive 
investment sales transactions between 2011 and 2009, with 2011 showing a 
significantly greater number of such transactions ($145,788 average monthly trade 
value in 2011 as compared to $34,333 in 2009).  
 
5.2.6 Analysis of the Variable COUNT_DEFBUYS Based on Fund Size 
In addition to considering the frequency of aggressive investment 
transactions, the dollar value and frequency of defensive investment transactions 
were also analysed. The results of the analysis of COUNT_DEFBUYS, which 
measures the monthly average number of defensive asset purchase transactions, are 
shown in Tables 5.19, 5.20 and 5.21. 
 
Table 5.19 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of defensive purchase 
transactions (COUNT_DEFBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group 1 funds (small funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly 
different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 9 2009 
A 8 2008 
A 7 2010 
A 6 2007 
A 6 2006 
A 5 2005 
A 5 2011 
 
Table 5.19 shows that no statistically significant differences were found in 
the monthly average number of defensive purchase transactions for small funds 
within the sample. 
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Table 5.20 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of defensive purchase 
transactions (COUNT_DEFBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group 2 funds (medium funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly 
different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 7 2005 
A 6 2009 
A 5 2007 
A 5 2006 
A 5 2008 
A 4 2011 
A 4 2010 
 
As with small funds within the sample, no significant differences were found 
in the monthly average number of defensive purchase transactions for medium-sized 
funds. 
 
Table 5.21 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of defensive purchase 
transactions (COUNT_DEFBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group 3 funds (large funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly 
different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 10 2005 
A 9 2006 
A 9 2007 
A 9 2008 
A 8 2009 
A 8 2011 
A 6 2010 
 
As with small funds and medium-sized funds, no statistically significant 
differences were detected in the monthly average number of defensive purchase 
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5.2.7 Analysis of the Variable COUNT_DEFSALES Based on Fund Size 
 In contrast to the measurement of defensive investment purchase 
transactions, COUNT_DEFSALES measures the average monthly frequency of 
defensive sales transactions. The results of the analysis of this variable for each of 
the fund sizes are shown in Tables 5.22, 5.23 and 5.24. 
 
Table 5.22 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of defensive sales 
transactions (COUNT_DEFSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group 1 funds (small funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 6 2008 
B A 5 2011 
B A 5 2010 
B A 4 2009 
B A 3 2007 
B   3 2006 
B   2 2005 
 
For small funds within the sample, there were a significantly greater number 
of defensive sales transactions in 2008 (6) as compared to 2006 (3) and 2005 (2). 
 
Table 5.23 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of defensive sales 
transactions (COUNT_DEFSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group 2 funds (medium funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 6 2008 
A 4 2009 
A 4 2011 
A 3 2007 
A 3 2010 
A 2 2006 
A 2 2005 
 
Unlike small funds, medium-sized funds within the sample showed no 
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Table 5.24 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average number of defensive sales 
transactions (COUNT_DEFSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group 3 funds (large funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 9 2008 
A 6 2011 
A 5 2007 
A 4 2010 
A 4 2005 
A 3 2006 
A 3 2009 
 
As with medium-sized funds, large funds also showed no significant 
differences in the monthly average number of defensive sales transactions between 
the years 2005 to 2011.  
 
5.2.8 Analysis of the Variable VALUE_DEFBUYS Based on Fund Size 
The next variable analysed was VALUE_DEFBUYS, which represents the 
average monthly dollar value of investment transactions which involved the purchase 
of a defensive investment. Tables 5.25, 5.26 and 5.27 show the results of the analysis 
of the variable VALUE_DEFBUYS for each of the fund size groupings within the 
sample. 
 
Table 5.25 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of defensive 
purchase transactions (VALUE_DEFBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group 1 funds (small funds) 
(p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $378,067 2010 
B A $330,129 2011 
B A $184,271 2007 
B A $171,433 2009 
B   $149,927 2006 
B   $148,172 2008 
B   $132,889 2005 
 
With regards to the level of purchases of defensive assets, 2010 ($378,067) 
saw a significantly higher level of such activity as compared to 2005 ($132,889), 
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Table 5.26 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of defensive 
purchase transactions (VALUE_DEFBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group 2 funds (medium 
funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly 
different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A $151,067 2007 
A $145,416 2005 
A $126,891 2009 
A $100,773 2011 
A $95,104 2008 
A $93,546 2006 
A $66,140 2010 
 
With regards to medium-sized funds, no statistically significant differences in 
the monthly dollar average value of defensive purchase transactions between the 
years 2005 and 2011 were detected. 
 
Table 5.27 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of defensive 
purchase transactions (VALUE_DEFBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group 3 funds (large funds) 
(p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $180,566 2007 
B A $132,927 2006 
B A $131,937 2005 
B A $125,445 2011 
B A $109,640 2010 
B A $101,843 2008 
B   $68,173 2009 
 
Large funds within the sample showed a significant difference in the monthly 
average dollar value of defensive purchase transactions between 2007 and 2009, with 
2007 averaging an additional $112,393 per month in defensive purchase transactions, 
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5.2.9 Analysis of the Variable VALUE_DEFSALES Based on Fund Size 
The variable VALUE_DEFSALES, which measures the average monthly 
dollar value of sales of defensive investments, was also analysed for the three 
different fund size groupings. The results are illustrated in Tables 5.28, 5.29 and 
5.30. 
 
Table 5.28 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of defensive sales 
transactions (VALUE_DEFSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group 1 funds (small funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $383,818 2010 
B A $337,993 2011 
B C $177,438 2008 
  C $147,962 2009 
  C $120,670 2007 
  C $104,353 2006 
  C $63,103 2005 
 
Significant differences were found between 2010 ($383,818) and the years 
2005 to 2009 (ranging from $63,103 in 2005 to $147,962 in 2009), while 2011 
($337,993) also saw a significantly greater number of defensive sales transactions 
than 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009. 
 
Table 5.29 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of defensive sales 
transactions (VALUE_DEFSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group 2 funds (medium funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A $121,814 2008 
A $119,880 2007 
A $107,179 2011 
A $101,309 2009 
A $71,414 2010 
A $53,371 2005 
A $51,398 2006 
 
Unlike small funds, medium-sized funds within the sample showed no 
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Table 5.30 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average dollar value of defensive sales 
transactions (VALUE_DEFSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group 3 funds (large funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A $127,213 2008 
A $121,833 2011 
A $100,052 2010 
A $94,426 2007 
A $57,157 2005 
A $52,647 2006 
A $43,712 2009 
 
As with medium-sized funds, large funds within the sample exhibited no 
significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of defensive sales 
transactions.  
 
5.2.10 Analysis of the Variable NET_FLOWDEF Based on Fund Size 
The results of the analysis of the variable NET_FLOWDEF, which indicates 
the net flow of funds into defensive assets, are outlined in Tables 5.31, 5.32 and 5.33. 
 
Table 5.31 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average net flow of money into 
defensive assets (NET_FLOWDEF) from 2005 to 2011 for group 1 funds (small funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A $65,059 2005 
A $18,565 2011 
A -$13,861 2010 
A -$34,508 2006 
A -$43,193 2008 
A -$63,133 2009 
A -$67,805 2007 
 
The variable NET_FLOWDEF indicates the overall direction of flow of 
funds, with a positive value signifying a net flow of funds into defensive assets for 
that specific period. For small funds within the sample, no significant differences 
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Table 5.32 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average net flow of money into 
defensive assets (NET_FLOWDEF) from 2005 to 2011 for group 2 funds (medium funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter are 
not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A   $72,157 2011 
B A   $47,499 2005 
B A C -$4,131 2010 
B A C -$4,783 2007 
B   C -$24,408 2008 
  D C -$63,290 2006 
  D   -$118,758 2009 
 
With regards to medium-sized funds within the sample, a number of 
significant differences were found in the level of net flow into defensive assets. 2011 
($72,157) and 2005 ($47,499) saw a significantly greater level of net flow of funds, 
as compared to 2006 (-$63,290) and 2009 (-$118,758). The year 2011 was also 
significantly greater than 2008 (-$24,408), while the value for 2009 was significantly 
lower than all other years except for 2006.  
 
Table 5.33 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average net flow of money into 
defensive assets (NET_FLOWDEF) from 2005 to 2011 for group 3 funds (large funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A -$46,218 2011 
A -$54,610 2010 
A -$65,981 2008 
A -$79,658 2009 
A -$82,897 2005 
A -$108,205 2007 
A -$142,690 2006 
 
As was found with small funds within the sample, large funds exhibited no 
significant differences in the level of net flow of funds into defensive assets across 
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5.2.11 Analysis of the Variable TRADE_VALUE Based on Fund Size 
The final variable analysed in this portion of the study was TRADE_VALUE, 
which is the monthly average dollar value of all trades over the period 2005 to 2011, 
regardless of the nature of each transaction. This variable measures the overall 
trading activity of the funds within the sample. The results of the analysis for the 
three fund size groupings are shown in Tables 5.34, 5.35 and 5.36. 
 
Table 5.34 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average total trade value of all 
investment transactions (TRADE_VALUE) from 2005 to 2011 for group 1 funds (small funds) 
(p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter are 
not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A   $1,017,811 2010 
B A   $895,517 2011 
B A C $757,348 2007 
B   C $588,585 2006 
B   C $555,132 2008 
    C $494,286 2009 
    C $433,429 2005 
 
Significant differences were found in the overall level of trading activity for 
small funds within the sample, with 2010 ($1,017,811) having a significantly greater 
level of trading activity (as measured by total trade values) than 2005 ($433,429), 
2006 ($494,286), 2008 ($555,132) and 2009 ($494,286). The value for 2011 
($895,517) was also significantly greater than 2005 and 2009.  
 
Table 5.35 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average total trade value of all 
investment transactions (TRADE_VALUE) from 2005 to 2011 for group 2 funds (medium 
funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $454,818 2007 
B A $379,178 2005 
B A $374,077 2009 
B A $366,109 2011 
B A $344,231 2006 
B A $280,640 2008 
B   $220,777 2010 
 
With regards to medium-sized funds within the sample, significant 
differences in the level of total trade value were only found between 2007 ($454,818) 
and 2010 ($220,777), with 2007 exhibiting a significantly larger average monthly 
total trade value than 2010.  
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Table 5.36 Test for statistical differences in the monthly average total trade value of all 
investment transactions (TRADE_VALUE) from 2005 to 2011 for group 3 funds (large funds) (p 
= 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $630,646 2007 
  A $585,071 2011 
B A $498,329 2006 
B A $481,623 2010 
B A $431,683 2008 
B A $389,382 2005 
B   $260,208 2009 
 
With regards to large funds within the sample, the average monthly total trade 
value was significantly greater in 2007 ($630,656) and 2011 ($585,071) as compared 




This chapter presented the results of the analysis of SMSFs within the sample 
based on segmentation of the funds according to their size (the total assets held 
within each fund as at 1 January 2005). The objective of the analysis was to 
determine whether or not fund size can be used as an indicator of trustee trading 
behaviour and whether or not trustees reacted differently prior to, during and 
following the financial crisis based on the total value of assets under trustee 
management. 
 
Small funds within the sample tended to trade more frequently prior to the 
financial crisis when compared to those periods both during and following the crisis, 
although the monthly average total trade value was higher in those years following 
the crisis as compared to prior to and during the crisis. Smaller funds therefore 
appear to have reduced trading activity in response to the crisis, but the average 
dollar value of these trades were higher than prior to or during the crisis. Small funds 
were also engaged in significantly greater numbers (and dollar values) of aggressive 
investment purchase trades immediately prior to the financial crisis, although this 
was matched to some extent by a high level of aggressive investment sales 
transactions prior to the crisis. The results of the analysis do indicate however, that 
small funds within the sample were not significantly increasing defensive asset 
exposure on the eve of the crisis, but tended to increase their dollar value 
commitment to defensive investment purchase transactions following the financial 
crisis. While not statistically significant, changes in the variable NET_FLOWDEF 
tend to indicate that small funds within the sample increased defensive investment 
exposure in those years following the financial crisis and reduced the same exposure 
prior to the financial crisis. There was also some evidence of an increase in net 
aggressive investment exposure by small SMSFs during the financial crisis, but this 
was also not statistically significant. 
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Medium-sized funds within the sample exhibited significant differences in 
trading activity, generally reducing both trading frequency and trade value in the 
period following the financial crisis. Medium-sized funds also tended to increase 
aggressive investment exposure on the eve of the financial crisis, although trustees of 
medium-sized funds were also significantly increasing aggressive investment 
exposure in 2009, as markets began to recover following the crisis. Medium-sized 
funds tended to make no significant changes to their exposure to defensive assets 
over the period 2005 to 2011, although the variable NET_FLOWDEF does indicate 
that trustees of medium-sized funds were increasing net defensive investment 
exposure following the crisis, particularly when compared to 2009, which saw them 
significantly increase aggressive investment exposure. 
 
Large funds within the sample made no significant changes to trade 
frequency over the period 2005 to 2011, although average monthly trade value 
tended to be higher in both the period prior to and following the financial crisis. 
Large funds tended to make a greater number of trades involving the purchase of 
aggressive investments prior to the financial crisis, although the actual dollar value of 
these transactions was not significantly different across the time period under 
consideration. As with medium-sized funds, large funds tended to show no 
significant differences in the frequency or value of those investment transactions 
involving defensive assets. While the variable NET_FLOWDEF revealed that large 
funds tended to have greater net exposure to defensive investments in those years 
following the crisis, the level of change was not statistically significant when 
compared to both prior to and during the financial crisis. 
 
The results of the analysis of fund trading behaviour within this chapter may 
have relevance to the concepts of relative and absolute risk aversion. It is generally 
assumed that investors exhibit constant relative risk aversion, which implies that the 
percentage of wealth that an investor is willing to risk remains unchanged as wealth 
increases (Chiappori & Paiella 2011). In a related manner, decreasing absolute risk 
aversion suggests that investors increase the absolute amount of wealth invested in 
higher risk assets as wealth increases (Kihlstrom, Romer & Williams 1981). In the 
context of this study, this implies that larger SMSFs within the sample would be 
expected to have the same investment risk exposure as smaller SMSFs within the 
sample on a percentage basis, although the absolute level of aggressive assets held by 
larger funds would be greater than smaller funds. Therefore over the period 2005 to 
2011 any changes in investment risk exposure across different fund sizes should be 
consistent so as to adhere to both constant relative risk aversion and decreasing 
absolute risk aversion. This is not evident in the results of the analysis, which 
indicates that medium-sized funds were more likely to increase exposure to 
aggressive investments as markets bottomed in 2009, trading behaviour not shared 
by trustees of small or large funds. Smaller funds were more likely to increase 
aggressive investment exposure leading up to the financial crisis, behaviour which is 
again not evident in the trading decisions of trustees of larger SMSFs. The only 
change in trading activity common to funds of all sizes appears to be an increase in 
defensive investment exposure in the period following the financial crisis. Overall 
however, it does appear that the trading behaviour of SMSF trustees in this study 
does not conform to the general concepts of constant relative risk aversion and 
decreasing absolute risk aversion. This suggests that further investigation into 
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relative and absolute risk aversion of SMSF trustees may be warranted, although this 
matter is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
This chapter presented the results of the analysis of SMSFs within the sample 
based on segmentation according to the size of the fund. The results tend to indicate 
that funds of all sizes increased exposure to defensive investments following the 
crisis and were not taking active steps to decrease exposure to aggressive 
investments prior to the crisis. Of the three fund-size categories, only medium-sized 
funds appeared to increase exposure to aggressive investment as markets bottomed 
during the financial crisis. The next chapter presents the results of the analysis of 
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CHAPTER 6  
RESULTS: TRADING BEHAVIOUR AND FUND RISK PROFILE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the results of the analysis of SMSF 
investment transactions over the period 2005 to 2011 based on fund size. This was 
done on an annual basis and considered the trading activity of funds within the 
sample based on the dollar value of assets held within each fund. This chapter 
presents the results of the analysis of the trading behaviour of SMSFs on the basis of 
fund risk profile. This analysis seeks to address the question of whether or not funds 
with differing risk profiles exhibited the same trading behaviour over the period 2005 
to 2011. 
 
Segmenting the SMSFs within the sample based on risk profile should allow 
for generalisations to be drawn regarding the behaviour of fund trustees with 
differing risk profiles when confronted with the set of circumstances that existed 
over the period 2005 to 2011. For example, it would be reasonable to assume that 
trustees of those funds with a more aggressive risk profile would have taken 
advantage of falling asset prices during the financial crisis, while trustees with a 
more defensive risk profile would have been reducing aggressive investment 
exposure immediately prior to the financial crisis. The analysis of the variables 
outlined in Table 3.7 in Chapter 3 on the basis of fund risk profiles may allow for 
answers to be found to these and similar questions regarding SMSF trustee risk 
profiles and associated trading behaviour. 
 
6.2 Statistical Differences in SMSF Trading Behaviour Based 
on Risk Profile 
The SMSFs within the sample data were separated into three groups based on 
their risk profile as at 1 January 2005 and were tested for significant differences 
across each year for each of the variables as defined in Table 3.7. The mean values 
for each of the variables for funds in group A are shown in Table 6.1. Group A funds 
are those funds with an ‘aggressive’ risk profile (funds with an equities allocation of 
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Table 6.1 Monthly means of variables for group A funds (aggressive funds) for each year from 
2005 to 2011 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
COUNT 37 42 41 37 36 36 25 
COUNT_AGGBUYS 20 25 19 17 20 15 11 
COUNT_AGGSALES 10 10 14 7 4 12 6 
VALUE_AGGBUYS $87,456 $173,276 $197,106 $174,072 $115,396 $157,211 $138,912 
VALUE_AGGSALES $109,950 $112,225 $178,226 $110,474 $34,182 $127,374 $82,905 
COUNT_DEFBUYS 6 5 6 8 9 6 5 
COUNT_DEFSALES 2 2 3 5 3 3 3 
VALUE_DEFBUYS $115,714 $76,602 $129,876 $118,171 $88,000 $139,375 $182,452 
VALUE_DEFSALES $47,829 $40,336 $89,208 $123,157 $65,145 $141,309 $149,187 
NET_FLOWDEF $22,494 -$61,052 -$18,879 -$63,598 -$81,214 -$29,838 -$56,007 
TRADE_VALUE $360,949 $402,439 $594,416 $525,874 $302,724 $565,268 $553,456 
 
The data shows that the frequency of trading activity by aggressive funds, as 
measured by the variable COUNT, was relatively stable across the period 2005 to 
2010, with only 2011 exhibiting a substantially lower average monthly number of 
trades. COUNT_AGGBUYS, which measures the average number of aggressive 
investment purchase transactions per month, appears to indicate a drop in the level of 
such transactions following the financial crisis, with only 15 and 11 such transactions 
in 2010 and 2011 respectively. This compares to 20 and 25 such transactions in 2005 
and 2006 respectively. COUNT_AGGSALES, which measures the average monthly 
number of aggressive investment sales transactions, peaked at 14 such transactions in 
2007, with a low point of just four in 2009. VALUE_AGGBUYS, which measures 
the average monthly dollar value of aggressive investment purchase transactions, was 
relatively consistent across the period 2005 to 2011, although 2007 did represent the 
highest level of such transactions. VALUE_AGGSALES, representing the average 
monthly dollar value of aggressive sales transactions, reached a low of $34,182 per 
month in 2009.  
 
With regards to defensive investment transactions, COUNT_DEFBUYS, 
which measures the average monthly number of defensive investment purchase 
transactions, peaked in 2009 with an average of nine such transactions per month. 
COUNT_DEFSALES, which measures the average monthly number of defensive 
investment sales transactions, showed little variation over the seven year period, 
although 2008 saw the highest number of such transactions, averaging eight per 
month. VALUE_DEFBUYS, which measures the average monthly dollar value of 
defensive investment purchases, was higher in the years following the crisis. 2011 
and 2010 saw monthly averages of this type of transaction of $185,452 and $139,375 
respectively, which were the two highest recorded figures over the seven year period. 
VALUE_DEFSALES, which measures the monthly average dollar value of 
defensive investment sales transactions, tended to be higher in the years following 
the crisis, peaking in 2011 with an average monthly value of $149,187 of such trades. 
NET_FLOWDEF, which measures the net flow of funds into defensive assets, 
reached an average monthly low of -$81,214 in 2009. TRADE_VALUE, which is 
simply the average monthly dollar value of all investment decisions, showed some 
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differences over the seven year period, with a low in 2009 of $302,724 in average 
monthly trade value. 
 
Table 6.2 shows the monthly mean for each of the variables for group M 
funds, which are moderate risk funds within the sample. These are funds with an 
equities allocation of greater than 50% but less than 60% as at 1 January 2005. 
 
Table 6.2 Monthly means of variables for group M funds (moderate funds) for each year from 
2005 to 2011 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
COUNT 46 44 53 30 28 29 29 
COUNT_AGGBUYS 22 22 22 11 16 13 8 
COUNT_AGGSALES 14 9 17 5 2 6 9 
VALUE_AGGBUYS $102,226 $206,877 $254,612 $86,372 $111,812 $113,166 $102,656 
VALUE_AGGSALES $126,218 $99,546 $147,455 $45,994 $40,730 $82,362 $180,962 
COUNT_DEFBUYS 8 9 9 7 6 6 6 
COUNT_DEFSALES 3 4 5 8 4 4 6 
VALUE_DEFBUYS $158,584 $200,367 $240,449 $114,506 $91,126 $135,366 $119,937 
VALUE_DEFSALES $54,127 $122,852 $144,024 $167,855 $84,483 $131,956 $139,765 
NET_FLOWDEF $23,992 -$107,331 -$107,156 -$40,379 -$71,082 -$30,804 $78,307 
TRADE_VALUE $441,155 $629,643 $786,540 $414,728 $328,152 $462,849 $543,321 
 
With regards to the overall level of trading frequency, measured by the 
variable COUNT, moderate risk funds exhibit a similar pattern to funds with a more 
aggressive risk profile. That is, the years following the financial crisis tended to have 
a lower monthly average trade count when compared to the years leading up to the 
crisis. In this regard the monthly average trade count peaked at 53 trades in 2007, 
with only 28, 29 and 29 trades in 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively. The variable 
COUNT_AGGBUYS shows a similar pattern, with an average of just eight such 
transactions per month in 2011, compared to 22 such transactions per month for the 
years 2005, 2006 and 2007. COUNT_AGGSALES, the measure of aggressive sales 
transactions, exhibits a different pattern, with an average of just two such 
transactions in 2009, compared to 17 in 2007. VALUE_AGGBUYS shows a similar 
pattern to COUNT_AGGBUYS, with a greater monthly average dollar value of 
aggressive purchase transactions in the years leading up to the financial crisis, 
peaking at a monthly average of $254,612 in 2007. As would be expected, 
VALUE_AGGSALES shows a similar pattern to COUNT_AGGSALES, with the 
monthly average dollar value of aggressive investment sales reaching a low of 
$40,730 in 2009. 
 
With regards to defensive investment transactions, COUNT_DEFBUYS, 
which shows the average monthly number of defensive purchase transactions, peaked 
in 2006 and 2007, averaging nine such transactions per month. Overall however, 
there was little differentiation across the period 2005 to 2011, with the lowest 
monthly average of such trades being 6 in 2009, 2010 and 2011. 
COUNT_DEFSALES, which measure the monthly average number of defensive 
investment sales transactions, also showed only slight variation across the period. 
The lowest monthly average number of this type of transaction occurred in 2005, 
 89   
 
with three per month, and the highest number of defensive sales transactions 
occurred in 2008, with an average of 8 transactions. VALUE_DEFBUYS, which 
measures the monthly average dollar value of defensive investment purchases, varied 
from an average of $240,449 in 2007, to $91,126 in 2009. VALUE_DEFSALES 
exhibits a similar pattern, although the average monthly dollar value of defensive 
investment sales transactions peaked in 2008, at $167,855 per month. 
NET_FLOWDEF, which measures the net flow of funds into defensive assets, varied 
from $78,307 in 2011, to -$107,156 in 2007. TRADE_VALUE, the measurement of 
the overall dollar value of all trades, varied considerably across the period 2005 to 
2011, peaking in 2007 with an average monthly trade value of $786,540, and a low 
of $328,152 in 2009. 
 
Table 6.3 shows the monthly means for each of the variables for defensive 
funds within the sample, or group D funds. These are funds with an equities 
allocation of less than 50% as at 1 January 2005. 
 
Table 6.3 Monthly means of variables for group D funds (defensive funds) for each year from 
2005 to 2011 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
COUNT 33 31 29 26 28 22 27 
COUNT_AGGBUYS 16 15 12 9 15 9 9 
COUNT_AGGSALES 7 8 8 4 3 4 8 
VALUE_AGGBUYS $75,047 $140,364 $116,752 $48,820 $130,029 $67,368 $86,693 
VALUE_AGGSALES $87,721 $90,232 $72,598 $23,365 $21,802 $55,287 $114,002 
COUNT_DEFBUYS 7 6 5 7 7 5 5 
COUNT_DEFSALES 4 3 4 7 3 4 5 
VALUE_DEFBUYS $120,177 $92,311 $122,705 $110,520 $182,033 $248,143 $236,607 
VALUE_DEFSALES $71,676 $45,209 $97,576 $133,666 $142,501 $252,161 $249,373 
NET_FLOWDEF $12,674 -$50,132 -$44,154 -$25,455 -$108,227 -$12,080 $27,309 
TRADE_VALUE $354,620 $368,115 $409,631 $316,371 $476,366 $622,960 $686,675 
 
The overall level of trading activity of defensive funds is measured by the 
variable COUNT. This variable, measuring the monthly average number of all 
investment transactions, peaked in 2005 with 33 transactions, with a low of 22 
transactions in 2010. COUNT_AGGBUYS, which measures the number of 
aggressive investment purchase transactions, shows a similar pattern, reaching a high 
of 16 transactions in 2005 and a low of 9 transactions in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
COUNT_AGGSALES, the number of monthly aggressive investment sales 
transactions, reached a high of 8 in 2006, 2007 and 2011. VALUE_AGGBUYS, 
which measures the average monthly dollar value of aggressive investment purchase 
transactions, reached an average monthly high of $140,364 in 2006. 
VALUE_AGGSALES, similar to COUNT_AGGSALES, recorded high levels in 
2005, 2006 and 2007. The highest average monthly dollar of aggressive investment 
sales transactions however, was reached in 2011, with an average of $114,002. 
COUNT_DEFBUYS, a measure of the average monthly number of defensive 
investment purchase transactions, shows little variation across the period 2005 to 
2011, ranging from 5 transactions 2007, 2010 and 2011, to 7 transactions in 2005, 
2008 and 2009. COUNT_DEFSALES, the measure of defensive investment sales 
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transactions, shows some variation, from 3 transactions in 2006 and 2009, to 7 
transactions in 2008. With regards to VALUE_DEFBUYS, 2010 and 2011 recorded 
average monthly defensive investment purchase of $248,143 and $236,607 
respectively. This is higher than corresponding figures in 2006 and 2007 of $92,311 
and $122,705 respectively. VALUE_DEFSALES shows a similar trend, with a 
monthly average of $252,161 of defensive investment sales transactions in 2010, and 
just $45,209 in 2006. NET_FLOWDEF, the measure of net flow of funds into 
defensive investments, recorded positive values in 2005 and 2011 and a low of          
-$108,227 net flow into defensive investments in 2009. TRADE_VALUE, the 
measure of average monthly dollar trade value, shows an increase from the years 
preceding the crisis to the years following the crisis.  
 
As with Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the data as presented in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 
6.3 does not indicate whether or not any of the changes in the trading behaviour of 
fund trustees (as grouped by risk profile) was statistically significant or could be 
explained by normal variations in the data. Once again the next step was to test the 
variables in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 for significant differences across each year using 
Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) test based on a significance level of 
0.05. The results of the statistical analysis are grouped based on each variable tested.  
 
6.2.1 Analysis of the Variable COUNT Based on Fund Risk Profile 
The results of the analysis of the variable COUNT for the three fund risk 
profile groupings are shown in Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. 
 
Table 6.4 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
investment transactions (COUNT) from 2005 to 2011 for group A funds (aggressive funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 42 2006 
A 41 2007 
A 37 2005 
A 37 2008 
A 36 2009 
A 36 2010 
A 25 2011 
 
In terms of the average monthly number of all investment transactions for 
aggressive funds, no statistically significant differences were observed between the 
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Table 6.5 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
investment transactions (COUNT) from 2005 to 2011 for group M funds (moderate funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 53 2007 
B A 46 2005 
B A 44 2006 
B   30 2008 
B   29 2010 
B   29 2011 
B   28 2009 
 
Statistically significant differences were found in the number of average 
monthly investment transactions for moderate risk funds, with 2007 having a 
significantly higher number of transactions than 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. 
 
Table 6.6 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
investment transactions (COUNT) from 2005 to 2011 for group D funds (defensive funds) (p = 
0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 33 2005 
A 31 2006 
A 29 2007 
A 28 2009 
A 27 2011 
A 26 2008 
A 22 2010 
 
As with aggressive funds, funds with a defensive risk profile exhibited no 
significant differences in the average monthly number of investment transactions 
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6.2.2 Analysis of the Variable COUNT_AGGBUYS Based on Fund Risk 
Profile 
The results of the analysis of the variable COUNT_AGGBUYS for the three 
fund risk profile groupings are shown in Tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9. 
 
Table 6.7 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
aggressive purchase transactions (COUNT_AGGBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group A funds 
(aggressive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 25 2006 
B A 20 2009 
B A 20 2005 
B A 19 2007 
B A 17 2008 
B A 15 2010 
B   11 2011 
 
A statistically significant difference was found in the monthly average 
number of aggressive purchase transactions between 2006 and 2011, with an average 
of 25 such transactions in 2006, compared to just 11 in 2011.  
 
Table 6.8 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
aggressive purchase transactions (COUNT_AGGBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group M funds 
(moderate funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 22 2006 
  A 22 2005 
  A 22 2007 
B A 16 2009 
B A 13 2010 
B   11 2008 
B   8 2011 
 
Similar to funds with more aggressive risk exposure, moderate risk funds 
exhibited a number of statistically significant differences in the monthly average 
number of aggressive purchase transactions, with the mean number of such 
transactions in 2005 (22), 2006 (22) and 2007 (22) being significantly greater than 
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Table 6.9 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
aggressive purchase transactions (COUNT_AGGBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group D funds 
(defensive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 16 2005 
B A 15 2006 
B A 15 2009 
B A 12 2007 
B A 9 2008 
B   9 2010 
B   9 2011 
 
With regards to the average monthly number of aggressive purchase 
transactions by defensive funds, a significantly greater difference was found in the 
level of such transactions between 2005 and 2010 and 2011, with respective means 
of 16, 9 and 9.  
 
6.2.3 Analysis of the Variable COUNT_AGGSALES Based on Fund Risk 
Profile 
The results of the analysis of the variable COUNT_AGGSALES for the three 
fund risk profile groupings, which measures the average monthly number of sales 
transactions of aggressive investments, are shown in Tables 6.10, 6.11 and 6.12. 
 
Table 6.10 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
aggressive sales transactions (COUNT_AGGSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group A funds 
(aggressive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 14 2007 
B A 12 2010 
B A 10 2006 
B A 10 2005 
B A 7 2008 
B A 6 2011 
B   4 2009 
 
With regards to the monthly average number of aggressive sales transactions 
of aggressive funds, the level of activity in 2007 (an average of 14 such transactions) 
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Table 6.11 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
aggressive sales transactions (COUNT_AGGSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group M funds 
(moderate funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter are 
not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A   17 2007 
B A   14 2005 
B A C 9 2011 
B A C 9 2006 
B   C 6 2010 
B   C 5 2008 
    C 2 2009 
 
For moderate risk funds, 2007 saw a significantly greater number of 
aggressive sales transactions (mean of 17) when compared to 2010 (6), 2008 (5) and 
2009 (2). The mean number of transactions for 2009 was also significantly lower 
than in 2005, with just 2 such transactions in 2009 compared to 14 in 2005.  
 
Table 6.12 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
aggressive sales transactions (COUNT_AGGSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group D funds 
(defensive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 8 2006 
A 8 2011 
A 8 2007 
A 7 2005 
A 4 2010 
A 4 2008 
A 3 2009 
 
Unlike aggressive and moderate risk funds, no statistically significant 
differences were found in the monthly average number of aggressive sales 
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6.2.4 Analysis of the Variable VALUE_AGGBUYS Based on Fund Risk 
Profile 
The results of the analysis of the variable VALUE_AGGBUYS, which 
measures the monthly average dollar value of aggressive investment purchase 
transactions, are shown in Tables 6.13, 6.14 and 6.15. 
 
Table 6.13 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of 
aggressive purchase transactions (VALUE_AGGBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group A funds 
(aggressive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A $197,106 2007 
A $174,072 2008 
A $173,276 2006 
A $157,211 2010 
A $138,912 2011 
A $115,396 2009 
A $87,456 2005 
 
No statistically significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of 
aggressive purchase transaction were found for aggressive funds within the sample. 
 
Table 6.14 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of 
aggressive purchase transactions (VALUE_AGGBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group M funds 
(moderate funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letters 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $254,612 2007 
B A $206,877 2006 
B   $113,166 2010 
B   $111,812 2009 
B   $102,656 2011 
B   $102,226 2005 
B   $86,372 2008 
 
Moderate risk funds within the sample showed a statistically significant 
difference in the monthly average dollar value of aggressive purchase transactions 
between the years 2007 and 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. The mean value of 
aggressive investment purchase transactions in 2007 of $254,612 was more than 
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Table 6.15 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of 
aggressive purchase transactions (VALUE_AGGBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group D funds 
(defensive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $140,363 2006 
  A $130,029 2009 
B A $116,752 2007 
B A $86,693 2011 
B A $75,047 2005 
B A $67,368 2010 
B   $48,820 2008 
 
Defensive funds within the sample showed a significantly greater difference 
in the monthly average dollar value of aggressive purchase transactions between the 
years 2006 ($140,363), 2009 ($130,029) and the year 2008 ($48,820).  
 
6.2.5 Analysis of the Variable VALUE_AGGSALES Based on Fund Risk 
Profile 
The results of the analysis of the variable VALUE_AGGSALES for the three 
fund risk profile groups, which measures the monthly average dollar value of 
aggressive investment sales transactions, are shown in Tables 6.16, 6.17 and 6.18. 
 
Table 6.16 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of 
aggressive sales transactions (VALUE_AGGSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group A funds 
(aggressive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $178,226 2007 
B A $127,374 2010 
B A $112,225 2006 
B A $110,474 2008 
B A $109,950 2005 
B A $82,905 2011 
B   $34,182 2009 
 
For aggressive funds, the monthly average dollar value of aggressive 
investment sales transactions was significantly greater in 2007 ($178,226) as 
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Table 6.17 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of 
aggressive sales transactions (VALUE_AGGSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group M funds 
(moderate funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $180,962 2011 
B A $147,455 2007 
B A $126,218 2005 
B A $99,546 2006 
B A $82,362 2010 
B   $45,994 2008 
B   $40,730 2009 
 
With regards to the variable VALUE_AGGSALES and moderate risk funds, 
the value recorded in 2011 ($180,962) was significantly greater than 2008 ($45,994) 
and 2009 ($40,730).  
 
Table 6.18 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of 
aggressive sales transactions (VALUE_AGGSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group D funds 
(defensive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $114,002 2011 
B A $90,232 2006 
B A $87,721 2005 
B A $72,598 2007 
B A $55,287 2010 
B   $23,365 2008 
B   $21,802 2009 
 
Defensive funds within the sample showed a significantly greater difference 
in the monthly average dollar value of aggressive sales transactions between 2011 
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6.2.6 Analysis of the Variable COUNT_DEFBUYS Based on Fund Risk 
Profile 
The results of the analysis for the variable COUNT_DEFBUYS, which 
measures the monthly average number of defensive investment sales transactions for 
the three fund risk profile groupings, are shown in Tables 6.19, 6.20 and 6.21. 
 
Table 6.19 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
defensive purchase transactions (COUNT_DEFBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group A funds 
(aggressive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 9 2009 
A 8 2008 
A 6 2005 
A 6 2010 
A 6 2007 
A 5 2011 
A 5 2006 
 
With regards to the variable COUNT_DEFBUYS for aggressive funds, which 
represents the monthly average number of aggressive purchase transactions, no 
statistically significant differences were found between the years from 2005 to 2011. 
 
Table 6.20 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
defensive purchase transactions (COUNT_DEFBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group M funds 
(moderate funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 9 2006 
A 9 2007 
A 8 2005 
A 7 2008 
A 6 2011 
A 6 2009 
A 6 2010 
 
As with aggressive funds within the sample, no statistically significant 
differences were found in the monthly average number of aggressive purchase 
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Table 6.21 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
defensive purchase transactions (COUNT_DEFBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group D funds 
(defensive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 7 2009 
A 7 2005 
A 7 2008 
A 6 2006 
A 5 2007 
A 5 2011 
A 5 2010 
 
As was the case with both aggressive and moderate funds within the sample, 
defensive funds also showed no statistically significant differences in the monthly 
average number of defensive purchase transactions between the years 2005 to 2011.  
 
6.2.7 Analysis of the Variable COUNT_DEFSALES Based on Fund Risk 
Profile 
The results of the analysis of the variable COUNT_DEFSALES, which 
measures the monthly average number of defensive sales transactions from 2005 to 
2011 for the three fund risk profile groupings, are shown in Tables 6.22, 6.23 and 
6.24. 
 
Table 6.22 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
defensive sales transactions (COUNT_DEFSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group A funds 
(aggressive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 5 2008 
A 3 2009 
A 3 2011 
A 3 2010 
A 3 2007 
A 2 2006 
A 2 2005 
 
With regards to the monthly average number of defensive sales transactions 
for aggressive funds within the sample, no statistically significant differences were 
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Table 6.23 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
defensive sales transactions (COUNT_DEFSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group M funds 
(moderate funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A 8 2008 
B A 6 2011 
B A 5 2007 
B A 4 2009 
B A 4 2006 
B   4 2010 
B   3 2005 
 
Moderate funds within the sample showed a number of statistically 
significant differences in the monthly average number of defensive sales 
transactions, with 2008 (8) having a significantly higher monthly average than 2005 
(3) and 2010 (4).  
 
Table 6.24 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of 
defensive sales transactions (COUNT_DEFSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group D funds 
(defensive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A 7 2008 
A 5 2011 
A 4 2007 
A 4 2010 
A 4 2005 
A 3 2009 
A 3 2006 
 
As with aggressive funds within the sample, defensive funds showed no 
statistically significant differences in the monthly average number of defensive sales 
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6.2.8 Analysis of the Variable VALUE_DEFBUYS Based On Fund Risk 
Profile 
The results of the analysis of the variable VALUE_DEFBUYS for the three 
fund risk profile groupings, which measures the average monthly dollar value of 
investment transactions which involved the purchase of a defensive investment, are 
shown in Tables 6.25, 6.26 and 6.27. 
 
Table 6.25 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of 
defensive purchase transactions (VALUE_DEFBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group A funds 
(aggressive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $182,452 2011 
B A $139,375 2010 
B A $129,876 2007 
B A $118,171 2008 
B A $115,714 2005 
B A $88,000 2009 
B   $76,602 2006 
 
Aggressive funds within the sample showed a significantly greater difference 
in the monthly average dollar value of defensive purchase transactions between the 
years 2011 ($182,452) and 2006 ($76,602).  
 
Table 6.26 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of 
defensive purchase transactions (VALUE_DEFBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group M funds 
(moderate funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $240,449 2007 
B A $200,367 2006 
B A $158,584 2005 
B A $135,366 2010 
B   $119,937 2011 
B   $114,506 2008 
B   $91,126 2009 
 
Significantly greater differences in the monthly average dollar value of 
defensive purchase transactions for moderate risk funds were found between 2007 
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Table 6.27 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of 
defensive purchase transactions (VALUE_DEFBUYS) from 2005 to 2011 for group D funds 
(defensive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A $248,143 2010 
A $236,607 2011 
A $182,033 2009 
A $122,705 2007 
A $120,177 2005 
A $110,520 2008 
A $92,311 2006 
 
Unlike aggressive and moderate risk funds, no statistically significant 
differences were found in the monthly average dollar value of defensive purchase 
transactions over the period 2005 to 2011 for defensive funds.  
 
6.2.9 Analysis of the Variable VALUE_DEFSALES Based on Fund Risk 
Profile 
The results of the analysis of the variable VALUE_DEFSALES for the three 
fund risk profile groupings, which measures the monthly average dollar value of 
defensive investment sales transactions, are shown in Tables 6.28, 6.29 and 6.30. 
 
Table 6.28 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of 
defensive sales transactions (VALUE_DEFSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group A funds 
(aggressive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter are 
not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A   $149,187 2011 
B A   $141,309 2010 
B A C $123,157 2008 
B A C $89,208 2007 
B A C $65,145 2009 
B   C $47,829 2005 
    C $40,336 2006 
 
For aggressive funds within the sample the year 2011 ($149,187) was 
significantly greater than both 2005 ($47,829) and 2006 ($40,336), while 2010 
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Table 6.29 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of 
defensive sales transactions (VALUE_DEFSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group M funds 
(moderate funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $167,855 2008 
B A $144,024 2007 
B A $139,765 2011 
B A $131,956 2010 
B A $122,852 2006 
B A $84,483 2009 
B   $54,127 2005 
 
With regards to moderate risk funds within the sample there was a 
significantly greater difference in the monthly average dollar value of defensive sales 
transactions between 2008 and 2005, with 2008 recording an average of $167,855 
compared to $54,127 in 2005.  
 
Table 6.30 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average dollar value of 
defensive sales transactions (VALUE_DEFSALES) from 2005 to 2011 for group D funds 
(defensive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $252,161 2010 
  A $249,373 2011 
B A $142,501 2009 
B A $133,666 2008 
B A $97,576 2007 
B   $71,676 2005 
B   $45,209 2006 
 
For defensive funds within the sample 2010 recorded a significantly greater 
monthly average dollar value of defensive sales transactions than 2005 and 2006, 
with averages of $252,161, $71,676 and $45,209 respectively. The year 2011 was 
also significantly greater than 2005 and 2006, with respective mean values of 
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6.2.10 Analysis of the Variable NET_FLOWDEF Based on Fund Risk 
Profile 
The results of the analysis of the variable NET_FLOWDEF for the three fund 
risk profile groupings, which measures the net flow of funds into defensive assets, 
are shown in Tables 6.31, 6.32 and 6.33. 
 
Table 6.31 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average net flow of money 
into defensive assets (NET_FLOWDEF) from 2005 to 2011 for group A funds (aggressive funds) 
(p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
A $22,494 2005 
A -$18,879 2007 
A -$29,838 2010 
A -$56,007 2011 
A -$61,052 2006 
A -$63,598 2008 
A -$81,214 2009 
 
For aggressive funds within the sample no statistically significant differences 
in the monthly average net flow of money into defensive assets were found over the 
period 2005 to 2011.  
 
Table 6.32 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average net flow of money 
into defensive assets (NET_FLOWDEF) from 2005 to 2011 for group M funds (moderate funds) 
(p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $78,307 2011 
B A $23,992 2005 
B A -$30,804 2010 
B A -$40,379 2008 
B   -$71,082 2009 
B   -$107,156 2007 
B   -$107,331 2006 
 
For moderate risk funds within the sample there was a significantly greater 
difference in the variable NET_FLOWDEF between 2011 ($78,307) and 2006         
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Table 6.33 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average net flow of money 
into defensive assets (NET_FLOWDEF) from 2005 to 2011 for group D funds (defensive funds) 
(p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $27,309 2011 
  A $12,674 2005 
B A -$12,080 2010 
B A -$25,455 2008 
B A -$44,154 2007 
B A -$50,132 2006 
B   -$108,227 2009 
 
For defensive funds within the sample there was a significantly greater 
difference in NET_FLOWDEF between the years 2011 ($27,309) and 2005 
($12,674) with 2009 (-$108,227).  
 
6.2.11 Analysis of the Variable TRADE_VALUE Based on Fund Risk 
Profile 
The results of the analysis of the variable TRADE_VALUE, which measures 
the monthly average dollar value of all investment transactions for the three fund risk 
profile groupings, are shown in Tables 6.34, 6.35 and 6.36. 
 
Table 6.34 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average total trade value 
of all investment transactions (TRADE_VALUE) from 2005 to 2011 for group A funds 
(aggressive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $594,416 2007 
B A $565,268 2010 
B A $553,456 2011 
B A $525,873 2008 
B A $402,439 2006 
B A $360,949 2005 
B   $302,724 2009 
 
For aggressive funds within the sample 2007 recorded a significantly greater 
monthly average total trade value than 2009, with an average of $594,416 compared 






 106   
 
Table 6.35 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average total trade value 
of all investment transactions (TRADE_VALUE) from 2005 to 2011 for group M funds 
(moderate funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter are 
not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A   $786,540 2007 
B A   $629,643 2006 
B A C $543,321 2011 
B   C $462,849 2010 
B   C $441,155 2005 
B   C $414,728 2008 
    C $328,152 2009 
 
For moderate risk funds within the sample a number of statistically 
significant differences in the monthly average total trade value of all investment 
transactions were found. The monthly average of $786,540 in 2007 was significantly 
greater than 2009 ($328,152), 2008 ($414,728), 2005 ($441,155) and 2010 
($543,321). 2006, with a monthly average of $629,643, was also significantly greater 
than 2009 ($328,152).  
 
Table 6.36 Test for statistically significant differences in the monthly average total trade value 
of all investment transactions (TRADE_VALUE) from 2005 to 2011 for group D funds 
(defensive funds) (p = 0.05) 
Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different. 
Grouping Mean Year 
  A $686,675 2011 
B A $622,960 2010 
B A $476,366 2009 
B A $409,631 2007 
B A $368,115 2006 
B   $354,620 2005 
B   $316,371 2008 
 
For defensive funds within the sample 2011 had a significantly greater 
monthly average total trade value than 2008 and 2005, with means of $686,675 
compared to $316,371 and $354,620 respectively. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
This section of the study outlined the results of the analysis of funds within 
the sample based on the relative risk profile of each of the funds. The purpose of the 
analysis is to determine whether or not fund risk profile is a differentiating factor 
when considering the investment approach adopted by fund trustees.  
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SMSFs within the sample which were categorised as having an aggressive 
investment approach tended to show little difference in the frequency of trades over 
the period 2005 to 2011, although the average monthly dollar value of trades was 
significantly lower during the financial crisis (2009) when compared to immediately 
prior to the crisis (2007), suggesting that trustees of these SMSFs made only slight 
changes to the frequency and dollar value of their trading activity. Interestingly, 
trustees with an aggressive risk profile generally showed little willingness to 
significantly increase aggressive investment exposure in the middle of the financial 
crisis as asset markets reached their lows. Furthermore, the same trustees tended to 
increase defensive investment exposure after the financial crisis when compared to 
those periods prior to and during the crisis. This relatively conservative investment 
behaviour would appear to be somewhat at odds with an aggressive investment 
approach. 
 
Those funds within the sample with a moderate risk profile tended to trade 
less frequently both during and following the financial crisis when compared to the 
period leading up to the financial crisis. Trading activity and the monthly average 
dollar trade value was particularly low during 2009, a period when equity markets 
reached their lows during the financial crisis. In general, moderate risk funds 
increased aggressive investment exposure immediately prior to the financial crisis, 
rather than the more appropriate strategy of reducing such exposure. There is also 
little evidence that trustees of moderate risk funds took advantage of low prices 
during or following the financial crisis to increase exposure to aggressive 
investments. 
 
Those SMSF within the sample with a defensive risk profile made no 
significant changes in trading frequency over the period 2005 to 2011, although those 
years following the crisis tended to exhibit a greater monthly average total trade 
value. Trustees of defensive funds generally increased exposure to aggressive 
investments in those years prior to the crisis, although not to a significant degree on 
the eve of the crisis in 2007. Interestingly in 2009, during which equity markets 
reached their lows, defensive-minded trustees significantly increased their exposure 
to aggressive investments, most likely taking advantage of low asset prices at that 
time. With regards to those transactions involving increasing exposure to defensive 
investments, there were no significant differences in the trading behaviour of 
defensive-minded trustees. 
 
The analysis of SMSFs within the sample based on risk profile has 
implications for a number of the behavioural finance concepts previously discussed 
in this study. In particular, the fact that trustees of both aggressive and moderate risk 
funds did not take advantage of lower asset prices during the financial crisis suggests 
the existence of loss aversion among those trustees. Given their more aggressive risk 
profile, trustees of these funds may have incurred significant losses as markets fell at 
the onset of the financial crisis and were therefore unwilling to realise these losses in 
order to take advantage of low asset prices as the market bottomed and subsequently 
recovered. Trustees with a defensive investment approach however, who likely 
suffered lower unrealised losses as markets fell, were more willing to take advantage 
of low asset prices as the market bottomed. This is contrary to the expectation that 
aggressively-minded trustees would be quick to invest in higher risk assets as 
markets reached their lows in early 2009.  
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The behaviour of aggressive and moderate risk trustees also suggests the 
existence of regret avoidance, where trustees were unwilling to sell their losing 
investments in order to take advantage of lower prices for other assets. However this 
would need to be confirmed by a closer analysis of the individual transactions of 
each fund trustee in order to identify the exact investment holdings which were sold 
by trustees. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this study but potentially 
presents an opportunity for further research. Overall however, this trading behaviour 
again suggests that SMSF trustee risk profiles are not constant, but do change as 
circumstances change, confirming work by Gai and Vause (2005). This finding has 
implications for those who provide investment advice to SMSF trustees, principally 
financial advisers and accountants. Their reliance on risk profiling may not be 
sufficiently dynamic to take into account changing risk profiles of SMSF trustees 
under differing circumstances. The finding that SMSF trustees tended to increase 
their exposure to defensive assets after the financial crisis, regardless of trustee risk 
profile, again suggests that SMSF trustees exhibit the availability heuristic, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. This indicates that regardless of their appetite for risk, SMSF 
trustees tended to overestimate the likelihood of another investment bear market in 
the period following the financial crisis.  
 
This chapter presented the results of the analysis of the trading behaviour of 
SMSFs according to the risk profile of each fund within the sample. In general, 
regardless of risk profile, fund trustees tended to increase aggressive investment 
exposure prior to the financial crisis. Only trustees with a defensive risk profile 
avoided increasing their aggressive investment exposure on the eve of the financial 
crisis. Again, only trustees with a defensive risk profile showed any evidence of 
being willing to take advantage of lower prices during the financial crisis to increase 
their exposure to aggressive investments and most likely benefit from the subsequent 
recovery in equity markets. The next section of the study, Chapter 7, discusses the 
results of the analysis that has been presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. This discussion 
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The previous three chapters presented the results of the analysis of SMSF 
investment transactions over the period 2005 to 2011. This was done on both an 
annual and per period basis and also considered the trading activity of funds within 
the sample based on the size of each fund and the level of aggressive or defensive 
assets held within each fund. This chapter discusses the results of the analyses which 
were outlined in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
 
The discussion of the results of the analyses is framed with reference to 
addressing the research questions outlined in Chapter 3, which are: 
 
1. Did SMSFs increase their exposure to cash and other defensive investments in the 
period leading up to the global financial crisis? 
2. Did SMSFs increase their exposure to market risk assets as stock markets 
bottomed and recovered in 2009? 
3. Have SMSFs become more conservative in their investment approach since the 
global financial crisis? 
4. Did larger or less risk-averse SMSFs behave differently as compared to smaller or 
more conservative SMSFs over the course of the global financial crisis? 
 
The discussion begins with an assessment of whether or not evidence exists 
that SMSF trustees were increasing their exposure to defensive investments on the 
eve of the financial crisis, which may indicate whether or not SMSF trustees were 
correctly positioning their investment portfolios prior to the significant equity market 
falls which occurred during the crisis. 
 
7.2 Evidence that SMSF Trustees were Increasing Defensive 
Investment Exposure Prior to the Financial Crisis 
SMSFs are viewed as having weathered the 2008 global financial crisis 
slightly better, or at least on par with professionally managed superannuation funds 
(Phillips, Baczynski & Teale 2009), with their significant holdings of cash prior to 
the crisis identified as one of the possible reasons for this performance. This high 
cash weighting may have come at a cost however, if SMSFs had held high levels of 
cash through the years 2005 to 2007. Ideally SMSFs would have been increasing 
their cash exposure on the eve of the financial crisis, a strategy which would have 
reduced investment losses during the crisis, yet allowed the SMSFs to benefit from 
rising markets prior to the crisis. When considered on an annual basis however, the 
results of this study show no significant evidence of a switch into defensive assets by 
SMSF trustees immediately prior to the financial crisis. There was no evidence of a 
significant increase in the purchase of defensive assets prior to the financial crisis 
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and no significant decrease in the level of existing defensive assets over the same 
period. There was evidence of an increase in the level of aggressive asset sales 
immediately prior to the financial crisis, but this tended to be matched by a 
simultaneous increase in the level of aggressive investment purchases, which 
suggests that at that time fund trustees were trading in and out of aggressive assets, 
rather than actively selling aggressive investments and reinvesting the sale proceeds 
in defensive assets such as fixed-interest securities. When assessed on a ‘per period’ 
basis, the conclusion remains the same – that SMSF trustees were not actively 
increasing exposure to defensive assets prior to the financial crisis. These findings 
tend to support Hypothesis 1, that there were no significant differences in the cash 
allocations of SMSFs leading up to the financial crisis. This leads to the conclusion 
that high levels of SMSF exposure to cash and other defensive assets prior to the 
financial crisis were more as a result of fortune, rather than a deliberate strategy to 
increase defensive investment exposure as markets peaked prior to the financial 
crisis. This conclusion supports the suggestion  by Phillips et al. (2009) that the 
relatively satisfactory performance of SMSFs during the bear market of 2007-08  
was more due to luck than planning. 
 
The implication of this finding is that SMSF trustees would most likely have 
missed out on the positive market returns enjoyed over the period leading up to the 
financial crisis. It may be that forgoing the high returns enjoyed by other 
superannuation funds over this period more than offset the relative outperformance 
of SMSFs during the financial crisis. This question could be resolved through a 
comparison of SMSF returns with other superannuation funds across a longer 
timeframe than that canvassed by this study. 
 
The next section considers whether or not evidence exists to support the 
notion that SMSF trustees took advantage of lower prices for aggressive assets 
during the financial crisis by increasing their exposure to such assets as markets fell 
and subsequently bottomed in early 2009, a strategy which would have likely 
resulted in higher investment returns. This seeks to address Hypothesis 2, that there 
was no significant difference in the exposure to risk assets by SMSFs between those 
periods prior to and during the financial crisis. 
 
7.3 Evidence that SMSF Trustees Increased their Exposure to 
Riskier Investments as Markets Recovered Following the 
Financial Crisis 
The global financial crisis and associated falls in market indices in most 
countries resulted in steep losses for investors, but also presented an opportunity for 
astute investors to invest at or close to the market bottom in early 2009. Such a 
strategy would have likely resulted in significant capital growth as markets recovered 
in 2009 and 2010. For SMSFs, which typically held a greater allocation to cash than 
other superannuation funds, there existed an attractive opportunity to take advantage 
of cheap prices for most assets, including listed investments.  
 
In terms of this study, the actions of SMSF trustees to take advantage of such 
an opportunity should be evident in the level of aggressive investment purchases 
made by trustees over 2008 and 2009. Evidence however, of a deliberate decision by 
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SMSF trustees to invest at such an opportune time is not confirmed by the results of 
the analysis. On both an annual and ‘per period’ basis, there is no evidence of a 
statistically significant increase in the level of exposure to aggressive investments by 
SMSF trustees over that period encompassing the market lows. This conclusion tends 
to support Hypothesis 2 that there is no evidence that SMSFs made significant 
changes to their exposure to riskier assets during the financial crisis. These findings 
support previous research regarding changes in the risk profile of Australian 
investors during the financial crisis (Bateman et al. 2010), where it was found that 
there was little difference in the risk attitudes of investors between ‘tranquil’ periods 
and the financial crisis of 2008. Work by Kallberg et al. (2012) however, found that 
Chinese investors tended to reduce risk during the financial crisis, with a reduction in 
the standard deviation of portfolios within the sample as compared to the market’s 
standard deviation. It may be that SMSF trustees, managing assets held exclusively 
for retirement, adopted a longer term perspective than the private investors analysed 
in the study by Kallberg et al. (2012) and were more willing to ‘ride out’ the market 
falls during the financial crisis. This suggests a further area of research, which could 
be to directly compare investment trading decisions of SMSF trustees with those of 
private Australian investors. 
 
The results of the analysis of SMSF trading activity prior to and during the 
financial crisis would tend support Hypothesis 2, that there was no significant 
difference in the exposure to higher risk assets by SMSFs between those periods 
prior to and during the financial crisis. The next section seeks to address the third 
research question, which asks if the events of the financial crisis have resulted in 
fund trustees adopting a more conservative investment approach. 
 
7.4 Evidence that SMSF Trustees have Become More 
Conservative in their Investment Approach Since the Global 
Financial Crisis 
The third research question considers whether the investment approach of 
SMSF trustees has been impacted by the events and investment returns experienced 
through the financial crisis. That is, have the sharp falls associated with equity 
markets and other asset classes had a permanent impact on the investment strategy of 
SMSF trustees? Have SMSF trustees responded to the losses experienced through 
2008 and 2009 by permanently altering their investment approach to a more 
conservative style, as compared to their approach prior to the global financial crisis? 
This question can be answered by comparing the results of the analysis of a number 
of the variables both before and after the financial crisis. If trustees have made 
significant changes to their investment approach in response to the financial crisis, 
one would expect to see statistically significant differences between the results prior 
to and following the crisis for those variables which outline increasing or decreasing 
defensive or aggressive investment exposure respectively. 
 
In terms of the results of the analysis of this study, there is some evidence to 
suggest that SMSF trustees have become more conservative since the global financial 
crisis. While not overwhelming, a number of those variables which measure the rate 
of increasing or decreasing exposure to defensive or aggressive assets respectively, 
do tend to show a significant change in the investment approach of SMSFs. In 
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general, fund trustees did not actively reduce their level of aggressive investment 
exposure (little or no significant differences in aggressive sales transactions) in the 
period following the crisis as compared to prior to the crisis, but there was a 
significantly lower level of aggressive investment purchase transactions. In those 
years following the crisis, 2010 and 2011, SMSF trustees did increase their dollar 
commitment to defensive investment purchases, although only 2011 was statistically 
significantly greater than those years prior to the crisis. Overall however, there is 
sufficient evidence to suggest that SMSF trustees have adopted a more conservative 
investment approach since the financial crisis, as compared to that period prior to the 
crisis. This result is similar to findings by Kallberg et al. (2012) who found that 
Chinese investors were more likely to reduce aggressive investment exposure within 
their portfolios following market falls, although in that instance the analysis 
compared the period during the market falls with the period following the market 
falls.  
 
The change in investment approach by SMSF trustees across the period 2005 
to 2011 is also evident in the trading frequency of the funds within the sample. In 
general it was found that fund trustees traded significantly more frequently prior to 
the crisis than following the crisis, however the average dollar value of each trade 
was highest in that period following the crisis. It was also found that the frequency 
and dollar value committed per trade was lowest during the financial crisis, which 
may indicate reluctance by SMSF trustees to make any form of investment decisions 
during the crisis, be they aggressive or defensive in nature. The higher average dollar 
value per trade in that period following the crisis may simply reflect that SMSF 
trustee’s assets under management had grown over the seven year period covered by 
the study. This propensity to reduce trading activity is not matched by 401(k) 
participants in the United States, where it was found that investors traded more 
frequently during the financial crisis, although the increase was not seen as 
significant (Tang et al. 2011). 
 
The results of the analysis of SMSF defensive investment trading behaviour 
does not support Hypothesis 3, that there was no significant difference in the 
exposure to higher risk assets by SMSFs between the period prior to and following 
the financial crisis. There is a significant difference in the trading behaviour of 
SMSFs across those two periods, manifesting itself as a change to a more 
conservative investment approach following the crisis when compared to prior to the 
crisis. The next section discusses the results of the analysis of the trading behaviour 
of SMSFs within the sample based on fund size. This analysis was conducted in 
order to determine whether or not different sized SMSFs responded differently to the 
events occurring prior to, during and after the global financial crisis. 
 
7.5 SMSF Trading Behaviour Based on Fund Size 
The issue of SMSF size and how it relates to the trading behaviour of fund 
trustees raises a number of questions. It is reasonable to assume that in general, 
larger SMSFs (in terms of assets under the management of fund trustees) would 
belong to members with a greater overall wealth than members of SMSFs with a 
lower level of assets within the fund. Given that most individuals tend to accumulate 
wealth later in life, particularly with respect to superannuation, it may also be that 
larger SMSFs are managed by trustees who are older or more experienced than 
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trustees of smaller funds. Analysing the trading behaviour of SMSF trustees on the 
basis of fund size may therefore act as a proxy for some of the demographic features 
of SMSF trustees, specifically trustee age and overall wealth. In order to determine 
whether or not the size of a SMSF is related to the investment decisions of the fund’s 
trustees, the funds within the sample were grouped by size and their investment 
transactions analysed according to the variables outlined in Table 3.7. 
 
7.5.1 The Trading Behaviour of Small SMSFs 
As with the SMSF sample as a whole, small funds within the sample 
exhibited a greater tendency to trade more frequently and more aggressively prior to 
the financial crisis. Small funds also tended to be more conservative in the period 
following the crisis, with a greater emphasis on the purchase of defensive 
investments in that period. There is little evidence that trustees of small SMSFs 
within the sample acted to take advantage of falling or lower asset prices during the 
financial crisis. Such behaviour may indicate the existence of behavioural traits such 
as herding and naivety. 
 
7.5.2 The Trading Behaviour of Medium-Sized SMSFs 
As with small funds, medium-sized funds within the sample also tended to be 
more aggressive in the period prior to the financial crisis, as compared to the years 
following the crisis. Interestingly however, there is evidence that medium-sized 
funds acted to increase their exposure to aggressive investments during the crisis. 
Such a strategy of increasing exposure to riskier assets close to or at the bottom of 
the bear market may have resulted in medium-sized funds within the sample earning 
a higher overall investment return. Medium-sized funds also tended to trade more 
frequently prior to the financial crisis. 
 
7.5.3 The Trading Behaviour of Large SMSFs 
Large funds within the sample tended to show the least variation in trading 
frequency over the period 2005 to 2011 when compared to small and medium-sized 
funds, however the nature of the activity did change. Trustees of large SMSFs made 
significantly greater average monthly dollar value purchases of defensive 
investments immediately prior to the financial crisis. Of the three fund size groupings 
within the SMSF sample, only trustees of larger funds appear to have been increasing 
defensive investment exposure prior to the crisis. This may be due to the possibility 
that trustees of larger SMSFs are older and more experienced than trustees of smaller 
funds and may have more readily expected the stock market falls during 2008-09. 
However, the trading behaviour of large SMSFs differs from the behaviour of other 
‘sophisticated’ investors during the financial crisis. Ben-David at el. (2011) showed 
that US based hedge funds, professional investors who generally employ complicated 
and sophisticated investment trading strategies, sold down nearly a third of their 
equity holdings during the early stages of the financial crisis (the first six months of 
2008). This suggests that trustees of large SMSFs, while potentially more 
sophisticated than their counterparts at smaller funds, do not exhibit the same 
investment trading patterns as professional investors. 
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7.5.4 Summary of Fund Size and Trading Behaviour 
The trading behaviour of SMSF trustees does appear to vary according to the 
size of the fund. In general, larger funds may have lessened the impact of the 
financial crisis by increasing allocations to defensive investments prior to the crisis, 
while medium-sized funds were more likely to act to take advantage of falling and 
lower stock market prices around 2008-09. Small SMSFs tended to exhibit little 
evidence of an appropriate investment strategy. It may be that trustees of such funds 
are either less experienced than their counterparts at larger funds, or that the trustees, 
potentially being younger and with a longer investment time horizon, may have been 
less concerned about the market volatility and kept to their existing investment 
strategy regardless of economic and market conditions. The issue of fund size is an 
important one, given that much attention has been focused on the optimum size of an 
SMSF, although this is usually within the context of fees, not investment returns or 
investment strategies. Given their relative inflexibility, it may be that smaller funds 
are more likely to have generated lower returns than compared to medium-sized or 
larger funds within the sample, which potentially presents an area of further research. 
This would add further information to the question of the optimal size of a SMSF. 
 
This section discussed the results of the analysis of fund trading activity 
based on fund size. The next section discusses the analysis of the same variables 
based on fund risk profile. As outlined in Chapter 3, each fund within the sample was 
identified as having an ‘aggressive’, ‘moderate’ or ‘defensive’ approach and 
segmented accordingly. Each risk profile grouping was then assessed as per the 
variables outlined in Chapter 3. 
 
7.6 SMSF Trading Behaviour Based on Fund Risk Profile 
The discussion of the analysis of funds within the sample based on fund risk 
profile addresses variations in the investment approach of funds with differing risk 
profiles. For example, did fund trustees with a lower risk tolerance correctly reduce 
market risk exposure prior to the financial crisis? Did fund trustees with higher risk 
tolerance levels react more quickly to take advantage of falling asset prices during 
the financial crisis, or was there no discernible difference in the behaviour of fund 
trustees, regardless of their risk tolerance levels? These are a number of the questions 
that may be answered through the analysis of the transaction data on the basis of fund 
risk profile. 
 
7.6.1 The Trading Behaviour of Aggressive SMSF Trustees 
Funds within the sample with an aggressive investment approach tended to 
display the same characteristics of the general SMSF sample. That is, they tended to 
invest aggressively immediately prior to the financial crisis, showed only minor 
evidence of taking advantage of lower prices for assets during the financial crisis, 
and tended to be more conservative following the crisis. Being classified as 
‘aggressive’ investors, it is surprising that trustees of these SMSFs did not move to 
take advantage of falling or low prices for investment assets over the period 2008-09, 
particularly with regards to listed investments. This may indicate that even trustees 
with an aggressive investment approach were concerned by economic and financial 
events during the financial crisis. This may suggest that the risk profile of SMSF 
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trustees is not fixed and can change depending on external factors. This is reinforced 
by the apparent increase in defensive investment exposure following the crisis by 
what are notionally ‘aggressive’ SMSF trustees. It may also be that those funds 
classified as ‘aggressive’ may have been fully invested at the onset of the financial 
crisis and did not possess the available cash required to invest in ‘cheap’ assets at the 
bottom of the bear market, or may have been unwilling to realise losses on existing 
holdings in order to invest at the market bottom. The finding that aggressive trustees 
did not increase exposure to aggressive investment holdings during the financial 
crisis differs from work by Ho et al. (2010), who found that 401(k) investors in the 
United States with an aggressive investment profile tended to increase their exposure 
to aggressive assets as markets fell, particularly through the year 2008. The authors 
acknowledged however, that their study had low external validity, being based on the 
analysis of the 401(k) investment decisions of employees of one small company. 
Other studies have found similar conclusions relating to the trading behaviour of 
401(k) participants (Mitchell et al. 2007; Yamaguchi 2006). It may be that the 
average participant in the study with a 401(k) plan was less engaged in the 
management of their retirement assets than trustees of Australian SMSFs, and were 
more likely to simply continue their pre-existing approach to investment allocation, 
regardless of economic or market circumstances. The substantial administrative and 
regulatory burden associated with acting as trustee of a SMSF may lead to a greater 
engagement by the trustees in the management of their assets, and therefore trustees 
may be more likely to make changes to their investment approach as economic and 
market circumstances change.  
 
7.6.2 The Trading Behaviour of Moderate Risk SMSF Trustees 
Moderate risk SMSFs within the sample tended to exhibit trading behaviour 
which was very similar to that of aggressive funds – little evidence of reducing 
investment risk exposure on the eve of the crisis; little evidence of acting to take 
advantage of low asset prices during the crisis and a more conservative approach 
following the crisis.  One differentiating characteristic is that moderate risk SMSFs 
appeared to reduce their defensive investment exposure during the financial crisis, 
specifically during 2008. It may be however that trustees were simply taking action 
to increase cash holdings at the expense of other investments classified as 
‘defensive’, such as corporate bonds or hybrid securities. Compared to SMSFs with 
an aggressive risk profile, there was a more significant fall in overall trading activity 
and trade value during the crisis however. It appears that SMSF trustees with a 
moderate risk profile were more sensitive to falling markets than more aggressive 
trustees, and tended to refrain from all types of trading activity during the crisis. This 
finding is not wholly unexpected given the differences in risk profile of the trustees. 
 
7.6.3 The Trading Behaviour of Conservative SMSF Trustees 
The trustees of SMSFs with a conservative risk profile exhibited the most 
surprising trading behaviour of the three different risk profile classifications. While 
conservative trustees did not act to reduce aggressive investment exposure on the eve 
of the financial crisis, they did significantly increase their exposure to aggressive 
investments during 2009, just as equity markets bottomed and began to recover from 
the financial crisis. This shift into aggressive investments during this period was 
more pronounced for conservative trustees than for aggressive or moderate risk 
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trustees, which is an unexpected finding. It may be that conservative trustees, more 
so than the other trustees, had the ability to take advantage of low asset prices during 
this period due to larger cash (or other defensive investment) holdings than 
aggressive or moderate risk trustees. The ability to buy when prices are low usually 
requires the cash to do so, a situation which may have escaped those SMSF trustees 
with more aggressive risk profiles. This finding again differs from conclusions drawn 
by Ho et al. (2010), who found that 401(k) investors in the United States with a 
conservative investment profile tended to continue to increase their exposure to 
defensive assets as markets fell during the financial crisis. As outlined in section 
7.6.1, it may be that SMSF trustees are more engaged in the management of their 
assets within the fund when compared to 401(k) investors, and therefore more likely 
to adjust their investment strategy as required. This fits with other conclusions drawn 
by Ho et al. (2010), that 401(k) participants rebalanced their investment infrequently 
and tended to leave the asset allocation of their monthly contributions to the plan in 
place, regardless of changes in the economy and stock market. Other characteristics 
of defensive SMSF trustees were as expected, including a more defensive investment 
approach in that period following the financial crisis (the willingness to increase risk 
during the financial crisis notwithstanding). 
 
7.6.4 Summary of Fund Risk Profile and Trading Behaviour 
The analysis of the relationship between fund risk profile and trading 
behaviour revealed a number of interesting insights. The most surprising finding was 
that conservative SMSF trustees were the group most likely to take advantage of low 
asset prices during the financial crisis. Trustees with an aggressive risk profile, 
whom would have been expected to be investing aggressively during the financial 
crisis, showed little evidence of such an inclination. As discussed, it may simply be 
that significant losses on existing higher risk holdings left aggressive trustees in a 
position that did not allow them to fully benefit from low asset prices at the bottom 
of the bear market, or they had no available cash to take advantage of these 
opportunities. Given this finding, it is possible that the investment performance of 
conservative SMSF trustees since the financial crisis has been better than that of 
moderate or aggressive minded trustees. A comparison of investment returns 
between SMSFs with varying risk profiles across differing time periods is beyond the 
scope of this study but may be an area for further investigation.  
 
In general however, there were few other significant differences between the 
trading behaviour of SMSF trustees with differing risk profiles. All trustees, 
regardless of risk profile, tended to increase their exposure to aggressive assets prior 
to the financial crisis, an inappropriate strategy given the steep falls in asset prices 
during the financial crisis. All trustees, again regardless of risk profile, tended to 
become more conservative in that period following the crisis, mimicking the findings 
of the analysis of the sample as a whole. Again, this differs from work by Bateman et 
al. (2010), who found only a slight decrease in investor risk profile in 2008. As 
mentioned earlier, it may be that SMSF trustee risk profiles are not static but can and 
do change according to current economic and market conditions. Hoffman et al. 
(2011) similarly found that risk tolerance fluctuates over periods of crisis when 
compared to non-crisis periods. Unfortunately the evidence suggests that, regardless 
of the perceived risk profile of SMSF trustees, SMSF trustees tended to be too 
aggressive during periods of rising markets, when investment caution may have been 
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a more appropriate strategy. Furthermore, most SMSF trustees, with the exception of 
those with a conservative risk profile, also tended to be too conservative during those 
periods during and after bear markets, when an aggressive approach may have been a 
more appropriate strategy. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
The analysis of the trading behaviour of SMSF trustees over the period prior 
to, during and after the financial crisis of 2008-09 provides a number of insights into 
the investment decision-making process of fund trustees. In general, SMSFs 
exhibited little evidence of an increase in exposure to defensive assets leading up to 
the financial crisis, which suggests that the relative outperformance of SMSFs during 
the financial crisis, when compared to other superannuation funds, was more a result 
of good fortune rather than good planning. SMSFs on the whole also tended to miss 
the opportunity to take advantage of low prices for assets during the financial crisis, 
although those funds with a conservative risk profile did show some evidence of 
increasing their exposure to higher risk assets during the crisis, a strategy which may 
have resulted in higher investment returns than other SMSFs over the same period. 
There is also evidence that SMSFs have adopted a more conservative investment 
approach since the financial crisis, indicating that the risk profiles of SMSF trustees 
are sensitive to existing economic and market conditions. Unfortunately this shift to a 
more conservative approach may have resulted in SMSFs forgoing the positive 
investment returns enjoyed as asset prices recovered following the crisis.  
 
SMSF size also was found to be an important determination in trading 
behaviour, with large and medium-sized funds making more significant changes to 
their investment approach when compared to small funds. There was some evidence 
that large funds were correctly increasing defensive investment exposure prior to the 
financial crisis, while medium-sized funds were more likely to take advantage of low 
prices for assets during the crisis. Small SMSFs appeared to lack any of the optimal 
changes to investment strategy which may have resulted in improved investment 
returns over the period 2005 to 2011. Overall the analysis suggests that larger-sized 
SMSFs with a conservative investment approach were more likely to adopt the most 
appropriate investment strategy given the set of economic and market circumstances 
encountered over the time period under consideration. 
 
The next and final chapter, Chapter 8, concludes this study with a summary 
of the main findings, interpretations and insights gained from the study, in addition to 
suggestions for further research to improve awareness of the investment trading 
behaviour of SMSFs. 
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Over a third of all Australian superannuation assets are now managed through 
SMSFs, yet comparatively little empirical research has been undertaken to determine 
whether or not SMSFs are meeting the needs and objectives of their members, 
policy-makers and the public in general. In particular, knowledge of the investment 
decision-making and trading behaviour of SMSF trustees is limited, with only a 
relatively small number of investigations into the theoretical and practical investment 
approaches adopted by SMSF trustees (Phillips 2007; Phillips, Baczynski & Teale 
2009a, 2009b; Phillips, Cathcart & Teale 2007). With this background, this study set 
out to investigate the investment trading behaviour of SMSF trustees over the period 
2005 to 2011. This is the first study to consider the investment decisions of SMSF 
trustees over a period of time, as compared to a specific point in time. The time 
period under investigation includes events occurring prior to, during and after the 
2008 global financial crisis. This presents an opportunity to assess the investment 
decision-making of SMSF trustees in periods of both relative financial calm and 
significant stress. 
 
The study sought to answer a number of questions regarding the investment 
decision-making of SMSF trustees: 
 
1. Did SMSFs increase their exposure to cash and other defensive investments in the 
period leading up to the global financial crisis? 
2. Did SMSFs increase their exposure to market risk assets as stock markets 
bottomed and recovered in 2009? 
3. Have SMSFs become more conservative in their investment approach since the 
global financial crisis? 
4. Did larger or less risk-averse SMSFs behave differently as compared to smaller or 
more conservative SMSFs over the course of the global financial crisis? 
 
The research questions were structured in order to allow for an assessment of the 
correctness or otherwise of SMSF trustee investment decision-making. There is 
anecdotal evidence that SMSFs out-performed other superannuation alternatives 
during the 2008 global financial crisis, largely attributed to their significant holdings 
of cash. If SMSF trustees acted to increase their cash holdings in the period leading 
up to the financial crisis, this may indicate the existence of a sophisticated or 
appropriate investment strategy by SMSFs. If the large cash holdings on the eve of 
the financial crisis were simply due to good fortune however, with little or no 
evidence of deliberate decisions by trustees, this raises questions over the investment 
strategy of SMSFs and the potential outcomes in the event of another significant bear 
market. 
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The next section of this chapter outlines the empirical findings from the study, 
followed by a discussion of the theoretical and policy implications of the results of 
the study. Recommendations for future research are then discussed and the chapter 
concludes with a final comment regarding the study. 
 
8.2 Empirical Findings 
The main empirical findings were summarised in each of the chapters which 
presented the results of the analysis, being Chapters 4, 5 and 6. This section will 
summarise the results within the context of the research questions outlined in 
Chapter 3 and listed in Section 8.1 of this chapter. 
 
1. Did SMSFs increase their exposure to cash and other defensive investments in the 
period leading up to the global financial crisis? 
There is no conclusive evidence that SMSFs increased their exposure to cash 
and other defensive assets prior to the global financial crisis. SMSFs tended hold 
large cash balances during those years prior to the financial crisis, but there was little 
indication of a deliberate strategy to increase those balances as stock markets rose in 
those years preceding the crisis. This indicates that the relative out-performance of 
SMSFs during the 2008 global financial crisis when compared to alternative 
superannuation approaches was more a result of good fortune than careful planning. 
This supports Hypothesis 1, which was that there were no significant differences in 
the cash balances of SMSFs in the period leading to the 2008 global financial crisis. 
 
2. Did SMSFs increase their exposure to market risk assets as stock markets 
bottomed and recovered in 2009? 
There is no conclusive evidence that SMSFs acted to take advantage of lower 
priced assets during the 2008-09 bear market by increasing their exposure to higher 
risk assets. This supports Hypothesis 2, that there was no significant difference in 
SMSF exposure to higher risk assets in that period prior to and during the financial 
crisis. It appears that SMSFs missed an opportunity to generate higher investment 
returns by investing at or close to the market low in early 2009. 
 
3. Have SMSFs become more conservative in their investment approach since the 
global financial crisis? 
There is evidence that, in response to the 2008 global financial crisis, SMSF 
trustees have adopted a more conservative investment approach. SMSF trustees were 
less likely to increase their investment exposure to higher risk assets in that period 
following the crisis, when compared to the period prior to the crisis. These findings 
do not support Hypothesis 3, that there is no significant difference in the exposure of 
SMSFs to riskier assets between the periods prior to and following the crisis. SMSF 
trustees have responded to the events of the global financial crisis by adopting a 
more conservative investment approach. This conservative investment approach has 
persisted in the years following the financial crisis which are covered by this study. 
 
4. Did larger or less risk-averse SMSFs behave differently as compared to smaller or 
more conservative SMSFs over the course of the global financial crisis? 
Larger SMSFs were more likely to increase allocations to defensive 
investments prior to the financial crisis, thereby potentially limiting investment 
losses during the crisis. Medium-sized funds were more likely to take advantage of 
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low asset prices during the bear market, potentially increasing their investment 
returns as markets recovered. Small funds did not act to change their investment 
exposure either prior to or during the financial crisis, potentially indicating the lack 
of an appropriate investment strategy. These findings do not support Hypothesis 4, 
that there were no significant differences in the trading behaviour between funds 
based on fund size. The evidence suggests that a relationship exists between SMSF 
size (as measured by assets under management) and the investment approach adopted 
by the fund’s trustees. The results also suggest that smaller SMSFs tend to exhibit the 
least desirable investment behaviour, with little or no change in investment patterns 
regardless of changes in economic and market conditions.  
 
A number of minor differences were found in the investment strategies 
between funds of differing risk profiles. More aggressive funds tended to be the least 
responsive, in terms of their trading behaviour, to changes in market and economic 
conditions. Conservative-minded fund trustees were more likely to take advantage of 
cheaper asset prices during the 2008 bear market, though this may have simply been 
due to these types of funds having available cash at hand to invest at that point in the 
market cycle. All SMSFs within the sample, regardless of risk profile, adopted a 
more conservative investment approach following the financial crisis. Although not 
conclusive, these findings tend not to support Hypothesis 5, that there were no 
significant differences in the trading behaviour between funds based on fund risk 
profile. The evidence suggests that a weak relationship exists between SMSF risk (as 
measured by exposure to higher risk assets) and the investment approach adopted by 
the fund’s trustees. 
 
The results of the analyses suggest that, in general, SMSFs did not adopt the 
ideal investment strategies in the period prior to, during and following the 2008 
global financial crisis. SMSFs within the sample also exhibited a number of 
behavioural biases in their investment approach. SMSF trustees appeared unwilling 
to realise losses on their investments, an indication of the existence of loss aversion. 
SMSF trustees within the sample did not however conform to general expectations of 
constant relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion. Their 
expectations of consistently increasing investment returns prior to the crisis suggest 
the presence of representativeness, while their switch to a defensive investment 
strategy after the financial crisis potentially indicates the existence of the availability 
heuristic. The apparent inaction on the part of SMSF trustees as asset prices fell 
during the crisis further suggests the presence of cognitive dissonance. Faced with 
evidence to the contrary, trustees within the sample appeared reluctant to make 
significant changes to their investment holdings as asset prices fell, perhaps in the 
belief that any falls were only temporary. 
 
The study’s findings, which have shown that SMSF trustees within the 
sample did not in general make ideal investment decisions prior to, during and 
following the global financial crisis, coupled with the existence of a number of 
behavioural biases, has both theoretical and policy implications. These are outlined 
in section 8.3. 
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8.3 Theoretical and Policy Implications 
The theoretical implications of this study primarily relate to evidence that 
SMSF trustees exhibit a number of investment biases which have already been 
identified in other groups of investors. SMSF trustees appear to closely match 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) concept of loss aversion, apparently unwilling to 
realise losses in order to take advantage of lower asset prices during the global 
financial crisis. SMSF trustees also exhibit the existence of another of Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1972) behavioural traits, that of representativeness. Based on their trading 
behaviour prior to the financial crisis and during that period following the crisis, 
SMFS investors expected future investment outcomes to be the same as past 
investment outcomes. This behaviour also confirms the existence of both the 
availability heuristic and recency bias – SMSF trustees placed too much weight on 
the likelihood of recent events to re-occur in the future. 
 
With regards to risk aversion, the behaviour of SMSF trustees does not 
generally support notions of constant relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute 
risk aversion. SMSF trustees within the sample did not make consistent changes in 
investment risk exposure regardless of SMSF size, indicating the lack of constant 
relative risk aversion and decreasing relative risk aversion. This may be explained by 
the possibility of the existence (or otherwise) of significant investment assets held 
outside of superannuation. When taking all SMSF trustee investment assets into 
account, not just those held within superannuation, it may be that trustee investment 
choices conform to expectations of constant relative risk aversion and decreasing 
absolute risk aversion.  
 
The results of the study present a number of implications for policy relating 
to the SMSF sector and Australian retirement planning more broadly. Firstly, the 
finding that SMSF trustees tended not to exhibit desirable investment trading patterns 
over the periods prior to, during and following the financial crisis, suggests that 
many SMSF trustees have not developed or implemented appropriate investment 
strategies. Current legislation requires SMSF trustees to develop and review their 
investment strategy on an annual basis, though this requirement is largely a 
compliance matter and does not necessarily have a bearing on the resulting 
investment decisions of SMSF trustees.  
 
Secondly, the apparent lack of appropriate SMSF investment strategies raises 
the question of SMSF trustee education, training or support. It may be that the 
appointment of a SMSF trustee should include a mandatory education component, 
specifically focusing on the investment decision-making process. Current legislative 
and regulatory guidance tends to concentrate on assisting SMSF trustees in meeting 
their compliance related objectives, with the investment aspect of managing a SMSF 
left almost entirely to the trustee’s own discretion. It may be that a minimum 
education requirement for SMSF trustees, specifically in the area of investment 
decision-making, will lead to more appropriate investment decisions by SMSF 
trustees. The findings also suggest that the current regulatory emphasis on 
compliance related matters is insufficient and should be expanded to include 
oversight of the investment decision-making of SMSF trustees. Indeed, it may be 
appropriate that, contrary to the very name ‘self-managed’, trustees are required to 
enlist some form of professional assistance in the development and oversight of their 
investment strategy. This requirement could take a form similar to the existing audit 
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requirement for SMSFs, where an annual review and approval of the SMSF 
investment strategy and decision-making would be required. Such a requirement 
would increase the ongoing cost of managing a SMSF, although it would not be 
expected to be prohibitively expensive, particularly given the size of the average 
SMSF in terms of funds under management. 
 
This leads to a further policy implication regarding the ideal size of a SMSF. 
The findings in this study suggest that smaller SMSFs tend to be more likely to lack 
evidence of appropriate investment decision-making. This lends itself to the existing 
debate over the minimum size of a SMSF and whether there should be regulatory 
guidance regarding the allowable minimum fund size. Although this debate is usually 
framed in terms of the cost of running a SMSF, which can be significantly higher for 
smaller SMSFs on a percentage of funds under management basis, the potential for 
inappropriate investor behaviour by trustees of smaller funds may also need to be 
taken into account. It may be that SMSF size (in terms of assets under management) 
is an accurate proxy for trustee wealth, education and investing experience, which 
leads back to the issues raised earlier in terms of improving SMSF trustee investing 
knowledge or the requirement for professional assistance. In the absence of such 
initiatives, it may be that a minimum SMSF size is required in order to reduce the 
likelihood of the erosion of the retirement savings of those trustees responsible for 
managing relatively smaller SMSFs. 
 
The potential existence of a number of investor biases within the SMSF 
sample, coupled with a general lack of appropriate investor decision-making or 
investment strategies, suggests that greater emphasis should be placed on assisting 
SMSF trustees with the investment related aspects of their role. This may include 
minimum education requirements, professional assistance or stricter criteria for the 
appointment of an SMSF trustee. It also suggests that the current regulatory focus on 
compliance and administration related matters is too narrow and should be expanded 
to include the investment related matters of SMSF management. The next section of 
this chapter outlines a number of potential areas for future research, based on the 
findings of this study. 
 
8.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
Given the general conclusion in this study, that SMSFs within the sample 
tended to lack evidence of ideal investment decision-making, the most appropriate 
area for further research relating to SMSFs would be in the area of investor 
behaviour. In particular, a more detailed analysis of the individual investment 
transactions carried out by SMSF trustees would allow for confirmation (or 
otherwise) of the existence of a number of behavioural traits, such as regret aversion 
and loss avoidance. This would require information regarding the details of each 
investment transaction carried by SMSF trustees, including the gain or loss on any 
investment sale and the length of ownership. It would also be of interest to compare 
the investment decision-making of SMSF trustees with those of other Australian 
investors. This could be achieved through a comparison of the investment 
transactions of private or institutional investors with those of SMSF trustees, 
preferably across a period of time which allows for a meaningful comparison. This 
type of study would provide evidence of the relative capability of SMSF trustees to 
manage their retirement savings appropriately. 
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A further area of research would be to consider the investment decisions of 
SMSF trustees in relation to trustee demographics. While this study did segment 
SMSFs (and therefore each fund’s trustees) both by risk profile and funds under 
management, awareness of the demographic nature of fund trustees would provide 
insight into the background of the trustees of SMSFs and how this influences their 
investment decisions. Information such as household income, postcodes, age, 
education levels and occupation would allow for greater segmentation of fund 
trustees and may provide deeper insights into the ‘ideal’ SMSF trustee and how this 
relates to current policy settings regarding SMSF trustee education and experience. 
Given the relative paucity of research concerning the SMSF sector, any additional 
work which deepens our understanding of the sector and the behaviour of fund 
trustees is likely to be of value. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
This study set out to investigate whether or not SMSF trustees made the ideal 
investment decisions over the period 2005 to 2011, a period which included the 
volatile market and economic conditions associated with the 2008-09 global financial 
crisis. The evidence suggests that, with the benefit of hindsight, SMSF trustees did 
not make the correct investment decisions, given the set of financial and economic 
circumstances prevailing at the time. The findings of this study suggests that 
anecdotal evidence of out-performance by SMSFs when compared to alternative 
superannuation arrangements, may be more a result of good fortune than good 
planning.  
 
Given the importance of the SMSF sector within the context of the Australian 
retirement system, where more than a third of superannuation assets are managed 
through SMSFs, these findings suggest that under current legislative and regulatory 
arrangements, mismanagement of SMSF assets potentially poses a risk to member 
retirement assets and perhaps the broader retirement system. While wholesale 
changes to the SMSF sector are not necessarily required, a greater emphasis on 
SMSF trustee education, training or expert assistance may reduce the likelihood of 
SMSF trustees making inappropriate investment choices during the next period of 
severe financial stress. 
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